

BERKELEY BUDDHIST STUDIES SERIES 1

Published under the auspices of:
The Group in Buddhist Studies, and
The Center for South & Southeast Asian Studies
at the University of California, Berkeley; &
The Institute of Buddhist Studies


Printed in Korea

PRAJÑĀPĀRAMITĀ
AND RELATED SYSTEMS:

Studies in honor of Edward Conze

Edited by Lewis Lancaster

Associate Editor Luis O. Gómez



BERKELEY BUDDHIST STUDIES SERIES

1977

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Foreword *ix*
Abbreviations *xi*
List of Contributors *xv*

I Aṣṭasāhasrikā

The Position of the *Aṣṭasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā* in the Development of Early Mahāyāna
Andrew Rawlinson 3

Textgeschichtliche Beobachtungen zum 1. Kapitel der *Aṣṭasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā*
Lambert Schmithausen 35

II Vajracchedikā

The Concluding Verses of the Khotanese *Vajracchedikā*
R. E. Emmerick 83

"Thus Spoke the Blessed One . . ."
Yuichi Kajiyama 93

III Hṛdaya

Hsuän-tsang 玄奘 (602–664) and the *Heart Scripture*
Leon Hurvitz 103

The *Heart Sutra* in Japanese Context
Michael Pye 123

Secret of the *Heart Sutra*
Alex Wayman 135

Mahāprajñāpāramitā-sūtra
H. W. Bailey 153

A Study of a Khotanese *Prajñāpāramitā* Text: After the Work of Sir Harold Bailey
L. Lancaster 163

IV Suvikrāntavikrāmiparipṛcchā

2. Notes on Prajnāpāramitā texts: The *Suvikrāntavikrāmiparipṛcchā*
J. W. de Jong 187

V Prajñāpāramitāratnaguṇasaṃcayagāthā

The First Two Chapters of the *Prajñā-pāramitā-ratna-guṇa-saṃcaya-gāthā* (*Rgs*)
Akira Yuyama 203

VI The Bodhisattva Tradition

The Bodhisattva as Wonder-worker
Luis O. Gómez 221

The Bodhisattva Ideal in the *Aṣṭa* and *Pañca Prajñāpāramitā Sūtras*
Nancy R. Lethcoe 263

VII The Ekayāna Tradition

The *gotra*, *ekayāna* and *tathāgatagarbha* theories of the *Prajñāpāramitā* according to Dharmamitra and Abhayākaragupta
D. Seyfort Ruegg 283

Some Aspects of the Ekayāna
Arnold Kunst 313

VIII The Mahāyāna Developments

Notes on the Vision Quest in Early Mahāyāna
Stephan Beyer 329

Another Look at the Mādhyamika vs. Yogācāra Controversy Concerning Existence and Non-existence
Jay Hirabayashi and Shotaro Iida 341

Mahāyāna Literature in Sri Lanka: The Early Phase
Heinz Bechert 361

IX Related Systems

A Note on Evil and its Conquest from Indra to Buddha
W. B. Bollée 371

Jñānaśrīmitra's *Sarvajñasiddhiḥ*
Ernst Steinkellner 383

Mystery and Mysticism
Geoffrey Parrinder 395

Prajñā and *dṛṣṭi* in the Vaibhāṣika Abhidharma
Padmanabh S. Jaini 403

Plates

The Works of Edward Conze

Index

FOREWORD

It is difficult to say exactly when the project of a volume to honor Professor Conze was started and equally difficult to recount how it was finally translated into a reality. A few letters were exchanged and the idea began to gather momentum. Invitations were extended to some twenty scholars to send papers and from that point forward there was no doubt of the support. From scholars around the world came acceptances, many deciding to write something dealing directly with the *Prajñāpāramitā* or a related area. These scholars in their writing have all said, in some terms of their own, that they owe much to the work of Professor Conze and provide numerous examples of that assistance. The volume, thus assembled, unlike many such *festschrifts*, marks no particular birthday—no moment of retirement from teaching; it is only a statement of appreciation. It is a salute to Professor Conze from the moment the articles were being written, for each has been based in part on his work and relates to it in some significant way. It has been impossible for any of the contributors to write of the *Prajñāpāramitā* without reference to his mapping of the literature or his textual work. No scholar could ask for a greater tribute and few will ever have an honorary volume so dominated by their own research and ideas.

When the time came to choose a publisher, the Group in Buddhist Studies at the University of California at Berkeley and the Institute of Buddhist Studies, the graduate training school for the Buddhist Churches of America, had reached an agreement to start the *Berkeley Buddhist Studies Series*. It was decided that a volume honoring Professor Conze would be an excellent beginning for the *Series*, and so it has become the initial volume in what is hoped will be a major new publication venture. The funds for this have come from the Graduate Division of the University and the Institute of Buddhist Studies, with administrative assistance from the Center for South and Southeast Asian Studies. The preparation of the manuscript has been done with the help of Sheila Regan, William Powell, Carl Bielefeldt, K. Douglass, Kenneth Eastman, and Brian Galloway, as well as the secretarial staff of the Department of Oriental Languages.

For all who have contributed to this volume, there is the hope that it will be of value to scholars and interested readers. For Professor

Conze, we wish a long and active future in his continued scholarly work and express in this concrete way appreciation for all that he has accomplished through his various endeavors in Buddhist studies.

Lewis R. Lancaster,
Editor.

TABLE OF ABBREVIATIONS

AA	*Abhisamayālaṃkāra-Prajñāpāramitopadeśaśāstra,* ed. Stcherbatsky and Obermiller, Bibliotheca Buddica XXIII, 1929.
AAĀ	*Abhisamayālaṃkārālokā-Prajñāpāramitāvyākhyā,* Haribhadra, ed. U. Wogihara, Tokyo, 1932.
AbhS	*Abhidhammatthasaṅgaho* of Anuruddha, *Journal of the Pali Text Society*, 1884.
ACT	"An Analysis of the Aṣṭasāhasrikāprajñāpāramitāsūtra from the Chinese Translations," L. Lancaster, Ph. D. thesis, Wisconsin, 1968.
Acta Or.	*Acta Orientalia*
ADV	*Abhidharmadīpavibhāṣāprabhāvṛtti*, ed. P. S. Jaini, K. P. Jayaswal Research Institute, Patna 1959.
AiB	*Aitareya Brāhmaṇa*
AKośa	*Abhidharmakośa*, kośasthāna and kārikā.
AKB	*Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* of Vasubandhu, ed. P. Pradhan, K. P. Jayaswal Research Institute, Patna, 1967.
AM	*Asia Major,* Leipzig.
AN	*Aṅguttara Nikāya* (PTS ed.)
Aṣṭa	*Aṣṭasāhasrikāprajñāpāramitāsūtra*
Aṣṭa(M)	*Aṣṭasāhasrikāprajñāpāramitāsūtra*, ed. R. Mitra, Bibliotheca Indica, Calcutta, 1888.
Aṣṭadaśa	*Aṣṭādaśasāhasrikāprajñāpāramitāsūtra,* Gilgit Ms. according to E. Conze's ed., Serie Orientale Roma XXVI and XLVI, Rome, 1962 and 1974.
AV	*Atharva Veda*
BcāP	*Bodhicaryāvatāra-Pañjikā*, ed. L. de la Vallée Poussin, Bibliotheca Indica, Calcutta, 1902–1914.
BEFEO	*Bulletin de L'Ecole Francaise de L'Extreme Orient*
BG	*Bhagavad Gītā*
BhK	*Bhāvanākrama*
BhKI	*First Bhāvanākrama of Kamalaśīla*, ed. G. Tucci, *Minor Buddhist Texts*, Part II, Serie Orientale Roma, Vol. IX, Rome, 1958.
BhKII	(Second) *Bhāvanākrama*, Sde-dge edition, To. 3916.
BhKIII	*Third Bhāvanākrama*, ed. G. Tucci, *Minor Buddhist Texts*, Part III, Serie Orientale Roma, Vol. XLIII, Rome, 1971.
BHSD	*Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Dictionary,* F. Edgerton, Yale 1953.
BHSG	*Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Grammar,* F. Edgerton, Yale 1953.
BSOAS	*Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies*, London.
BuBhū	*Buddhabhūmisūtra,* ed. Kyoo Nishio, *The Buddhabhūmi-sūtra and the Buddhabhūmivyākhyāna of Çīlabhadra*, Part I, Nagoya, n.d.

BuBhūvyā	*Buddhabhūmivyākhyāna*, see *BuBhū.*
C.	Chinese translation
CCB	*The Central Conception of Buddhism and the Meaning of the Word "Dharma"*, Th. Stcherbatsky, RAS., London, 1923.
ChUp	*Chāndogya Upaniṣad*
Dhpd Com	*Dhammapada Commentary*, (PTS ed.)
Dhs	*Dhammasangaṇi*, Pali Text Society.
DhsA	*Dhammasangaṇi-Aṭṭhakathā* (*Aṭṭhasālinī*), ed. P. V. Bapat, Poon 1932.
DN	*Dīghanikāya* (PTS ed.)
Dśbhū	*Daśabhūmikasūtra*, ed. R. Kondo, Tokyo, 1936.
Gr. PP.	*Große-Prajñāpāramitāsūtra*, d. h. *Śata, Pañca,* u. *Astadaśa.*
Gv	*Gaṇḍavyūhasūtra*, ed. P.L. Vaidya, Darbhanga, 1960.
HJ	*Hibbert Journal*
HJAS	*Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies*, Cambridge.
H.O.S.	Harvard Oriental Series, Cambridge.
IAKB	*Index to the AKB* by Akira Hirakawa, Part I, Tokyo 1973.
IBK	*Indogaku Bukkyōgaku Kenkyu*, Tokyo.
IIJ	*Indo-Iranian Journal*, The Hague.
J	*Jñānaśrimitrabandhāvali*
JAOS	*Journal of the American Oriental Society*, New Haven.
JB	*Jaiminīya Brāhmaṇa*
JRAS	*Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*
KA	Kumārajīva's trans. of the *Aṣṭa*, T.227.
KB	*Kauṣītaki Brāhmaṇa*
L.	Lhasa edition of the Kanjur.
LA	Lokakṣema's trans. of the *Aṣṭa*, T.224.
Laṅk	*Laṅkāvatārasūtra*, ed. B.Nanjio, Otani University, Kyoto, 1956.
Lin	*Lin-chi-lu*, Yanagida Seizan, *Rinzai-roku*, Kyoto, 1961.
M	*Mañjuśrinairatmyāvatārasūtra*
MA	*Majjhimanikāyaṭṭhakathā*, Pali Text Society.
Māvṭ	*Madhyāntavibhāgaṭīkā*, ed. S. Yamaguchi, Nagoya, 1934.
MDPL	*Materials for a Dictionary of the Prajñāpāramitā Literature*, E. Conze, Tokyo.
MG	*Manchester Guardian*
MHK-YTV	*Madhyamakahṛdayakārikā*: *Yogācāratattvaviniścaya*
MK	*Madhyamaka-Kārikā*
MN	*Majjhima-Nikāya* (PTS ed.)
MSA	*Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra*, ed. S. Lévi, Paris, 1907.
MSABh	*Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra-Bhāṣya*, ed. S. Lévi, Paris, 1907.
Mv	*Mahāvastu*, ed. E.Senart, *Le Mahāvastu*, 3 vols,. Paris, 1882–1897.

MW	*The Middle Way*
OA	*Oriental Art*
Pañca	*Pañcaviṁśatisāhasrikāprajñāpāramitāsūtra*
Pañca(D)	*Pancaviṁśatisāhasrikāprajñāpāramitāsūtra*, ed. N. Dutt, Calcutta, 1934.
Pañca(G)	Gilgit ms., Facsimile-Edition in *Śatapitaka* v. 10(3).
Pras	*Prasannapadā*, ed. L. de la Vallee Poussin, Bibliotheca Buddhica, St. Petersburg, 1912.
Ps	*Paṭisambhidāmagga* (PTS ed.)
PTS	Pāli Text Society
PVB	*Pancaviṁśa Brāhmaṇa*
Rgs	*Ratnaguṇasaṁcayagāthā*
RGV	*Ratnagotravibhāga*
RGV(J)	*Ratnagotravibhāga*, ed. E. H. Johnston, Patna, 1950.
RP	*Rāṣṭrapālaparipṛccha*
RP(E)	*The Questions of Rāstrapāla*, tr. J. Ensink, Zwolle (Holland), 1952
RP(F)	*Rāṣṭrapālaparipṛcchā*, ed. L. Finot (pagination given in Vaidya's ed.).
RP(V)	*Rāṣṭrapālaparipṛcchā*, ed. P.L. Vaidya, in *Mahāyānasūtrasaṃgraha*, Pt. I, Buddhist Sanskrit Texts, vol. 17 (Darbhanga, 1961), pp. 120–64.
RV	*Ṛg Veda*
S.	Sanskrit text.
SAKV	*Sphuṭārthā-Abhidharma-kośa-Vyākhyā* of Yaśomitra, ed. U. Woghihara, Tokyo, 1932–46.
Śata	*Śatasāhasrikāprajñāpāramitāsūtra*
ŚB	*Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa*
Śgs	*Śūraṁgamasamādhisūtra*, tr. E. Lamotte, *Melanges Chinois et Bouddhique*, XIII, Brussels, 1965.
Siddhi	*Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi*: *la siddhi de Hiuan-tsang*, tr. L. de la Vallée-Poussin, 2 vols. & Indices, Paris, 1928–29, 1948.
Sin	die chinesischen Übersetzungen der Aṣta.
SLS	"Studies in the Lotus Sutra (*Saddharmapuṇḍarīka*)," A. Rawlinson, Ph.D. thesis, Lancaster University, 1972 (2 vols.).
SN	*Saṁyutta-Nikāya* (PTS ed.)
SNS	*Saṁdhinirmocanasūtra*
SNS(L)	*Saṁdhinirmocanasūtra*, Tib. text ed. & tr. E. Lamotte, Louvain, 1935.
SP	*Saddharmapuṇḍarīkasūtra*
SP(K)	The *Saddharmapuṇḍarīka* (The Lotus of the Good Law), tr. H. Kern, Sacred Books of the East, vol. 21, Oxford, 1884.

SP(KN)	*Saddharmapuṇḍarīkasūtra*, ed. H. Kern & B. Nanjio, Bibliotheca Buddhica, 10, St. Petersburg, 1912.
SP(WT)	*Saddharmapuṇḍarīkasūtram*, ed. U. Wogihara & C. Tsuchida, Tokyo, 1933–35.
Sr	*Samādhirājasūtra*
Sr(D)	*Samādhirājasūtra*, ed. N. Dutt, Gilgit Manuscripts, vol. II, parts i–iii, Calcutta, 1941–54.
Sr(R)	*Three Chapters from the Samādhirājasūtra*, K. Regamey, Warsaw, 1938.
Sr(V)	*Samādhirājasūtra*, P. L. Vaidya, Buddhist Sanskrit Texts, vol. 2, Darbhanga, 1961.
Su	*Suvikrāntavikrāmiparipṛcchāprajñāpāramitāsūtra*, ed. R. Hikata, Fukuoka, 1958.
Sukh	*Sukhāvatī-vyūha*, F. Max Mueller & B. Nanjio, Anecdota Oxoniensis, Aryan Series, vol. 1, pt. II, Amsterdam, 1972(repr.).
Suv	*Suvarṇabhāsottamasūtra*
Suv(B)	*Suvarṇaprabhāsasūtra*, ed. S. Bagchi, Buddhist Sanskrit Texts, vol. 8, Darbhanga, 1967.
Suv(N)	*Suvarṇabhasotamasūtra*, ed. J. Nobel, Leipzig, 1937.
T.	Taisho Shinshu Daizōkyo 大正新修大藏經, Tokyo.
Théorie	*La théorie du tathāgatagarbha et du gotra*, D. Seyfort Ruegg, Publications de l'École française d'Extrême-Orient, vol. LXX, Paris, 1969.
Ti	Tibetan translation.
Traité	*Traité de la grande vertu de sagesse de Nāgārjuna*, E. Lamotte, 3 vols., Bibliothèque du Muséon, 18, Louvain, 1944–49, and Publications de l'Institut Orientaliste de Louvain, 2, Louvain, 1970.
T.T.	The Tibetan Tripitaka, Peking Edition, Tokyo-Kyoko, 1961.
TYBS	*Thirty Years of Buddhist Studies*, E. Conze, Oxford, 1967.
V	*Khotanese Vajracchedikā*
Vin	*The Vinaya Piṭakaṃ*, ed. H. Oldenberg, London & Edinburgh, 1880.
Vism	*Visuddhimagga*, Harvard Oriental Series, vol. 41, Cambridge, 1950.
Vkn	*Vimalakīrtinirdeśa*, tr. E. Lamotte, Bibliothèque du Muséon, 51, Louvain, 1962.
Vṛtti	*Abhisamayālaṃkāravṛtti*, Ārya Vimuktisena, ed. C. Pensa, Serie Orientale Roma, vol. XXXVII, Rome, 1967.
WZKS	*Wiener Zeitschrift fur die Kunde Sud-und Ostasiens*
Zambasta	*Book of Zambasta: a Khotanese poem on Buddhism,* London Oriental Series 21, 1968.

LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS

Sir H. W. Bailey
Queen's College
Cambridge CB3 9ET
England

Heinz Bechert
Seminar für Indologie und Buddhismskunde
D-34 Gottingen
Haindbundstrasse 21
Federal German Republic

Stephan Beyer
Department of South Asian Studies
1242 Van Hise Hall, 1220 Linden Drive
University of Wisconsin
Madison, Wisconsin 53706

W. B. Bollée
D-5025 St Augustine 2
Lilienthalstrasse 17
Federal German Republic

R. E. Emmerick
Seminar für Kultur und Geschichte des Vorderen Orients
Universität Hamburg
2 Hamburg 13
Rothenbaumchaussee 36
Federal German Republic

Luis O. Gómez
Program on Studies in Religion
1053 LSA Building
500 South State Street
Ann Arbor, Michigan 48109

Jay Hirabayashi
Department of Religious Studies
University of British Columbia
2075 Westbrook Place
Vancouver, B. C., Canada V6T IW5

Leon Hurvitz
Department of Asian Studies
University of British Columbia
2075 Westbrook Place
Vancouver, B. C., Canada V6T IW5

Shotaro Iida
Department of Religious Studies
University of British Columbia
2075 Westbrook Place
Vancouver, B. C., Canada V6T IW5

P. S. Jaini
Department of South and Southeast Asian Studies
University of California
Berkeley, Ca. 94720

J. W. de Jong
Australian National University
Box. 4 P. O.
Canberra ACT 2600, Australia

Yuichi Kajiyama
Faculty of Letters
Kyoto University
Kyoto, Japan

Arnold Kunst
85 York Mansions
Prince of Wales Drive
London SW11 4BN

Lewis Lancaster
Department of Oriental Languages
University of California
Berkeley, Ca. 94720

Nancy Lethcoe
Pearson College
R. R. #1 Victoria, B. C.
Canada V8X 3W9

E. G. Parrinder
University of London
King's College
Strand, London W. C. 2
England

Michael Pye
Department of Theology and Religious Studies
University of Leeds
Leeds, England LS2 9JT

Andrew Rawlinson
Department of Religious Studies
Furness College, University of Lancaster
Bailrigg, Lancaster, England

D. Seyfort Ruegg
Department of Far Eastern Languages
406 Thomson Hall
University of Washington
Seattle, Wash. 98106

Lambert Schmithausen
Seminar für Kultur und Geschichte Indiens
Universität Hamburg
2 Hamburg 13,
Rothenbaumchaussee 62
Federal German Republic

E. Steinkellner
A-1030 Vienna
Reisnerstrasse 6/14
Austria

Alex Wayman
Department of Middle Eastern Languages and Cultures
607 Kent Hall
Columbia University
New York, N. Y. 10027

Akira Yuyama
Reiyukai Library
1-7-8 Azabudai Minato-ku
Tokyo 106 Japan

I

Aṣṭasāhasrikāprajñāpāramitā

Textgeschichtliche Beobachtungen zum 1. Kapitel der *Aṣṭasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā*

Lambert Schmithausen (Hamburg)

1.

Die ***Aṣṭasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā*** (*Aṣṭa*) und ihre metrische Entsprechung, die ***Ratnaguṇasaṃcayagāthā*** (*Rgs*), um deren philologische und vor allem inhaltliche Erschließung sich der Jubilar in besonderem Maße verdient gemacht hat, gelten allgemein als die ältesten erhaltenen Dokumente des Mahāyāna-Buddhismus. Ob die Prosa- oder die Versversion als älter zu gelten hat, ist bisher m. W. nicht entschieden[2]. Das Problem wird dadurch erheblich kompliziert, daß offensichtlich beide Versionen im Laufe des Überlieferungsprozesses nachträglicher Überarbeitung ausgesetzt gewesen sind[3]. Dies gilt, wie vor allem CONZE, HIKATA und LANCASTER gezeigt haben, ganz besonders für die Prosa-Version, sc. die *Aṣṭa*.

CONZE expliziert oder verwendet—insbesondere in seinem Aufsatz "The Composition of the ***Aṣṭasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā***"[4]—zur Beurteilung der Echtheit des Textes der *Aṣṭa* und zur Aussonderung späterer Zusätze sowohl äußere als auch innere Kriterien. Als äußere Kriterien nennt er den Vergleich mit der *Rgs* und den chinesischen[5] Übersetzungen, von denen die um das Jahr 180 n. Chr.[6] angefertigte Version *Lokakṣemas (T. 224) die älteste ist. Weiterhin benutzt CONZE gelegentlich als Vergleichsmaterial die parallelen Partien der Großen ***Prajñāpāramitāsūtras*** (*Gr. PP.*), d. h. der *Aṣṭādaśa,* der *Pañca* und der *Śata.* Im Vordergrund stehen jedoch bei CONZE die inneren Kriterien, d. h. Divergenzen und Disharmonien in der Struktur (vor allem im Argumentationsablauf), in der Terminologie und im Lehrgehalt. Mit Hilfe insbesondere dieser inneren Kriterien und des Vergleiches mit der *Rgs* weist CONZE in dem o. g. Aufsatz nach, daß vor allem gegen Ende der *Aṣṭa* eine Reihe längerer heterogener Zusätze in den Text eingedrungen ist, u. a. die Kapitel 29–31 und einige den Buddha Akṣobhya erwähnende Stücke in den Kapiteln 19, 27 und 28[7]. HIKATA[8] kommt zu einem ähnlichen Ergebnis. LANCASTER[9] hat auf Anre-

gung von CONZE den überlieferten Sanskrit-Text der *Aṣṭa* systematisch mit allen erhaltenen chinesischen Übersetzungen verglichen.[10] Die älteste dieser Übersetzungen ist, wie gesagt, die des *Lokakṣema (T. 224). Eng verwandt mit T. 224 ist die Version des *Dharmapriya (?) (T. 226). Alt ist ferner die zwischen 222 und 229 n. Chr. angefertigte Übersetzung des Chih Ch'ien (T. 225), doch scheint das hier relevante 1. Kapitel unecht zu sein. T. 227 (Kumārajīva) und T. 220(5) (Hsüan-tsang) repräsentieren eine mittlere Stufe der Textentwicklung, während T. 220(4) (Hsüan-tsang) und T. 228 (Dānapāla) spätere, dem überlieferten Sanskrit-Text näherstehende Textformen darstellen. LANCASTER konnte aufgrund des von ihm vorgenommenen Vergleiches eine beträchtliche Anzahl von Stellen aus nahezu allen Kapiteln der *Aṣṭa* als sekundäre Elemente entlarven und überdies zeigen, daß bestimmte Termini und Lehrbegriffe mehrheitlich oder gar ausschließlich in solchen sekundären Textstellen auftreten und somit erst in späteren Entwicklungsstufen der *Prajñāpāramitā*-Tradition aufgekommen bzw. relevant geworden sind. CONZEs im wesentlichen auf inneren Kriterien und dem Vergleich mit der *Rgs* basierende textgeschichtliche Einsichten bzw. Hypothesen werden, obwohl zu einem erheblichen Teil durchaus einleuchtend, durch LANCASTERs Analyse der chinesischen Versionen zum überwiegenden Teil nicht verifiziert,[11] müssen somit durchweg auf eine Phase der Textgeschichte der *Aṣṭa*, die vor die auf uns gekommenen Textzeugnisse zurückreicht, bezogen werden.

CONZE betont in dem o. g. Aufsatz[12], daß auch dieser von ihm erschlossene—im Prinzip[13] HIKATAs "Ur-Text der *Prajñāpāramitā-Sūtras*" entsprechende—alte Kern der *Aṣṭa* das Ergebnis eines Wachstumsprozesses sein dürfte, nimmt aber von einer Rekonstruktion dieser frühesten Phase der Textgeschichte der *Aṣṭa* Abstand, nicht nur wegen der Schwierigkeit und Mühseligkeit dieses Unterfangens, sondern offenbar auch aus einer gewissen Skepsis heraus, die der Verteidiger lebendiger Spiritualität nicht ohne Recht gegenüber dem sich nicht selten verabsolutierenden destruktiven Moment einer bis ins letzte vorangetriebenen textgeschichtlichen Analyse empfindet. Andererseits ist aber doch die—gewiß zunächst destruktiv vorgehende—textgeschichtliche Analyse immer noch die zuverlässigste Basis für den anschließend vorzunehmenden umgekehrten, positiven Arbeitsgang der Rekonstruktion der—oft allmählichen—Genesis und der Geschichte des betreffenden Textes, durch die allein die Entwicklung der in diesem Text zum Ausdruck gebrachten Ideen in wissenschaftlich gesicherter Form nachvollzogen

und ein adäquates, die Inkohärenzen des erstarrten Endproduktes in der Dynamik des lebendigen Wachstumsprozesses auflösendes Verständnis des Textes erreicht wird.

Auch CONZE selbst verzichtet keineswegs gänzlich auf Aussagen über die Frühstufe der Textgeschichte der *Aṣṭa*. In seinem Aufsatz "The Development of *Prajñāpāramitā* Thought"[14] betrachtet er die Kapitel 3–28 der *Rgs* und die ihnen entsprechenden Teile der *Aṣṭa* als eine *zweite* Entwicklungsstufe,[15] der gegenüber die beiden ersten Kapitel der *Rgs*—und die (von CONZE in diesem Zusammenhang nicht eingeordneten) beiden ersten Kapitel der *Aṣṭa*?—den ursprünglichen Kern der *Prajñāpāramitā* bilden sollen[16]. CONZE stützt sich bei diesem Ansatz eines auf die beiden ersten Kapitel beschränkten ursprünglichen Kernes der *Prajñāpāramitā* ausschließlich auf inhaltliche, den Lehrgehalt betreffende Gesichtspunkte. Der japanische Gelehrte KAJIYOSHI scheint noch einen Schritt weiter gegangen zu sein und die Ur-*Prajñāpāramitā* auf das 1. Kapitel der *Aṣṭa* reduziert zu haben[17].

Wenngleich zuzugestehen ist, daß es sich hier nur um noch keineswegs ausreichend abgesicherte Hypothesen handelt, so scheinen mir doch die von HIKATA gegen KAJIYOSHIs Auffassung vorgebrachten Argumente[18] nicht zwingend zu sein. Das von HIKATA als erstes Argument ins Feld geführte Fehlen eines Schlußabschnittes am Ende von Kapitel 1 der *Aṣṭa* könnte—wie HIKATA selbst andeutet—darin begründet sein, daß ein solcher bei der Angliederung weiteren Materials weggelassen oder verschleppt (und eventuell auch noch modifiziert) wurde[19]. Auch braucht dieser Schlußabschnitt m. E. nicht notwendig die Form einer *parīndanā* gehabt zu haben.

Auch HIKATAs zweites Argument, die erste Verkündigung der *Prajñāpāramitā* als einer völlig neuen Lehre müsse in einer klareren und ausführlicheren Gestalt erfolgt sein als der, welche das 1. Kapitel der *Aṣṭa* bietet, und müsse daher von Anfang an die zusätzlich erläuternden Kapitel 2 ff. enthalten haben, scheint mir nicht schlüssig. Gewiß ist das 1. Kapitel in seiner überlieferten Gestalt, wie sich noch zeigen wird, voll von Inkohärenzen. Aber diese lösen sich durch die Hinzufügung weiterer, keinesfalls von Inkohärenzen freier Kapitel mitnichten auf. Auch ist m. E. kaum anzunehmen, daß eine neue Lehre wie die *Prajñāpāramitā ab initio* in einer auch nur annähernd so voluminösen Gestalt, wie sie die *Aṣṭa* darstellt, formuliert worden sei. Es dünkt mir viel wahrscheinlicher, daß dies zunächst in relativ kurzen Textstücken nach Art der Sūtras des alten Hīnayāna-Kanons geschah, und daß diese mutmaßlichen kurzen

Urelemente der *Prajñāpāramitā*—die nichts mit den späteren "summaries" (***Vajracchedikā, Prajñāpāramitāhṛdayasūtra,*** etc.) zu tun haben—im nachhinein kompiliert, erweitert und ergänzt und erst durch diesen Prozeß zu einem umfangreichen Werk nach Art der von HIKATA erschlossenen Ur-*Prajñāpāramitā* wurden.

Es gilt festzustellen, ob sich diese Vermutung durch eine genaue textgeschichtliche Analyse der *Aṣṭa* bestätigen läßt, und ggf. zu rekonstruieren, in welcher Form sich dieser Prozeß abgespielt hat. Ist die vermutete Kompilation im wesentlichen, d. h. abgesehen von einigen letztlich nicht ins Gewicht fallenden späteren Zutaten, in éinem Akt erfolgt—so daß die Ur-*Prajñāpāramitā*, etwa wie HIKATA meint, *ab initio* die Kapitel 1–28 (o. ä.) umfaßt hätte—? Oder ist der Wachstumsprozeß komplizierter verlaufen, etwa in der Form, daß zunächst ein relativ kleiner Nukleus—etwa (mit KAJIYOSHI) Kap. 1 oder (mit CONZE) Kap. 1–2—entstand und sich dann im Laufe der Zeit weiteres Material daran anlagerte? In beiden Fällen wäre ferner zu untersuchen, ob die kompilierten Teile bzw. der Nukleus und die einzelnen Akkretionen jeweils in sich homogen oder ihrerseits wiederum aus heterogenen Elementen zusammengesetzt—also kompiliert—sind.

Die vorliegende Untersuchung soll nur eine bescheidene Vorarbeit zur Klärung dieser schwierigen Fragen sein. Die Tatsache, daß das 2. Kapitel der *Aṣṭa* mit einem Preis der *Prajñāpāramitā* endet und darauf (zu Anfang des 3. Kapitels) ein *śravaṇaphala* folgt, also ein literarisches Element, das gewöhnlich am Ende—allenfalls am Anfang, aber doch kaum in der Mitte—eines Textes auftritt, scheint mir die von CONZE vermutete textgeschichtliche Sonderstellung der beiden ersten Kapitel zu stützen, wobei jedoch einkalkuliert werden muß, daß ein—vermutlich kleinerer—Teil des eher 'propagandistischen' Materials der folgenden Kapitel von Anfang an als Schlußteil dieses hypothetischen Nukleus fungiert haben könnte. Eine genaue textgeschichtliche Analyse der beiden ersten Kapitel der *Aṣṭa* ist von daher eine besonders vordringliche Aufgabe, zumal diese Kapitel schon bei oberflächlicher Lektüre weder zusammen noch jeweils in sich allein einen homogenen Eindruck machen; insbesondere besteht, dem äußerlichen Phänomen des Wechsels der Gesprächspartner entsprechend, offenbar keine notwendige strukturelle Verbindung zwischen Kapitel 1 und Kapitel 2. Der vorliegende Aufsatz kann leider, aufgrund zeitlicher und räumlicher Beschränkungen, nur einen relativ kleinen Teil der genannten Aufgabe in Angriff nehmen und führt somit nur zu vorläufigen Feststellungen über die Struktur

einzelner Teile des 1. Kapitels, insbesondere der Anfangsstücke (*Aṣṭa* [ed. VAIDYA] p. 1,4–3,25), nicht aber zu einer abschließenden textgeschichtlichen Analyse des Gesamtkomplexes der Kapitel 1 und 2.

Was die Untersuchungsmethode betrifft, so bildet der Versuch einer genauen und unvoreingenommenen Analyse der behandelten Textstücke den Ausgangspunkt, und es wird zunächst versucht, jedes Textstück nach Möglichkeit aus sich selbst zu interpretieren. Inkohärenzen werden als textgeschichtlich signifikant gewertet und können m. E. nicht mit dem beliebten Verweis auf die Unlogik der *Prajñāpāramitā* abgetan werden. Inkohärenzen und beabsichtigte Paradoxien sind doch zwei gänzlich verschiedene Phänomene! Ein zweiter Schritt ist die Heranziehung von offenkundigem Parallelmaterial, welches sich mehrfach innerhalb des 1. Kapitels der *Aṣṭa* findet. Darüber hinaus ist es notwendig, auch die äußeren Kriterien gebührend zu berücksichtigen. Das Zeugnis der *Rgs* ist immer beachtenswert, zugleich aber auch kritisch zu bewerten, da die relative Chronologie und das textgeschichtliche Verhältnis von *Aṣṭa* und *Rgs* bisher noch nicht endgültig geklärt sind. Unerläßlich ist die ständige Kontrolle der uns allein überlieferten späten Version des Sanskrit-Textes der *Aṣṭa* an Hand der größtenteils erheblich älteren chinesischen Übersetzungen, da—wie LANCASTER gezeigt hat[20]—der Text der *Aṣṭa* auch nach Abschluß des eigentlichen Kompilationsvorgangs im Laufe der vielen Jahrhunderte seiner Überlieferung im Detail erhebliche Modifikationen erfahren hat. Im einzelnen ist allerdings der Wortlaut vor allem der ältesten chinesischen Übersetzungen oft nicht leicht zu beurteilen, und nicht selten ist—zum mindesten für mich—eine Entscheidung, ob ein abweichendes Original zugrundeliegt oder es sich lediglich um eine ungenaue oder irrtümliche Wiedergabe handelt, unmöglich. Angesichts dieses gravierenden Unsicherheitsfaktors gewinnen die verschiedenen Versionen der Großen *Prajñāpāramitā*, die wahrscheinlich im ersten oder allenfalls zu Anfang des zweiten nachchr. Jh. von der damaligen Fassung der *Aṣṭa* (d. h. HIKATAs 'Urtext der *Prajñāpāramitā-Sūtras*') abzweigen und den Textbestand der *Aṣṭa*—oft eingeschoben in umfangreiche erweiternde oder auch kommentarartige Zusätze—weitgehend wörtlich enthalten, für die Herstellung einer älteren Textgestalt der *Aṣṭa* erheblich an Bedeutung. Im Laufe meiner Untersuchungen hat sich ergeben, daß die Lesungen der *Gr.PP.*, vor allem die der aus dem 6. oder 7. Jh. stammenden Gilgit-Handschrift der *Pañca* (*Pañca*(*G*)) und die der *Śata* (welche meist miteinander übereinstimmen), sehr häufig mit dem Text der älteren oder mittleren chine-

sischen Übersetzungen konform gehen und für die Rekonstruktion des diesen zugrundeliegenden älteren Sanskrit-Textes unentbehrlich sind.

2.

Den Ausgangspunkt für die vorliegende textgeschichtliche Untersuchung bildet wie gesagt der Anfang des 1. Kapitels der *Aṣṭa* (p. 1,3–3,25). Ich gebe zunächst eine schematische Inhaltsanalyse dieses Textstückes[21]:

A. Nidāna. 1,4–8

B. Der Erhabene fordert Subhūti auf, sich zur Prajñāpāramitā der Bodhisattvas zu äußern. 2,1–3

C. a. Śāriputra fragt sich, ob Subhūti seine Belehrung kraft eigener Einsicht oder unter dem Einfluß des Buddha (*buddhānubhāvena*) erteilen wird. 2,4–6

b. Subhūti erklärt Śāriputra, daß alles, was die Hörer (*śrāvaka*) des Buddha lehren, auf den Buddha zurückgeht, da sie durch die Verwirklichung seiner Lehre die *dharmatā*—das wahre Wesen von allem—geschaut haben, und somit alles, was sie lehren, im Einklang mit dieser *dharmatā* steht. 2,7–3,2

D. Subhūti kommt [unter dem Einfluß des Buddha (*buddhānubhāvena*)][22] der Aufforderung des Erhabenen, sich zur Prajñāpāramitā der Bodhisattvas zu äußern, nach: 3,3–15

a. (Eine wirkliche Entität 'Bodhisattva' ist nicht feststellbar:) 3,5–7

1.[23] Was die an mich—Subhūti—ergangene Aufforderung des Erhabenen (s. Abschnitt B!) angeht,

2. so wird darin ständig das Wort 'Bodhisattva' verwendet[24] (*bodhisattvo bodhisattva iti* [*yad idam*][25] *Bhagavann ucyate*);

3. Welche wirkliche Entität ist mit dem Wort 'Bodhisattva' angesprochen (*katamasyaitad . . . dharmasyādhivacanaṃ yaduta bodhisattva iti*)?

4. Ich kann keine wirkliche Entität 'Bodhisattva' feststellen (*nāhaṃ . . . taṃ dharmaṃ samanupaśyāmi yaduta bodhisattva iti*).

b.[26] Auch eine (wirkliche Entität) 'Prajñāpāramitā'

kann ich nicht feststellen (*tam apy ahaṃ . . . dharmaṃ na samanupaśyāmi yaduta prajñāpāramitā nāma*). 3,7

c. 1. Wenn ich—Subhūti—aber weder einen Bodhisattva feststellen kann (*so 'ham . . . bodhisattvam* [*vā bodhisattvadharmaṃ vā*][27] *avindan*[28] *anupalabhamāno*[29] *'samanupaśyan*[30]) 3,7 f.

2.[31] noch eine Prajñāpāramitā (*prajñāpāramitām apy avindan*[28] *anupalabhamāno*[32] *'samanupasyan*[33]), 3,8 f.

3. welchen Bodhisattva soll ich dann in welcher Prajñāpāramitā unterweisen (*katamaṃ bodhisattvaṃ katamasyāṃ*[34] *prajñāpāramitāyām avavadiṣyāmy anuśāsiṣyāmi*)? 3,9 f.

d. Wenn ein Bodhisattva angesichts dieser Belehrung nicht verzagt und erschrickt (*saced evam bhāṣyamāṇe deśyamāne upadiśyamāne bodhisattvasya*[35] *cittaṃ*[36] *nāvalīyate na saṃlīyate* [*na viṣīdati na viṣādam āpadyayate*][37] *nāsya vipṛṣṭhībhavati*[38] *mānasaṃ* [*na bhagnapṛṣṭhībhavati*][37] *nottrasyati na saṃtrasyati na saṃtrāsam āpadyate*), 3,10–12

e. dann ist er für die eben darin bestehende Unterweisung in der Prajñāpāramitā geeignet. 3,13–15

E. a. Der die Prajñāpāramitā praktizierende Bodhisattva muß in der Weise üben, daß er auch durch jenen 'Erleuchtungsgedanken' keiner Einbildung verfällt (. . . *evaṃ śikṣitavyaṃ yathāsau śikṣamāṇas tenāpi bodhicittena na manyeta*). 3,16 f.

b. Begründung: 3, 17 f.

1. Jener 'Gedanke' ist nicht (wirklich) ein Gedanke (*tathā hi tac cittam acittam*);

2.[39] Die (wahre) Natur des 'Gedankens' ist strahlend rein (*prakṛtiś cittasya prabhāsvarā*).

c. Frage Śāriputras, ob dieses *citta*, das nicht (wirklich) ein *citta* ist, tatsächlich existiere, und Subhūtis Nachweis der Unsinnigkeit dieser Frage. 3,19–25

d.[40] Das Nicht-*citta*-Sein (*acittatā*) (des *citta*) ist unwandelbar (*avikāra*) und frei von unangemessener reflektiver Unruhe (*avikalpa*). 3,25–27

e.[41] Śāriputra lobt Subhūti: Er habe gesprochen, wie man es von ihm als einem, den der Erhabene zum Vornehmsten der in der Streit- oder Leidenschaftslosigkeit Verharrenden (*araṇāvihārin*) erklärt hat (cf. ***Aṅguttaranikāya*** I, p. 24), erwarten kann. 3,28 f.

F. a.[41] Und (eben) deshalb ist der Bodhisattva als einer, der nicht mehr rückfällig werden kann, zu betrachten (*ataś ca*[42] *bodhisattvo mahāsattvo 'vivartanyīyo*[43] [*'nuttarāyāḥ samyaksambodher*][44] *upaparīkṣitavyaḥ*), 3,29 f.

b. und als der Prajñāpāramitā nicht ermangelnd aufzufassen (*avirahitaś ca bodhisattvo*[45] *mahāsattvaḥ*[45] *prajñāpāramitāyā veditavyaḥ*). 3,30 f.

G. Gleichgültig, ob sich einer in der spirituellen Stufe eines Śrāvaka, Pratyekabuddha, Bodhisattva [oder Buddha][46] üben möchte: auf jeden Fall muß er die Prajñāpāramitā hören, erfassen, behalten, etc. 3,31–4, 12

H. Subhūti spricht zum Erhabenen: 4,13–25

a.[47] Ich—Subhūti—kann nicht einmal diesen Namen 'Bodhisattva' feststellen (*yo 'ham* . . . ([48]*etad eva bodhisattvanāmadheyaṃ*[48]) *na* ([49]*vedmi nopalabhe na samanupaśyāmi*[49])); 4,13 f.

b.[50] auch eine Prajñāpāramitā kann ich nicht feststellen (*prajñāpāramitām api na vedmi*[51] *nopalabhe na samanupaśyāmi*). 4,14 f.

c. 1.[52] Wenn ich aber somit weder diesen Namen 'Bodhisattva' feststellen kann (*so 'ham* ([53]*etad eva bodhisattvanāmadheyam*[53]) *avindan* etc.) 4,15

2.[54] noch auch eine Prajñāpāramitā (*prajñāpāramitām apy avindan* etc.), 4,16

3. welchen Bodhisattva soll ich dann in welcher Prajñāpāramitā unterweisen (*katamaṃ bodhisattvaṃ katamasyāṃ*[55] *prajñāpāramitāyām avavadiṣyāmy anuśāsiṣyāmi*)? 4,16 f.

d. Es würde mich reuen, wenn ich, ohne eine wirkliche Entität (*vastu*) feststellen zu können, mit dem bloßen Namen 'Bodhisattva' herumhantierte[55A] (*nāmadheyamātreṇāyavyayaṃ kuryāṃ yaduta bodhisattva iti*[56]). 4,17–19

e. Überdies kennt auch dieser Name selbst aufgrund seiner Nichtexistenz (*avidyamānatvena*) weder

Bestand noch Verharren[57] (*tad api nāmadheyaṃ na sthitaṃ* [*nāsthitaṃ*][58] *na viṣṭhitaṃ* [*nāviṣṭhitaṃ*][59]). 4,19–21

f. Wenn ein Bodhisattva angesichts dieser Belehrung nicht verzagt oder erschrickt [und sie mit vollem Herzen bejaht] (*saced bodhisattvasya . . . evaṃ gambhīrāyāṃ*[60] *prajñāpāramitāyāṃ bhāṣyamāṇāyāṃ* etc. *cittaṃ nāvalīyate* etc. (wie D.d), [*adhimucyate 'dhyāśayena*][61]), 4,21–24

g.[62] dann ist er als der Prajñāpāramitā nicht ermangelnd zu betrachten (*avirahito bodhisattvo mahāsattvaḥ prajñāpāramitāyā veditavyaḥ*), 4,24 f.

h. (als) einer, der sich auf der Bodhisattva-Stufe, auf der es keinen Rückfall mehr gibt, befindet (*sthito 'vivartanīyāyāṃ bodhisattvabhūmau*), 4,25

i.[63] (als) sich wohl befindend in der Weise des Sich-nichtbefindens (= Nicht-auf-irgendetwas-Bestimmtes-fixiert-Seins) (*susthito 'sthānayogena*). 4,25

3.

Von den einzelnen Abschnitten der obigen Inhaltsanalyse brauchen *A* und *B* hier nicht weiter diskutiert zu werden. Der Abschnitt *C* enthält einen geschickt eingegliederten und m. E. höchst bemerkenswerten, überaus nüchternen Versuch eines Nachweises der Authentizität von Mahāyānasūtren, wobei dieser Nachweis davon ausgeht, daß, wie es zum mindesten in den beiden ersten Kapiteln der *Aṣṭa* weitgehend der Fall ist, einer der Jünger des Erhabenen als Verkünder der neuen Lehren fungiert, und nicht, wie in den meisten späteren Sūtren und auch in manchen späteren Kapiteln der *Aṣṭa*, der Erhabene selbst, welchem die neuen Lehren direkt in den Mund zu legen man sich vielleicht zunächst noch gescheut hat. Der gleiche Versuch eines Authentizitätsnachweises findet sich übrigens—in weniger ausführlicher Gestalt—auch im 2. Kapitel der *Aṣṭa* (p. 22, 17 ff.).

Kompositionell ist der Abschnitt C auf jeden Fall ein Einschub zwischen B und D, die unmittelbar aufeinander bezogen sind. Ob der Abschnitt C aus diesem Grunde als textgeschichtlich gegenüber B und D sekundär zu betrachten ist, muß vorerst offenbleiben. Auf jeden Fall handelt es sich um einen ziemlich alten Bestandteil; denn C ist sowohl in der *Rgs* (I, 2–4[64]) und der *Gr. PP.* wie auch in den alten chinesischen Übersetzungen (T. 224 etc.) repräsentiert. Im einzelnen allerdings

weichen diese Versionen, vor allem zum Ende hin, vom überlieferten Sanskrit-Text der *Aṣṭa* erheblich ab (vgl. auch LANCASTER, op. cit. p. 158), worauf jedoch hier nicht weiter eingegangen werden soll.

4.

Abschnitt *D* schließt, wie gesagt, mit D.a.1 *expressis verbis* an Abschnitt B an und bietet eine erste 'Definition' der Prajñāpāramitā (als einer spirituellen Praxis oder Haltung). Die Aufforderung in B ("Laß dir, Subhūti, etwas einfallen[65] bezüglich der Prajñāpāramitā der Bodhisattvas, auf daß die Bodhisattvas die Prajñāpāramitā meistern mögen") wird verstanden als Aufforderung, die Bodhisattvas in der Prajñāpāramitā zu unterweisen. Aber eine reale Entität, die den Worten 'Bodhisattva' und 'Prajñāpāramitā' entspräche, ist—in Wahrheit—nicht feststellbar. Es gibt in Wahrheit gar keinen Bodhisattva und keine Prajñāpāramitā, und infolgedessen auch keine Unterweisung des einen in der anderen. M.a.W.: Subhūti gibt die Belehrung über die Prajñāpāramitā, zu der er aufgefordert ist, in der Weise, daß er sich *unmittelbar* auf deren Niveau, d. h. auf die Ebene der absoluten Wahrheit, in der alle endlichen Erscheinungen und Fixierungen verschwunden sind, versetzt und von eben dieser Ebene her die Zentralbegriffe der Aufforderung selbst—'Bodhisattva' und 'Prajñāpāramitā'—als vordergründig erweist. Der Bodhisattva—im Sinne des nunmehr wieder eingenommenen konventionellen Standpunktes—, der diesen Sprung ins Eiswasser der absoluten Wahrheit ohne Furcht und Zagen verkraftet, erweist damit seine Reife für die Prajñāpāramitā.

Der Text des Abschnittes D, so wie er uns in der Sanskrit-Version überliefert ist, weist, soweit ich sehe, abgesehen von der Schlußpartie (D.e) keine Inkohärenzen auf. Ein Vergleich mit den chinesischen Übersetzungen und der Überlieferung in der *Gr.PP.*[66] zeigt aber, daß dennoch wesentliche Elemente sekundären Ursprungs sind.

Zunächst fehlt in allen Versionen das *buddhānubhāvena* von *Aṣṭa* 3,3, das also keinesfalls, wie man vielleicht hatte vermuten können, der Anlaß für die ausführliche Diskussion des Authentizitätsproblems in Abschnitt C gewesen sein kann, sondern vielmehr erst in später Zeit durch eben diesen Abschnitt induziert worden sein muß.

Absatz D.a.1, d. h. Subhūtis Wiederholung der an ihn ergangenen Aufforderung (*yad Bhagavān āha—'pratibhātu te . . . niryāyur' iti*) ist zwar in allen chinesischen Versionen bezeugt, fehlt aber in der *Gr.PP.* Sollte diese Auslassung des Absatzes D.a.1 in der *Gr.PP.* den ursprüng-

lichen Textzustand repräsentieren, so wäre der Zusammenhang von B und D erheblich gelockert und möglicherweise sekundär.

Von größter Bedeutung ist, daß sich der Absatz D.b, d. h. der Satz *tam apy ahaṃ dharmaṃ na samanupaśyāmi yaduta prajñāpāramitāṃ nāma*, in der *Pañca*[67] und in den älteren chinesischen Übersetzungen (T. 224, 226, 227; T. 225 ist schwer zu beurteilen) nicht findet. Die entsprechende Partie in Absatz D.c (D.c.2: *prajñāpāramitām apy avindan* etc.) ist zwar in T. 226, 225 und 227 sowie—wenngleich verkürzt—auch in der *Gr.PP.* vorhanden; in der ältesten chinesischen Version T. 224 jedoch fehlt auch sie. Und für das auf diesen beiden Sätzen als Prämissen basierende *katamasyām* (sc. *prajñāpāramitāyām*) in D.c.3 fehlt eine Entsprechung nicht nur in T. 224, sondern auch in T. 226, T. 225 und T. 227. M. a. W.: In der ältesten Fassung des Abschnittes D wurde die Unmöglichkeit, den Bodhisattvas die Prajñāpāramitā zu verkünden, *nur* mit der Nichtfeststellbarkeit, d. h. Nichtexistenz, eines *Bodhisattva* begründet, und diese läßt sich auch vom traditionellen Standpunkt der Hīnayāna-Dogmatik aus behaupten: insofern nämlich, als ein Bodhisattva als Person (*pudgala*), als substantielles Selbst (*ātman*), als Ganzheit, inexistent ist. Insofern beinhaltet die Prajñāpāramitā in der ursprünglichen Fassung des Abschnittes D zum mindesten dem Wortlaut nach nicht mehr als die Einsicht in die hīnayānistische 'Wesenlosigkeit der Person' (*pudgalanairātmya*). Mit der Zeit aber ist der Text dergestalt erweitert worden, daß die Prajñāpāramitā nunmehr explizit auch die Einsicht in die mahāyānistische 'Wesenlosigkeit (auch) der (substanzlosen) Daseinsfaktoren' (*dharmanairātmya*) einschloß, indem die Nichtfeststellbarkeit auch der Prajñāpāramitā selbst[68]—als eines besonders prominenten geistigen Dharma—hinzugefügt wurde, u. zw. offenbar zuerst in D.c als eine weiterführende Steigerung der für sich allein redundanten Wiederholungsformel D.c.1, und später auch im vorhergehenden Text als eine zweite, selbständige Prämisse (D.b). Überdies manifestiert sich die neue Intention, auch das *dharmanairātmya* einzuschließen, wohl auch in der in D.c.1 verwendeten differenzierenden Ausdrucksweise *bodhisattvaṃ vā bodhisattvadharmaṃ vā* (d. h. nicht nur eine substantielle Person 'Bodhisattva', sondern auch als 'Bodhisattva' benennbare Dharmas im Sinne der Daseinsanalyse der Hīnayānaschulen sind nicht feststellbar). Auch diese Worte stehen nur in den späten Versionen, wohingegen sich in der *Gr.PP.*[69] sowie T. 224, 225, 226 und 227 nur *bodhisattvam* findet.—Bemerkenswert ist, daß die Nichtfeststellbarkeit auch der Prajñāpāramitā auch in dem dem Abschnitt D (und

H) entsprechenden Vers der *Rgs* (I, 5) auftaucht, wodurch sich der Schluß nahelegt, daß an dieser Stelle—die zum ältesten Bestand der *Prajñāpāramitā*-Texte gehört haben muß (vgl. S. 60f.)—die *Rgs* eine (kaum als Ergebnis einer nachträglichen Überarbeitung erklärbare) spätere Textgestalt als T 224 voraussetzt und somit notwendigerweise später abgefaßt wurde als die Urform der Prosaversion.

Der Schlußabsatz D.e lautet in der überlieferten Sanskrit-Version: *eṣa eva bodhisattvo mahāsattvaḥ prajñāpāramitāyām anuśāsanīyaḥ. eṣaivāsya bodhisattvasya mahāsattvasya prajñāpāramitā veditavyā. eṣo 'vavādaḥ prajñāpāramitāyām. saced evaṃ tiṣṭhati, eṣaivāsyāvavādānuśāsanī.* Der Gedankengang ist zweifellos ziemlich undurchsichtig. Man hat Mühe, sich mit den jeweils unterschiedlich zu beziehenden Demonstrativpronomina zurechtzufinden. Ein Blick in die *Gr.PP.* und die chinesischen Übersetzungen zeigt in der Tat, daß die vorliegende Textgestalt unmöglich die ursprüngliche sein kann. Die *Pañca*[70] bestätigt nur einen Teil des Wortlautes: *eṣa eva bodhisattvasya mahāsattvasya avavādaḥ prajñāpāramitāyām, eṣaivānuśāsanī.* Die *Śata*[70] hat: *evam* (lies: *eṣa*?) *eva bodhisattvasyāvavādaḥ, eṣaivānuśāsanī,* und die älteste chinesische Übersetzung der *Pañca* (T. 221) lautet[71]: "Eben dies ist die Schulung des Bodhisattva, eben dies seine Praxis." Einen ähnlichen Wortlaut bezeugt auch T. 224, die älteste chinesische Übersetzung der *Aṣṭa.* Die Gilgit-Hs. der *Pañca* liest[70]: *eṣaiva bodhisattvasya mahāsattvasyāvavādānuśāsanī,* und dieser Formulierung entspricht auch T. 227. Daß diese zum mindesten in der *Gr.PP.* und T. 227 belegte Form des Absatzes besser an D.d anschlösse als der erste (oder auch der zweite) Satz der überlieferten Sanskrit-Version, kann man allerdings nicht behaupten. Die übrigen chinesischen Übersetzungen helfen, da sie erheblich divergieren und insgesamt für unseren Absatz eine geradezu chaotische Textsituation bezeugen, nicht weiter. Bestens an D.d anschließen würde der entsprechende Satz in *Rgs* I, 5 d: *so bodhisattva carate sugatāna prajñāṃ,* an den auch Elemente in T. 220(5), 220(4) und vielleicht auch T. 228 anklingen. In der Tat ist, wie sich an späterer Stelle dieser Untersuchung[72] zeigen wird, an einer parallelen Stelle auch in der *Aṣṭa* ein ähnlicher Satz überliefert. An der vorliegenden Stelle ist er möglicherweise sekundär verdrängt worden. Vielleicht schien es dem Gestalter des Textes verfrüht, dem Bodhisattva schon in dieser Phase—d. h. vor Erfüllung der in E.a noch zusätzlich geforderten Bedingung—ein 'Wandeln in der Prajñāpāramitā' zu bescheinigen?

5.

Abschnitt *E* ist offenbar durch die Absicht motiviert, den Bodhisattva, der sich im Sinne der Ausführungen von Abschnitt D bewährt und als reif für die Prajñāpāramitā erwiesen hat, vor der Gefahr eines auch dann noch möglichen Fehlverhaltens zu warnen. Der die Prajñāpāramitā praktizierende Bodhisattva muß sich—nach dem Wortlaut des überlieferten Sanskrit-Textes—in der Weise schulen, daß er auch durch den 'Erleuchtungsgedanken' nicht der Einbildung verfällt (*tenāpi bodhicittena na manyeta*). Diese Formulierung bereitet allerdings in mehrfacher Hinsicht Schwierigkeiten.

Zunächst sind die semantischen Implikationen von *na man-* c. Instr.[73] nicht klar; der Ausdruck war in den vorhergehenden Abschnitten nicht verwendet worden. In *Pañca* (*D*) 174, 23–175, 1 (einer Stelle, an der sich der vorliegende Satz in Verbindung mit zusätzlichen Glossen wiederfindet) wird *manyate* mit *abhiniviśate* glossiert[74] und bedeutet somit offenbar "Einbildung" im Sinne eines intellektuell-emotionalen Sichanklammerns oder Verhaftetseins. Kumārajīva (T. 1509, p. 385 b 7) übersetzt *na manyeta* in *Pañca*(*D*) 175, 1 mit "er soll nicht reflektieren: 'es gibt dieses *citta*'"; in seiner Wiedergabe von *Pañca*(*D*) 121, 12 f.[75] (wo die Gilgit-Hs.[70] liest: *tena bodhicittena* ⟨*na*⟩ *mantavyam*) hingegen findet sich "soll nicht (darüber) reflektieren oder *stolz sein*", so daß auch dieses Bedeutungsmoment einkalkuliert werden muß.[76] Für die Nuance *ichbezogener* inadäquater Reflexion spricht auch *Aṣṭa* 7, 16 f.: *na ca tena samādhinā manyate—'ahaṃ samāhitaḥ', 'ahaṃ samādhiṃ samāpatsye', 'ahaṃ samādhiṃ samāpadye', 'ahaṃ samādhiṃ samāpannaḥ' iti.*

Wichtiger für unsere textgeschichtliche Untersuchung sind die Worte *tenāpi bodhicittena*. Fassen wir *bodhicitta* im üblichen Sinne als "Entschluß (oder Entschlossenheit) zur Erleuchtung"—und was anders könnte es hier bedeuten?[77]—so bleibt das beigefügte, auf bereits Bekanntes zurückverweisende Demonstrativum *tena* rätselhaft; denn von einem solchen *bodhicitta* ist im Vorhergehenden nirgendwo die Rede gewesen. Es liegt also eine gravierende *Inkohärenz* vor, die sich nur durch die Annahme, daß Abschnitt E *heterogenen* Ursprungs ist, erklären läßt. Vorauszusetzen ist allerdings, daß der Wortlaut des überlieferten Sanskrit-Textes von E.a keine sekundäre Modifikation erlitten hat. Dies läßt sich nun allerdings, soweit ich sehe, nicht völlig ausschließen; denn während die Gilgit-Hs. zu *Pañca*(*D*) 121, 12 f. (cf. S.

47) sowie *Rgs* I,5c, T. 225, T. 220(4) und *last not least* die Parallele in *Pañca(D)* 174, 23 f. (cf. S. 47) den überlieferten Text stützen, findet sich in T. 227 (Kumārajīva) und T. 220(5) (Hsüan tsang!) die Wiedergabe 是菩薩心, was *tena* (*api*) *bodhisattvacittena* entspräche. *bodhisattva*- statt *bodhi*- haben auch T. 224 und 226 (T. 226 etwa: "Während er seinen Geist schult, soll er nicht über sich selbst reflektieren (in der Form:) 'ich bin ein Bodhisattva'."), doch finden wir dort auch an zwei weiteren Stellen[78] 菩薩心 für Skt. *bodhicitta;* das Zeugnis dieser Versionen bleibt also zweifelhaft; sie haben möglicherweise das (in den authentischen Teilen der *Aṣṭa* offenbar recht seltene) Wort *bodhicitta* als *'bodhisattva-citta'* wiedergegeben. Sollte jedoch (vor allem angesichts des gewichtigen Zeugnisses von T. 220(5)) eine Lesung **tenāpi bodhisattvacittena na manyeta* tatsächlich existiert haben, so liegt es nahe, sie als Rückverweis auf D.d (p. 3, 10 f.) *saced . . . bodhisattasya cittaṃ nāvalīyate* zu verstehen[79]. Allerdings wird in D.d die Stellung des Wortes *bodhisattvasya* unmittelbar vor *cittam* zwar durch die Parallelen in 13, 15 f. und 159, 19 f. und durch T. 225 gestützt, nicht aber durch die Parallelen in 4, 21 und 15, 28 f. und die Mehrzahl der chinesischen Übersetzungen. Ferner würde man eher erwarten, daß bei einem solchen Rückverweis auf D.d das wesentliche Element der Aussage, d. h. das *Nichtverzagen* des Geistes, und nicht die eigentlich selbstverständliche Tatsache, daß dieser Geist dem Bodhisattva angehört, als Gegenstand der reflektierenden Fixierung bzw. des Stolzes aufgegriffen würde (es sei denn, *bodhisattvacitta* sei prägnant als "die für einen Bodhisattva typische, oder: ihm gemäße, Geisteshaltung" o. ä. zu verstehen). Auch eine Lesung **tenāpi bodhisattvacittena* wäre somit nicht ganz ohne Schwierigkeiten, wenngleich zweifellos glatter als das *tenāpi bodhicittena* des überlieferten Sanskrit-Textes. Gewiß ist es denkbar, daß *bodhicitta* im Sinne der späteren terminologischen Entwicklung an die Stelle des unterminologischen **bodhisattvacitta* getreten sein könnte. Mindestens ebensogut ließe sich aber auch umgekehrt die Lesung **tenāpi bodhisattvacittena* (bzw. die entsprechende von T. 224 initiierte und von anderen Übersetzern übernommene chinesische Wiedergabe) als ein nachträglicher Versuch, die durch den ursprünglichen Wortlaut *tenāpi bodhicittena* gegebene Inkohärenz zu eliminieren, verstehen.—Letzteres gilt auf jeden Fall für die eigenartige Wiedergabe unseres Satzes durch die späte Übersetzung T. 228, welche lautet: ". . . und wenn jener Bodhisattva so übt, darf er nicht den Gedanken (*citta*) entstehen lassen: 'ich übe so'."

6.

Für die Authentizität der Lesung *tenāpi bodhicittena,* auf jeden Fall aber für den heterogenen Ursprung des Abschnittes E, spricht überdies eine Parallele auf p. 10,2-19 der *Aṣṭa.* Ich gebe zunächst eine schematische Inhaltsanalyse dieses im folgenden als *J* zitierten Abschnittes:

J.a.[80] (Der Bodhisattva wird 'Mahāsattva' genannt, weil er nicht einmal an dem 'Erleuchtungsgedanken' haftet:) 10, 2–9

1. (Einleitung:) Subhūti will die Bezeichnung 'Mahāsattva' erklären[81]. 10, 2–5
2. Der Bodhisattva haftet nicht einmal an dem unvergleichlichen 'Erleuchtungsgedanken' (authent. Text nach der *Pañca*, die weitgehend mit den älteren chin. Übersetzungen (T. 224—220(5)) übereinstimmt: *yad api tad Bhagavan bodhicittam*[82] *asamasamacittam asādhāraṇacittaṃ sarvaśrāvakapratyekabuddhaiḥ, tatrāpi citte 'saktaḥ*). 10, 5f.
3.[83] (Begründung:) Weil der 'Allwissenheitsgedanke' in keinem positiven Bezug zu den Leidenschaften steht und nicht in den Bereich des weltlichen Daseins gehört ((84*tat kasya hetoḥ? tathā hi tat sarvajñatā*84) *cittam* (85*anāsravam aparyāpannam*85). *tat*[86] ("deshalb") (87*yad api tat sarvajñatācittam* (85*anāsravam aparyāpannaṃ*85) 87), *tatrāpi citte 'sakto* [*'paryāpannaḥ*][88]). 10, 7f.
4. (Konklusion:) Deshalb wird der Bodhisattva als 'Mahāsattva' bezeichnet (*tenārthena bodhisattvo*[89] *mahāsattva iti saṃkhyāṃ gacchati*). 10, 8f.

b.[90] Begründung: der Bodhisattva haftet nicht einmal an jenem '(Erleuchtungs-)gedanken', weil dieser Gedanke (in Wahrheit) gar kein Gedanke ist (*kena kāraṇena . . . tatrāpi citte*[91] *'sakto* [*'paryāpannaḥ*][92]*? . . . acittatvāt . . . tatrāpi citte 'sakto* [*'paryāpannaḥ*][92]). 10, 10–12

c.[93] = E.c. 10, 13–17

d.[93] = E.e. 10, 17–19

Vergleicht man die parallelen Abschnitte E und J miteinander, so fällt als erstes auf, daß die Absätze E.a und E.b.1 durch J.a.2 und J.b sinngemäß und E.c sowie E.e durch J.c und J.d wörtlich repräsentiert sind, während E.b.2 und E.d in J keine Entsprechung haben. Daß es sich bei diesen beiden letzteren Absätzen um nachträgliche Zusätze handelt, bestätigt auch T. 224, wo (im Gegensatz zu T. 226) E.b.2 ein-

deutig fehlt. Für E.d gilt wahrscheinlich das Gleiche, doch entfernt sich der Wortlaut von T. 224 im Verlauf des Absatzes E.c so erheblich vom überlieferten Sanskrit-Text, daß mir eine sichere Beurteilung unmöglich ist. Die Absätze E.b.2 und E.d repräsentieren auch inhaltlich eine andere, offenbar spätere Entwicklungsstufe: In E.b.1 und E.c ist die Argumentation rein negativ: es wird lediglich, im Sinne eines Prasajyapratiṣedha[94], negiert, daß das (angebliche) *citta* (in Wahrheit) ein *citta* sei, und anschließend gezeigt, daß die Frage, ob es ein solches *citta*, das kein *citta* ist, denn wirklich gebe, unstatthaft ist, da an diesem Nicht-*citta*-Sein weder Existenz noch Nichtexistenz hafte, m. a. W.: da diese bloße Negation eines bestimmten *So*seins keinerlei Entität setzt, von der man nunmehr *Da*sein oder Nichtdasein aussagen könnte. Für die Absätze E.b.2 und E.d hingegen ist mit dem Nicht-*citta*-Sein des *citta* die transphänomenale Ebene der absoluten Wirklichkeit angesprochen—das strahlend reine wahre Wesen des Geistes, das frei von jeglicher Veränderung oder reflektiven Unruhe und Verfälschung ist. Es ist bezeichnend, daß die *Pañca* gerade an diese beiden Absätze zusätzliche Erläuterungen anschließt[95] und somit ein weiteres Anwachsen dieser Tendenz zu direkten Aussagen über die absolute Wirklichkeit bezeugt.

Die Tatsache, daß E.b.2 und E.d nachträgliche Zusätze sind, die in J fehlen, zwingt zu der Annahme, daß Abschnitt J im Vergleich zu E eine ältere Gestalt zum mindesten der zweiten Hälfte unseres Textstückes bewahrt hat. Man ist versucht, daraus zu schließen, daß entweder Abschnitt E, der ja ohnehin den Eindruck eines heterogenen Elementes macht, aus J übernommen und dann sekundär erweitert worden ist, oder aber E und J ihre Existenz der zweimaligen Inkorporation eines vorgegebenen Textstückes—dessen Anfang dann allerdings an mindestens einer der beiden Stellen eine Modifikation erfahren hätte—verdanken und E im nachhinein um die Absätze b.2 und d erweitert wurde, während Entsprechendes in J unterblieb. Ein Blick in die chinesischen Übersetzungen und die *Gr. PP.* zeigt jedoch, daß dieser Schluß voreilig ist und die textgeschichtlichen Verhältnisse wesentlich komplizierter sein müssen. Sowohl die *Gr. PP.*[96] wie auch die chinesischen Versionen mit Ausnahme der Repräsentanten der spätesten Textstufe (sc. T. 220(4) und T. 228) belegen nämlich nur die Absätze J.a und J.b[97], während J.c und J.d fehlen. E.c und E.e hingegen sind in allen Versionen belegt. Es scheint also, daß die Absätze J.c und J.d erst nachträglich, in Analogie zu E, eingefügt worden sind, doch muß dies offenbar auf der Basis einer Version, in der die Zusätze E.b.2 und E.d noch fehlten, geschehen sein,

sei es, daß es (trotz des negativen Zeugnisses aller vor das 7. Jh. zurückreichenden chinesischen Übersetzungen) doch auch schon früher eine Fassung *mit* J.c-d gegeben hat, sei es, daß eine Fassung ohne die Zusätze E.b.2 und E.d (trotz des gegenteiligen Zeugnisses aller chinesischen Versionen nach T. 224) auch nach dem 2. Jh. noch fortexistiert hat.

Wenden wir uns nunmehr den Absätzen J.a und J.b zu, so ist zunächst festzustellen, daß das auf etwas bereits Erwähntes zurückverweisende Demonstrativpronomen in dem—*tenāpi bodhicittena na manyeta* in E.a entsprechenden—Ausdruck *tatrāpi citte 'saktaḥ* in J.a.2 vollkommen organisch ist, da hier das besagte *citta* durch den vorhergehenden Relativsatz (*yad api tad bodhicittam . . .*) bereits eingeführt ist. Ferner paßt der Abschnitt J *thematisch* bestens in den voraufgehenden und folgenden Kontext, der in anderen Versuchen, den Terminus 'Mahāsattva' zu interpretieren, besteht. Eine genauere Inspektion fördert aber auch hier Schwierigkeiten zutage.

Erstens wird die Feststellung, der Bodhisattva sei auch dem *bodhicitta* nicht verhaftet, *doppelt* begründet, ohne daß diese beiden Begründungen inhaltlich oder formal irgendwie aufeinander abgestimmt wären. Die eine (J.a.3) geht der Konklusion (J.a.4) vorauf, während die andere auf diese Konklusion folgt, ohne jedoch irgendwie auf die Tatsache, daß vorher bereits eine Begründung gegeben worden war, Bezug zu nehmen. Da eine solche nachschleppende Begründung in keiner der übrigen Erklärungen von 'Mahāsattva' vorkommt—sie enden alle mit einem der Konklusion J.a.4 entsprechenden Schlußsatz—und sie überdies inhaltlich ganz mit E.b.1 übereinstimmt, ist man geneigt, diese zweite Begründung für einen (von E.b.1 angeregten?) Zusatz zu halten. Sie ist jedoch in allen chinesischen Übersetzungen enthalten und fehlt lediglich in der *Gr. PP.*, wird aber auch dort an späterer Stelle[98] ausdrücklich vorausgesetzt. Auch die *vor* der Konklusion gebotene Begründung (J.a.3) ist in ihrer Substanz bereits in der ältesten chinesischen Übersetzung (T. 224) belegt, erscheint dort allerdings (möglicherweise aber durch eine Textlücke) nicht als Begründung. Ihrem Fehlen in T. 228[99] ist kaum Gewicht beizumessen, da es sich hier um die späteste aller chinesischen Übersetzungen handelt[100]. Es ist also schwer zu sagen, welche der beiden Begründungen textgeschichtlich den Vorzug verdient. Vielleicht sind beide erst sekundär hinzugetreten.

Zweitens ist auch der Kern des Abschnittes J (d. h. die Absätze J.a.1, 2 und 4) inhaltlich keineswegs so unproblematisch, wie es auf den ersten Blick den Anschein hatte. Zwischen der Bezeichnung 'Mahāsattva' und

der Erklärung, daß sie dem Bodhisattva zukomme, weil er sogar dem *bodhicitta* nicht verhaftet sei, besteht doch gar kein spezifischer Zusammenhang. Er ergibt sich erst, wenn man an die Stelle des Sanskrit-Wortes *mahāsattva* die mittelindische Entsprechung *mahāsatta* setzt und sich klarmacht, daß diese letztere auch im Sinne von *mahā-asakta* "der Große Nichtverhaftete" deutbar wäre. Dann erst wird die Argumentation wirklich einleuchtend: Der Bodhisattva wird als der "Große Nichtverhaftete" bezeichnet, weil er sogar dem *bodhicitta* nicht verhaftet ist.

Ein weiterer Punkt, der bedacht werden muß, ist die Tatsache, daß sich bei genauer Betrachtung herausstellt, daß auch die Formulierung von J.a.2 auf einen bestimmten Kontext, der nicht mit dem in der *Aṣṭa* unmittelbar vorhergehenden identisch ist, verweist: Betrachtet man den einleitenden Relativsatz (*yad api tad bodhicittam* . . .) genauer, so wird doch auch hier mit dem Pronomen *tad* das *bodhicitta* als etwas bereits Bekanntes gekennzeichnet, und durch das steigernde *api* die (erneute) Bezugnahme darauf als Steigerung einer vorhergehenden Aussage charakterisiert. Nun erwähnen aber die in der *Aṣṭa* unmittelbar vorhergehenden Stücke—die beiden ersten Erklärungen des Terminus 'Mahāsattva'—weder das *bodhicitta*, noch läßt sich J.a als eine Steigerung dieser Erklärungen auffassen. Sie sind somit als ursprünglicher Kontext von J.a nicht geeignet. Der ihnen voraufgehende Abschnitt *Aṣṭa* 9,22-27 hingegen dürfte auf die richtige Spur führen. Er erklärt den Begriff 'Bodhisattva' und arbeitet dabei ebenfalls mit dem Terminus *asakta*[101]. Im einzelnen ist—wie die chinesischen Übersetzungen zeigen—der überlieferte Sanskrit-Wortlaut allerdings stark durch Zusätze entstellt. Es scheint, daß—zum mindesten seit T. 226—etwa folgende Erklärung des Wortes 'Bodhisattva' vorlag: *sarvadharmāṇām*[102] *asaktatāyāṃ śikṣate sarvadharmāṇām anubodhārthena; 〈tenā〉rthena bodhisattva ity ucyate.* Offenbar wird also *bodhisattva* bzw. Prakrit *bodhisatta* hier als *bodhi-'satta* (mit Elision des *a*- privativum[103]) im Sinne von *bodhyartham asaktaḥ* ("um der Erleuchtung willen—d. h. in dem Gedanken 'ich will die Erleuchtung erlangen'—nicht (den übrigen Dharmas) verhaftet") verstanden[104].

Es scheint daher, daß der alte Kern der Abschnitte *Aṣṭa* 9,22-27 und *Aṣṭa* 10,2-19 (= J) auf eine ursprünglich zusammenhängende etymologisierende Erklärung der Termini 'Bodhisattva' und 'Mahāsattva' zurückgeht, die vermutlich sogar in Prakrit oder Mischsanskrit abgefaßt war. Da sich überdies weiter unten[105] ergeben wird, daß das gesamte Textmaterial von *Aṣṭa* 9,23 bis *Aṣṭa* 12,29 kompositorisch[106] einen Einschub bildet, ist es wahrscheinlich, daß die *Aṣṭa* in den Abschnitten

9,23-27 und 10,2-19 ein vorgegebenes Textstück verarbeitet hat. In der *Rgs* ist allerdings nur der Abschnitt 9,22-27 repräsentiert (I, 16), während der Abschnitt J (= 10,2-19)—im Gegensatz zu den übrigen, ihm voraufgehenden und folgenden Erklärungen von 'Mahāsattva', die durch *Rgs* I, 17 und I, 18 wiedergegeben werden—in der *Rgs* keine Entsprechung hat. Ob man daraus schließen darf, daß der *Rgs* eine Textfassung vorlag, in der der Abschnitt J fehlte, und daß diese Fassung ohne J die ursprüngliche war, scheint mir, da die *Rgs* an anderer Stelle, wie wir oben[107] sahen, eindeutig eine bereits erweiterte Fassung der *Aṣṭa* voraussetzt, zweifelhaft. Sollte es dennoch so gewesen sein, so wäre die Möglichkeit, daß J.a (als bereits in die *Aṣṭa* integriertes Textelement) als Vorlage für den Absatz E.a—der in *Rgs* I,5b durch die Worte "*(upalabdhi) na citta bodheḥ*" zum mindesten indirekt vorausgesetzt wird[108]—gedient haben könnte, natürlich gänzlich ausgeschlossen. E.a müßte dann—ebenso wie J. a selbst—unmittelbar durch den oben erschlossenen, möglicherweise auf Prakrit oder Mischsanskrit abgefaßten vorgegebenen Text mit der etymologisierenden Erklärung der Begriffe 'Bodhisattva' und 'Mahāsattva' inspiriert worden sein. Diese Möglichkeit besteht selbstverständlich auch dann, wenn man—wozu ich, wie gesagt, eher neige—der Nichtberücksichtigung von J in der *Rgs* keine entscheidende Bedeutung beimißt, und sie wird weiter gestützt durch die Tatsache, daß ja auch der Absatz E.a an einen Abschnitt (sc. D) anschließt, der eine Diskussion des Terminus 'Bodhisattva' enthält (vgl. D.a.2-4). Allerdings reagiert—wie wir sahen—der Abschnitt D auf die Frage, was denn mit 'Bodhisattva' gemeint sei, völlig anders als *Aṣṭa* 9,22-27: Anstatt sie durch eine etymologisierende Erklärung des Wortes 'Bodhisattva' zu beantworten, benutzt der Verfasser von D die Frage bloß als Anlaß für einen abrupten Sprung in die Lehre von der Nichtexistenz einer substantiellen Person. Entsprechend ist auch in E.a das etymologisierende Moment ausgeschieden und lediglich das sachlich Wesentliche herausgehoben: die Aufforderung an den Bodhisattva, sich auch durch sein *bodhicitta*—durch den Gedanken, in dem er die Erleuchtung zu seinem Ziel macht—nicht zu irgendwelchen Formen von Einbildung verleiten zu lassen.

7.

Die beiden einander inhaltlich verwandten Sätze *ataś ca bodhisattvo mahāsattvo 'vivartanīya . . . upaparīkṣitavyaḥ* (3,29 f.) und *avirahitaś ca bodhisattvo mahāsattvaḥ prajñāpāramitāyā veditavyaḥ* (3, 30f.) sind

aus dem Grunde nicht zu E gezogen, sondern zu einem eigenen Abschnitt *F* zusammengefaßt worden, weil sie in der Parallele J nicht mehr enthalten sind. Ihr Anschluß an das Vorhergehende (also an E, insbes. an E.e) bereitet aber auch aus inneren Gründen Schwierigkeiten. Die in F.a getroffene Feststellung, daß der Bodhisattva nicht mehr rückfällig werden könne, läßt sich schwerlich—wie das einleitende *ataḥ* zu fordern scheint—als *Konsequenz* der Tatsache, daß Subhūti (die Sache so) dargelegt habe, wie (man es von ihm als) dem, dem der Erhabene den Rang des Besten der in Leidenschafts- oder Streitlosigkeit Verharrenden (*araṇāvihārin*) zuerkannt hat[109], (erwarten darf), verstehen.

Es könnte nun die Möglichkeit erwogen werden, das *ataḥ* von F.a auf E.*a* zurückzubeziehen. Dem Einwand, daß der Abstand zwischen diesen beiden Absätzen zu groß sei, ließe sich eventuell entgegenhalten, daß die dazwischenstehenden Absätze, zumal sie in der *Rgs* unberücksichtigt bleiben, erst nachträglich eingeschoben worden sein könnten. Schwierigkeiten macht hingegen auch in diesem Falle das im Sanskrit-Text der *Aṣṭa* und in der *Pañca*(*D*) nach *ataḥ* überlieferte *ca*. Es ließe sich allenfalls im Sinne eines *api* auffassen, doch scheint gegen eine solche Deutung zu sprechen, daß die in F.a und F.b auf *ataś ca* folgenden Aussagen—zum mindesten in dieser Form—im Vorhergehenden noch gar nicht vorgekommen waren und deshalb nicht gut als *auch* aus E.a folgend charakterisierbar sind. Allerdings fehlt das problematische *ca* in *Pañca*(*G*) und *Śata*, und diese Versionen bezeugen normalerweise eine ältere Textgestalt als die *Pañca*(*D*) oder gar der überlieferte Sanskrit-Text der *Aṣṭa*, wenngleich man im vorliegenden Falle nicht recht einzusehen vermag, warum ein völlig unpassendes *ca* nachträglich eingefügt worden sein sollte.

Eine andere, m. E. eher zutreffende Möglichkeit wäre, daß F.a (und F.b) unmittelbar an *D* anzuschließen sind. Ist *ataś ca* die authentische Lesung, so müßte F ursprünglich der zweite Teil des (im Detail seines Wortlautes leider sehr unsicheren) Schlußabsatzes D.*e* gewesen sein: "(Wenn der Bodhisattva angesichts dieser Belehrung nicht verzagt und erschrickt,) dann ist eben dieser Bodhisattva für die Unterweisung in der Prajñāpāramitā geeignet . . . (oder vielleicht ursprünglich: dann wandelt dieser Bodhisattva in der Prajñāpāramitā), und ist (eben) deshalb (d. h. weil er nicht erschrickt) als einer anzusehen[110], der keinem Rückfall mehr ausgesetzt ist, und ist—so muß man wissen—der Prajñāpāramitā nicht ermangelnd (d. h. entbehrt ihrer zu keinem Zeitpunkt)." Sollte hingegen die Lesung von *Pañca*(*G*) und *Śata* die richtige

und *ca* ein—wie auch immer zu erklärender—späterer Zusatz sein, so könnte F sogar den gesamten ursprünglichen, durch die nicht recht passenden Formulierungen von D.e sekundär verdrängten[111] Schluß des Abschnittes D darstellen und müßte dann von Haus aus unmittelbar an D.*d* angeschlossen haben[112]. Sollte sich diese Zuordnung von F zu D als richtig erweisen, so wäre der schon aufgrund seines Anfangs als heterogen verdächtige dazwischenstehende Abschnitt E endgültig als ein—angesichts des Zeugnisses von T. 224 und der *Rgs* gewiß sehr früher—nachträglich zwischen bzw. vor die Schlußsätze von D eingefügter Einschub erkannt.

8.

Der Abschnitt *G* hat *'propagandistischen'* Charakter und ist der Hervorhebung der Unabdingbarkeit der Prajñāpāramitā für die spirituelle Praxis der Adepten sowohl des 'Hīnayāna' wie auch des 'Mahāyāna'[113] gewidmet. In T. 224 erscheint der Abschnitt, wie LANCASTER[114] gezeigt hat, in einer erheblich kürzeren Gestalt,[115] deren Ursprünglichkeit im wesentlichen auch durch die übrigen älteren chinesischen Versionen und die *Gr.PP.*[116] bestätigt wird.

Die inhaltliche Verknüpfung des 'propagandistischen' Abschnittes G mit dem Kontext ist ziemlich locker. An das Vorhergehende (D + F) schließt G keineswegs unorganisch an, stellt aber ebensowenig eine notwendige Fortsetzung dar. Zwischen Abschnitt G und dem Folgenden besteht keinerlei inhaltliche oder formale Verbindung. G ist daher entweder ein nachträglich eingeschaltetes Textstück oder ein abschließendes Rahmenelement des Vorhergehenden. Die Entscheidung, welche dieser beiden Möglichkeiten zutrifft, ist nicht leicht. Gravierende Divergenzen zwischen D/F und G sind—soweit ich sehe—nicht vorhanden. Zu beachten ist allenfalls, daß mit der *Prajñāpāramitā,* von der es heißt, wer den Wunsch habe, sich auf der Stufe eines Śrāvaka etc. zu schulen, müsse sie *hören,* aufnehmen, behalten, *rezitieren*[117] und praktizieren, in diesem Abschnitt im Gegensatz zu D/F offenbar nicht so sehr eine spirituelle Praxis als vielmehr deren sprachliche Fixierung, ein *Prajñāpāramitā-Text,* gemeint ist. Die Tatsache, daß nach G die *Prajñāpāramitā* auch für diejenigen, die sich in der spirituellen Praxis eines Śrāvaka oder Pratyekabuddha schulen wollen, d. h. für die Adepten des Hīnayāna, verbindlich ist, legt jedoch eher eine relativ enge Verbindung von G mit D/F nahe und scheint dafür zu sprechen, daß der *Prajñāpāramitā*-Text, auf den G anspielt, eben der vorhergehende Abschnitt D/F

ist. Denn die von T. 224 bezeugte älteste Fassung von D implizierte ja lediglich eine Charakterisierung der Prajñāpāramitā im Sinne einer Einsicht in das *pudgalanairātmya*[118]. Vor allem aber ist zu beachten, daß der 'propagandistische' Abschnitt G ein typisches *Schlußelement* ist, dessen *nachträgliche* Einschaltung mitten im Text doch recht ungewöhnlich wäre. Es ist daher eher wahrscheinlich, daß G ein abschließendes Rahmenelement zu D/F darstellt. Da E als heterogen ausgeklammert werden muß, wäre als Sprecher von G, ebenso wie von D und F, Subhūti anzusetzen. Die an ihn ergehende Aufforderung (Abschnitt B) würde als einleitendes Rahmenelement passen[119], und das Gleiche gilt auch für das auffallend kurze, simple und konservative Nidāna (A). Zur Konstitution eines vollständigen, inhaltlich und formal homogenen und in sich geschlossenen Textchens, dessen Umfang in etwa dem einer traditionellen Lehrrede des Hīnayāna-Kanons entspräche, würde dann bloß noch ein Schlußsatz (Zustimmung des Erhabenen, und daran anschließend vielleicht noch ein Satz wie: *idam avocad Bhagavān; āttamanasas te bhikṣavo Bhagavato bhāṣitam abhyanandan*) fehlen. Aber dieses Fehlen kann nicht überraschen, da ein solcher Schlußsatz, im Rahmen der in der *Aṣṭa* vorgenommenen Kombination unseres vermutlichen Textchens mit weiterem Material, notwendigerweise eliminiert oder verschleppt werden mußte (vgl. den Schlußsatz der *Aṣṭa* p. 261, 5 ff.!).

9.

Wir kommen zum Abschnitt *H*, der sich schon bei oberflächlicher Betrachtung als eine *Parallele* zu Abschnitt *D* erweist, allerdings auch eine Reihe bemerkenswerter Abweichungen enthält.

Im wesentlichen parallel sind folgende Absätze:

H.a ≡ D.a.4; in T. 224, 226 u. 227 fehlt H.a (od. H.c.1?).

H.b ≡ D.b; analog zu D.b fehlt H.b in den älteren und mittleren chinesischen Versionen.

H.c ≡ D.b; ähnlich wie in D.c fehlt auch in H.c Satz 2 in einem Teil der chinesischen Überlieferung (T. 224–227), desgleichen *katamasyām* in Satz 3 (T. 224–227 u. T. 220(5)).

H.f ≡ D.d.

Überdies stützt der Schluß von H die im vorigen aufgestellte Hypothese, daß Abschnitt F ursprünglich unmittelbar an Abschnitt D anschloß; denn die auf H.f ≡ D.d folgenden Absätze H.g und H.h entsprechen respektive F.b und F.a. Beachtenswert ist die vertauschte Rei-

henfolge der Sätze in H, welche auf den ersten Blick einen plausibleren Eindruck macht, insofern F.a ≡ H.h im Sinne der späteren, für F.a durch den Zusatz "(*avivartanīyo*) *'nuttarāyāḥ samyaksambodheḥ*" belegten Terminologie einen Ausblick auf das Fernziel der Prajñāpāramitā-Praxis einschließt. Der genannte Zusatz ist aber sekundär[120] und daher nicht geeignet, die ursprünglichen Implikationen des Terminus *avivartanīya* zu erweisen. Überdies fehlt H.g in den älteren und mittleren chinesischen Versionen sowie in der *Gr. PP.*, dürfte somit erst nachträglich eingedrungen sein, möglicherweise aus *Aṣṭa* 5, 24–27, wo der gleiche Satz unmittelbar auf eine Parallele zu D.d ≡ H.f folgt: *saced evam upaparīkṣamāṇaḥ . . . nāvalīyate na saṃlīyate* etc. *na saṃtrāsam āpadyate, avirahito bodhisattvo mahāsattvaḥ prajñāpāramitayā veditavyaḥ.*

Die auffälligste Abweichung des Abschnittes H von D stellen die Absätze H.d und H.e dar, die in D keine Entsprechung haben. H.d expliziert den in der (rhetorischen) Frage von H.c.3 implizierten Gedanken der Unangemessenheit, mit dem Namen 'Bodhisattva' zu operieren, wenn eine entsprechende wirkliche Entität gar nicht festzustellen ist und es sich somit um einen bloßen Namen handelt[121]. H.e führt—eingeleitet durch das auch in D.d auftauchende, aber in beiden Fällen in den chinesischen Übersetzungen nicht repräsentierte *api tu khalu punaḥ*—den Gedankengang noch einen Schritt weiter mit der Feststellung, daß auch dieser Name als solcher keinen Halt bietet, da er ebenfalls nicht faßbar und inexistent ist. Es handelt sich hier offenbar um einen Zusatz, in dem die destruktive Stellungnahme gegen die substantielle Wirklichkeit einer Person 'Bodhisattva' auch auf den Namen 'Bodhisattva' ausgedehnt wird, um dem nach Haftpunkten suchenden Denken auch diesen Halt zu entziehen.

Außer dieser Hauptdivergenz zwischen H und D gibt es noch eine Reihe weniger gravierender, z. T. aber ebenfalls beachtenswerter Abweichungen:

1. Es fehlt in H eine Entsprechung für D.a.1–3 (in den älteren chinesischen Versionen offenbar auch für D.a.4), wodurch H, für sich betrachtet, den Eindruck eines am Anfang unvollständigen, mitten im Gedankengang einsetzenden Bruchstückes macht. Es fehlt ferner in H eine Entsprechung für den (in der vorliegenden Form allerdings, wie gesagt, erheblich um- und ausgestalteten, möglicherweise überhaupt sekundären) Absatz D.e.

2. Statt des einfachen *na samanupaśyāmi* in D.a.4 (und D.b) findet sich in H.a (und H.b) *na vedmi* (*Pañca*—wohl ursprünglicher —: *na vindāmi*) *nopalabhe na samanupaśyāmi.*

3. H.f liest *evaṃ gambhīrāyāṃ prajñāpāramitāyāṃ bhāṣyamāṇāyām* statt des simpleren *evaṃ bhāṣyamāṇe* in D.d, bezeichnet also im Gegensatz zu D.d die vorangehende Belehrung explizit als 'Prajñāpāramitā' (im Sinne einer *sprachlichen Formulierung* der betreffenden spirituellen Haltung; cf. Abschnitt G!).

4. H.f enthält ferner gegenüber der Parallele D.d zusätzlich den Satz *adhimucyate 'dhyāśayena,* der eine positive Komplementierung der rein negativen Ausdrucksweise von D.d darstellt. Daß es sich um einen sekundären Zusatz handelt, geht aus der Tatsache hervor, daß der Satz sowohl in der *Gr. PP.* wie auch in allen chinesischen Übersetzungen außer T. 225 und 220(4) fehlt. Es wäre zu untersuchen, ob die hier verwendete Terminologie—insbes. *adhyāśaya*—auch anderweitig auf spätere Textschichten der *Aṣṭa* beschränkt ist.

5. Nach H.h (≡ F.a) findet sich der Zusatz *susthito 'sthānayogena* (H.i), der in der ältesten chinesischen Version (T. 224) keine Entsprechung hat, somit sekundär und vielleicht von einer anderen Stelle der *Aṣṭa* (etwa 19,20) angeregt worden ist.

An allen bisher besprochenen Stellen macht der Text von H gegenüber D einen sekundären, weiterentwickelten Eindruck. Es bleibt noch eine letzte Divergenz zu besprechen, deren Beurteilung schwieriger ist. In H.a liest der überlieferte Sanskrit-Text: *yo 'ham . . . etad eva bodhisattvanāmadheyaṃ na . . . samanupaśyāmi,* während es D.a.4 geheißen hatte: *nāhaṃ . . . taṃ dharmaṃ samanupaśyāmi yaduta bodhisattva iti.* Analog finden wir H.c.1 *etad eva bodhisattvanāmadheyam* statt D.c.1 *bodhisattvam.* Der Wortlaut des überlieferten Sanskrit-Textes wird jedoch von den übrigen Versionen durchweg nicht bestätigt. Die von mir eingesehenen Fassungen der *Gr. PP.* (*Pañca*(*D*), *Pañca*(*G*), *Śata*, T. 221) lesen, im Sinne von D, *bodhisattvam* statt *etad eva bodhisattvanāmadheyam,* und diese Lesung scheint auch T. 225 und T. 227 zugrundegelegen zu haben. T. 224, 226 und 220(5) hingegen haben 菩薩心, d.h. *bodhisattvacittam* oder—wahrscheinlicher—*bodhicittam.*[122] Diese Lesart wird auch durch den offensichtlich auf H.a bzw. H.c.1 bezugnehmenden Wortlaut von *Rgs* I, 5b gestützt, wo es heißt: "Wenn einer weder eine Prajñāpāramitā noch einen Bodhisattva *noch ein Bodhicitta feststellt*[123], (und wenn einer,) wenn er solches gehört hat, nicht verzagt und nicht

erschrickt: ein solcher Bodhisattva wandelt in der Weisheit der Vollendeten[124]." Das *-nāmadheya* des überlieferten Sanskrit-Textes von H.a bzw. H.c.1 klingt lediglich in den späten chinesischen Übersetzungen T. 220(4) und 228 an. T. 220(4) lautet: "Wenn ich den Bodhisattva betrachte, so gibt es bloß den Namen ('Bodhisattva'), nicht aber läßt sich eine wirkliche Entität erkennen, auffinden oder wahrnehmen." T. 228: "(Eine Entität,) die 'Bodhisattva' genannt werden (könnte), kann ich nicht wahrnehmen, kann ich nicht auffinden; im Falle des (sog.) 'Bodhisattva' existiert vielmehr bloß der Name; und sogar eben dieser Name läßt sich nicht wahrnehmen, läßt sich nicht auffinden."

Nur der letzte Satz von T. 228 paßt inhaltlich zu dem *etad eva bodhisattvanāmadheyaṃ na . . . samanupaśyāmi* des überlieferten Sanskrit-Textes, vorausgesetzt, daß man *bodhisattvanāmadheyam,* wie es sprachlich naheliegt, mit Haribhadra[125] als Tatpuruṣa auffaßt. Eine solche Auffassung zerstört aber die Logik des Gedankenganges des Abschnittes H völlig; denn die Nichtexistenz auch des Namens 'Bodhisattva' wird erst in Absatz H.e eingeführt, u. zw. als eine über das Vorhergehende hinausgehende Steigerung (*tad api nāmadheyam . . .*). Ferner ist in H.a die Verwendung des auf einen bereits erwähnten Gegenstand verweisenden emphatischen Demonstrativums *etad eva* merkwürdig. Sie scheint allenfalls unter der Voraussetzung erklärbar, daß—analog zu D—am Anfang von H ein Satz wie *katamasyaitad dharmasyādhivacanaṃ* (od. *nāmadheyaṃ*?) *yaduta bodhisattva iti* (cf. D.a.3) zu ergänzen ist. Aber angesichts der zuvor aufgezeigten Unvereinbarkeit der (ohnehin nur in späten Textzeugnissen belegten) Lesung *etad eva bodhisattvanāmadheyam* mit der Logik des Gesamtgedankenganges von H—auch als Prämisse für die in H.c.3 gezogene Konsequenz ist diese Lesung, als Tatp. verstanden, wenig geeignet—kann kaum ein Zweifel bestehen, daß sie als unursprünglich zu verwerfen ist. Sie verdankt ihre Existenz vielleicht dem Bedürfnis einer Differenzierung der Abschnitte H und D, d. h. dem Versuch, den Abschnitt H insgesamt so zu gestalten, daß er gegenüber D einen grundsätzlichen Schritt weiterführt. Daß eine solche Weiterführung durch den Absatz H.e ohnehin bereits gegeben ist, scheint nicht genügt zu haben, und so wurde das in H.d-e auftretende *nāmadheya* offenbar auch nach H.a und H.c.1 verschleppt.

Inhaltlich befriedigend wäre die Lesart *etad eva bodhisattvanāmadheyam* in H.a und H.c.1 allenfalls dann, wenn man sie als Bahuvrīhi auffaßte: "eben dies, dessen Name 'Bodhisattva' ist (oder sein soll)".

In diesem Fall wäre die Ausdrucksweise aber doch recht ungewöhnlich, und es scheint, daß angesichts des Wortlautes der *Gr.PP.* (*bodhisattvam*) auch für die *Aṣṭa* eher eine ursprüngliche Lesung "(*etam eva*?) *bodhisattvaṃ nāma*" o. ä. anzusetzen ist.[126]

Dem scheint nun aber die von T. 224, 226 und 220(5) sowie der *Rgs* repräsentierte Lesung "(*etad eva*?) *bodhi*(*sattva*?)*cittam*" zu widersprechen. Grundsätzlich ist aber im Einzelfall nicht entscheidbar, ob bei Divergenzen die Lesungen von T. 224, die der *Rgs* oder die der *Gr.PP.* (insbesondere die der Gilgit-Hss. und der *Śata*) den Vorrang verdienen, da sich einerseits Fälle finden, in denen T. 224 gegen die *Rgs* und/oder die *Gr.PP.* das Ursprüngliche bewahrt hat (vgl. z. B. S. 45), andererseits aber auch das Gegenteil belegbar ist, z. B. im Falle der schon in T. 224 vorhandenen, in der *Rgs* sowie in der *Śata* und der Gilgit-Hs. der *Aṣṭādaśa* jedoch fehlenden sekundären Geschichte von Sadāpraruditа.[127] An der vorliegenden Stelle müssen somit innere Kriterien den Ausschlag geben. Nun ist es evident, daß der Satz H.a (bzw. H.c.1) mit der Lesung *bodhi* (*sattva*?) *cittam* als Basis für H.c.3, H.d und H.e kaum besser taugt als mit der (als Tatp. verstandenen) Lesung *bodhisattvanāmadheyam*; denn in H.c.3 und H.d wird ja gefolgert, daß es also keinen wirklichen Bodhisattva, sondern nur den Namen 'Bodhisattva' gebe, und in H.e weiterhin festgestellt, daß nicht einmal dieser Name 'Bodhisattva' wirklich existiere; vom Bodhi*citta* ist also gar keine Rede mehr. Die Lesung *bodhicittam* in H.a bzw. H.c.1 ist daher auf jeden Fall gegenüber dem bestens passenden Wortlaut von D.a.4 und D.c.1 sekundär.

Daraus folgt, daß D (in seiner von im Laufe des Überlieferungsprozesses der *Aṣṭa* hinzugetretenen späteren Zusätzen gereinigten Gestalt) im wesentlichen den ursprünglichen Wortlaut bewahrt hat. Offenkundig sekundär ist lediglich—zum mindesten in der überlieferten Gestalt—der Schlußabsatz D.e. Demgegenüber hat die ursprüngliche Zusammengehörigkeit von F und D durch H zusätzlich an Wahrscheinlichkeit gewonnen. Insgesamt stützt der Vergleich mit H die oben ausgesprochene Vermutung, daß der alte Textbestand von D/F einen in sich homogenen und einstmals selbständigen alten Text über die Prajñāpāramitā darstellt, den wir im folgenden als *D bezeichnen wollen. Zu diesem alten Text mögen auch A(?), B und G als passende Rahmenelemente gehört haben, kaum jedoch der Abschnitt C, dessen Eigengewicht im Rahmen eines solch kleinen Textes allzu groß erschiene und der ohnehin kompositorisch einen Einschub darstellt (cf. S. 43).

10.

In welchem Verhältnis steht nun aber der der Rahmenelemente und der Anfangssätze ermangelnde Parallelabschnitt H zu D/F etc. bzw. zu dem ursprünglichen Text *D? Grundsätzlich bieten sich zwei Möglichkeiten an:

1. Die eine Möglichkeit besteht darin, daß der Verfasser bzw. Kompilator der *Aṣṭa* (bzw. des hier in Betracht kommenden Teiles) den Abschnitt H zum Zwecke der Weiterführung der Argumentation nach dem Muster des vermutlich vorgegebenen Abschnittes *D selbst geschaffen hat. Diese Weiterführung kann durch die Absätze H.d und vor allem H.e als gegeben angesehen werden. In diesem Falle könnte die hierzu nicht passende Lesung *bodhicittam* in H.a bzw. H.c.1—auch im Rahmen von H als einer Umgestaltung von *D—kaum als ursprünglich angesehen werden und wäre eher als ein nachträglicher Versuch, an den (vielleicht erst von einer zweiten Hand eingeschalteten?) Abschnitt E(.a) anzuknüpfen, zu bewerten. Nimmt man hingegen an, die Lesung *bodhicittam* gehe auf den "Verfasser" (dieses Teiles) der *Aṣṭa* zurück, so müßten die Absätze H.d und H.e ihrerseits von einer späteren Hand stammen, wofür es aber nicht das geringste Indiz gibt. Ferner müßte dann dem "Verfasser" (dieses Teiles) der *Aṣṭa* auch die Einschaltung von E(.a) zugeschrieben und die Konsequenz gezogen werden, daß sein Werk—aufgrund einer nicht sonderlich geschickten Verarbeitung vorgegebener Elemente—von Anfang an durch gravierende Inkohärenzen gekennzeichnet war; denn E.a schließt, wie wir sahen, nicht organisch an D an, und auch zwischen H.a bzw. H.c.1 (mit der Lesung *bodhicittam*) und E.a bestehen gravierende stilistische Unterschiede: *man-* c. Instr. und Ermahnungsstil (3. Sg. Opt.) in E.a gegenüber *vid-* etc. c. Akk. und Ich-Aussage in H.a bzw. H.c. Ein ursprünglicher Zusammenhang von H.a bzw. H.c.1 mit E.a scheint überdies durch das Dazwischenstehen von F, welches in diesem Falle kaum zu erklären wäre, ausgeschlossen.

2. Die andere Möglichkeit ist die, daß auch der Abschnitt H dem "Verfasser" (oder dann doch wohl eindeutig besser: dem Kompilator) (dieses Teiles) der *Aṣṭa* bereits vorgegeben war. Es fragt sich dann, in welchem Verhältnis dieser *vorgegebene* Abschnitt (*H) zu dem ebenfalls vorgegebenen Abschnitt *D stand. War er als eine Weiterführung der Argumentation bereits in der Vorlage mit *D verbunden, oder handelte es sich um eine abweichende, weiterentwickelte Parallelüberlieferung von *D? Im ersteren Falle bereitet die formale Geschlossenheit von *D

—bzw. (A+B+)D+F(+G)—gegenüber der Torsohaftigkeit von H Schwierigkeiten. Das abschließende Rahmenelement G könnte dann kaum ein Bestandteil der Vorlage *D/*H gewesen sein, da es dann doch wohl erst (oder zum mindesten: auch) hinter H zu erwarten wäre. Demgegenüber entfallen diese Schwierigkeiten, wenn man annimmt, der Kompilator der *Aṣṭa* habe D und H als zwei verschiedene Überlieferungen eines ursprünglich identischen Textes (≈ *D) einfach juxtaponiert. Dabei wäre von der zweiten, offenkundig weiterentwickelten Fassung (*H) nur das die Divergenzen aufweisende Kernstück inkorporiert worden. Die Absätze H.d und H.e wären in diesem Falle wohl bereits Elemente des vorgegebenen Textes *H gewesen. Die Einschaltung von E.a (etc.) könnte vor, bei oder—von späterer Hand—nach der Kompilation vorgenommen worden sein, die Einführung der Lesung *bodhicitta* in H.a (bzw. H.c.1) hingegen frühestens vom Kompilator, ebensogut aber auch von einem späteren Bearbeiter, doch spricht hier die Bewahrung der (bei dieser zweiten textgeschichtlichen Hypothese für die Vorlage *H auf jeden Fall zu fordernden) Lesart *bodhisattvam* (*nāma*?) in der *Gr.PP.* und T. 227 eher für die letztere Alternative.

11.

Die Verhältnisse werden nun aber zusätzlich kompliziert durch die Tatsache, daß sich im 1. Kapitel der *Aṣṭa* eine weitere Parallele zu unseren Abschnitten D und H findet. Ich gebe zunächst eine schematische Inhaltsanalyse des betreffenden, im folgenden als *K* bezeichneten Abschnittes (wobei aufgrund der *Gr.PP.*[128] und der chinesischen Versionen als spätere Zusätze erkennbare Stücke in eckige Klammern gesetzt sind):

K.I.a. (Ein Bodhisattva ist) aber doch andererseits (*api tu khalu punaḥ*)[129] (gar nicht festzustellen): 12,29–13,3

1. Er ist weder als in[130] der Vergangenheit befindlich faßbar (*na pūrvāntato bodhisattva upaiti*),[131] noch als in der Zukunft befindlich, noch als in der Mitte (d. h. Gegenwart) befindlich.[132] 12,30

2. [Warum?][133] 12,31–13,1

α. Aufgrund der Unbegrenztheit des Körperlichen[134] ist der Bodhisattva unbegrenzt (*rūpasyāparyantatayā* [*hi*][135] *bodhisattvāparyantatā veditavyā*).

β.[136] Analog für die übrigen Skandhas.

3.[137] α. Es läßt sich auch dies nicht feststellen: sc. daß das Körperliche der Bodhisattva sei (*rūpam bodhisattva iti* [*nopaiti.*][138] *idam*[139] *api na vidyate nopalabhyate*). 13, 1 f.

β.[136] Analog für die übrigen Skandhas. 13, 2 f.

b. (Infolgedessen kann auch kein Bodhisattva belehrt werden:)

1. Indem ich—Subhūti—somit ganz und gar keinen [als] Bodhisattva [bestimmbaren wirklichen Daseinsfaktor] feststellen kann (*evam . . . sarveṇa sarvaṃ sarvathā sarvam bodhisattva-* [*dharma*][140]*m anupalabhamāno . . . 'samanupaśyan*),— 13, 3–6

(nachträglich eingeschoben:)[141]

[x. Eine wirkliche Entität, welcher der. Name 'Bodhisattva' zukäme, stelle ich nicht fest (*nāhaṃ . . . taṃ dharmaṃ samanupaśyāmi yasyaitan nāmadheyaṃ yaduta 'bodhisattva' iti*).] 13,4 f.

[y. Auch eine Prajñāpāramitā stelle ich nicht fest.] 13,5

[z. Auch eine Allwissenheit (*sarvajñatā*) stelle ich nicht fest.] 13,5 f.

⟨2.[142]—welchen Bodhisattva soll ich da in [welcher] Prajñāpāramitā unterweisen (*katamaṃ bodhisattvaṃ* [*katamasyāṃ*][143] *prajñāpāramitāyām avavadiṣyāmy anuśāsiṣyami*)?⟩

II. ⟨a.[142]Einen Bodhisattva kann ich überhaupt nicht feststellen (*bodhisattvam eva sakalaṃ na samanupaśyāmi nopalabhe*):⟩

b. (*Aṣṭa*-Skt.:)[144] welche Entität soll ich dann vermittels welcher Entität in welcher Entität unterweisen (*katamaṃ dharmaṃ katamena dharmeṇa katamasmiṃ dharme 'vavadiṣyāmy anuśāsiṣyāmi*)? 13,6 f.

(*Gr. PP.*:)[145] Welchen Bodhisattva soll ich dann in [welcher] Prajñāpāramitā unterweisen (*tat katamaṃ*

bodhisattvaṃ [katamasyāṃ][146] *prajñāpāramitāyām avavadiṣyāmy anuśāsiṣyāmi*)?

III. [a. 'Buddha' ist ein bloßer Name.][147] 13,7 f.

b. 1.[148]⟨Man spricht ständig von einem⟩ 'Bodhisattva' (⟨*bodhisattva*⟩ *bodhisattva iti Bhagavann* ⟨*ucyate*;⟩) 13,8

2. 'Bodhisattva' ist aber bloß ein Name (*nāmadheyamātram etat*[149]). 13,8

[c. 'Prajñāpāramitā' ist ein bloßer Name.][150] 13,8

[d. Auch dieser Name ist (in Wirklichkeit) *ab initio* inexistent (wörtl.: unentstanden[151]) (*tac ca nāmadheyam anabhinirvṛttam*).][152] 13,9

e. 1. So wie man ständig von einem substantiellen Selbst (*ātman*) redet, ein solches aber (in Wirklichkeit) *ab initio* ganz und gar inexistent ist (*atyantatayā cānabhinirvṛtta ātmā*[153]), 13,9 f.

2.[154]genau so steht es mit allen Daseinsfaktoren (*evaṃsvabhāvānāṃ sarvadharmāṇām*[155]) (d. h. genau so sind auch die substanzlosen Dharmas der Hīnayāna-Ontologie *ab initio* inexistent); 13,10

3. *α*. Welcher von ihnen soll da das Körperliche sein (das angeblich den Bodhisattva konstituiert), wenn dieses (qua Dharma) [unfaßbar und] *ab initio* inexistent ist (*katamat tad rūpaṃ yad [agrāhyam]*[156] *anabhinirvṛttam*)? 13,10

β. Analog die übrigen Skandhas. 13,11

(*γ*. Zusätzlicher Text in T. 224, 226, 227, 220(5) und 220(4)!)[157]

f.[158] Das Wesen[lossein] aller dieser Dharmas ist somit ihre Nichtexistenz *ab initio* (*evam eteṣāṃ sarvadharmāṇāṃ yā [']svabhāvatā*[159] *sā 'nabhinirvṛttiḥ*). 13,11 f.

g. Und die Inexistenz *ab initio* aller Dharmas ist nicht die Dharmas (*yā ca sarvadharmāṇām anabhinirvṛttir, na te dharmāḥ*[160]) (d. h. die allein wahre Nichtexistenz *ab initio* der Dharmas schließt die wahre Existenz eben dieser Dharmas aus (?)). 13,12 f.

h. Soll ich—Subhūti—also etwa die Nichtexistenz

ab initio (v. 1.: etwas *ab initio* Nichtexistierendes) in der [(ebenfalls auf diese) Nichtexistenz *ab initio* (reduzierbaren)] Prajñāpāramitā[161] unterweisen? (*tat kim anabhinirvṛttim*[162] [*anabhinirvṛttyām*[163]][164] *prajñāpāramitāyām avavadiṣyāmy anuśāsiṣyāmi*)? 13,13

i. Und außerhalb der Nichtexistenz *ab initio* [sind alle Dharmas oder die Dharmas, die einen Buddha oder] ein[en] Bodhisattva [konstituieren, oder einer], der nach der Erleuchtung strebt, nicht festzustellen (*na cānyatrānabhinirvṛttitaḥ*[165] [*sarvadharmā vā*][166] [*buddhadharmā vā*][167] *bodhisattva*[*dharmā vā*][167] *upalabhya*[*n*]*te yo* [*vā*] *bodhāya caret*). 13,13–15

IV. a. Wenn ein Bodhisattva ob einer solchen Belehrung nicht verzagt und erschrickt (*saced . . .* [*evaṃ bhāṣyamāṇe evaṃ deśyamāne*][168] *evam upadiśyamāne bodhisattvasya*[169] *mahasattvasya*[170] *cittaṃ*[171] *nāvaliyate*, etc.[172]), 13,15–17

b. dann wandelt er in der Prajñāpāramitā ([*evaṃ veditavyam*—][173] *caraty ayaṃ bodhisattvo mahāsattvaḥ prajñāpāramitāyām*), [dann übt er die Prajñ., betrachtet sie und meditiert über sie].[174] 13,17–20

12.

Die obige Analyse des Abschnittes K zeigt deutlich, daß es sich hier um eine weitere, teilweise allerdings erheblich modifizierte und erweiterte Version von *D handelt. Insbesondere fällt auf, daß der D.a-c entsprechende Teil in fast allen alten Textzeugnissen (T. 224, T. 226, *Pañca*(*G*) und *Śata*[175]) sowie in T. 227 dreifach, in den übrigen Versionen immerhin doppelt auftritt.

Alle drei Fassungen weisen Entsprechungen zu D.b und D.c.2 entweder überhaupt nicht oder nur in Form sehr später Zusätze auf, bestätigen also die Lesung von T. 224 in D.b und D.c.2. Desgleichen bestätigt der von Zusätzen gereinigte Text aller drei Fassungen direkt oder indirekt, daß für die D.a.4 und D.c.1 entsprechenden Sätze von *D die Lesung *bodhisattvam* als die ursprüngliche anzuerkennen ist, und nicht etwa die vv.11. *bodhisattvanāmadheyam* und *bodhi*(*sattva*)-*cittam* von H.a bzw. H.c.1.

Im übrigen zeichnet sich die Fassung *K.I*, sieht man von allen späte-

ren Zusätzen ab, vor allem dadurch aus, daß sie anstelle von D.a.4 eine in der Formulierung völlig neue und in der Argumentation detailliertere, in K.I.a.2 auch das *dharmanairātmya* einbeziehende Erörterung der Nichtauffindbarkeit eines Bodhisattva eingeführt hat[176]; die alte Fassung ist in K.I.x nachträglich am falschen Ort—d. h. mitten in dem D.c.1 entsprechenden Absatz K.I.b.1—eingedrungen. In dem D.c.3 korrespondierenden Absatz K.I.b.2 haben die älteren Versionen die ursprüngliche Form des Textes bewahrt, während der überlieferte Sanskrit-Text einen (wahrscheinlich allerdings zu K.II.b zu ziehenden) stark modifizierten Wortlaut aufweist.

Die Fassung *K.II* ist ganz kurz und findet sich nur in der älteren Überlieferung (mit Ausnahme von T. 221, der ältesten chinesischen Version der (*Pañca*); sie umfaßt nur eine Entsprechung zu D.a.4 und D.c.3, stellt somit eine ganz rudimentäre Fassung dar, die zum mindesten in dem von der *Gr.PP.* gebotenen Wortlaut einen archaischen Eindruck macht; in K.II.b (≡ D.c.3) fehlt in der Formulierung der *Pañca*(*G*) sogar das auch von den alten und z. T. auch von den mittleren chinesischen Übersetzungen nicht ausgedrückte *katamasyām* (vor *prajñāpāramitāyām*), dessen Auftreten eigentlich nur in Verbindung mit den Zusätzen D.b und D.c.2 sinnvoll ist. Die chinesischen Versionen belegen, im Gegensatz zur *Gr.PP.*, für K.II.b eine Ersetzung von *bodhisattva* durch *dharma* (wobei jedoch die syntaktische Stellung dieses Wortes unklar bleibt) und bezeugen so den Beginn der im Wortlaut des überlieferten Sanskrit-Textes zum Abschluß gekommenen Umformung, deren Motivation mir allerdings nicht durchsichtig ist.

Die Fassung *K.III* ist von allen die am weitesten entwickelte. Ignoriert man die späteren Zufügungen, so beginnt sie (K.III.b.1) mit den gleichen Worten wie D.a.2, weicht aber im folgenden vom ursprünglichen Wortlaut des Ausgangstextes *D erheblich ab. Anstelle der lapidaren Feststellung von D.a.4, daß eine Entität 'Bodhisattva' nicht festzustellen sei, heißt es zunächst (in K.III.b.2), 'Bodhisattva' sei bloß ein Name[177], und anschließend wird die Nichtexistenz einer diesem Namen entsprechenden Entität ausführlich dargelegt, indem in K.III.e.1 vom Nichtentstandensein (*anabhinirvṛtti*), d. h. der Nichtexistenz *ab initio*, eines substantiellen Selbstes ausgegangen, in e.2 zum Nichtentstandensein auch der vom Hīnayāna gelehrten Dharmas fortgeschritten und diese Lehre dann in e.3 auf die fünf Skandhas (als die angeblichen Konstituenten des Bodhisattva) angewandt wird. Das wahre Wesen der Dharmas ist also ihr In-Wahrheit-gar-nicht-wirklich-Entstandensein, ihre

Inexistenz *ab initio*, die—als kontradiktorischer Gegensatz—die wahrhafte Existenz eben dieser Dharmas (und somit auch jedes Substrates der sprachlichen Bezeichnung 'Bodhisattva') ausschließt (K.III.f-g). In K.III.h folgt dann die (im Sinne der vorhergehenden Argumentation umgeformte) Entsprechung zu D.c.3: (Wenn es keine reale Entität 'Bodhisattva' gibt, sondern nur die Inexistenz *ab initio* aller mit dieser Benennung intendierten Dharmas,—) soll ich—Subhūti—etwa diese Inexistenz *ab initio* in der Prajñāpāramitā (die, so fügen die meisten Versionen hinzu, in Wahrheit ebenfalls mit dieser Inexistenz *ab initio* zusammenfällt) unterweisen? Es folgt schließlich (K.III.i) noch eine ausdrückliche Versicherung, daß außerhalb dieser absoluten Inexistenz *ab initio*—d. h. als eine wirkliche, von dieser Inexistenz *ab initio* nicht berührte Entität—ein Bodhisattva nicht feststellbar sei: Gewissermaßen eine nachträgliche Bekräftigung der Ausgangsfeststellung von D.a.4 (bzw. K.III.b.2).

Damit ist die dritte in K überlieferte Fassung von *D. a-c beendet, und es folgt (*K.IV*) die Entsprechung zu D.d-e. Dabei stimmt K.IV.a wörtlich mit D.d überein. In K.IV.b hingegen finden wir die Formulierung *caraty ayaṃ bodhisattvaḥ . . . prajñāpāramitāyām*, die wir aufgrund des Zeugnisses von *Rgs* I, 5d als möglichen ursprünglichen Wortlaut von D.e in Erwägung gezogen hatten. Diese Formulierung erscheint übrigens auch an anderen Stellen der *Aṣṭa* nach Wendungen, die D.d = H.f = K.IV.a korrespondieren. Eine Entsprechung für F.a (≡ H.h) oder F.b (≡ H.g) fehlt in K.IV, findet sich jedoch später auf p. 15,31 (im Anschluß an einen D.d entsprechenden Satz!).

13.

Auf. S. 68 f. gebe ich, um den Überblick zu erleichtern, eine synoptische Gegenüberstellung der 5 im 1. Kapitel der *Aṣṭa* überlieferten Fassungen bzw. Bearbeitungen des Kernstückes des Textes *D. Sondergut einzelner Fassungen wird nicht im vollen Wortlaut zitiert, sondern durch Punkte (. . . , im Falle nachträglicher Einschübe: [. . .]) angedeutet.

14.

Die umseitige synoptische Tabelle zeigt, daß außer den Rahmenelementen auch die Anfangssätze des eigentlichen Textes (sc. D.a.2 und D.a.3), von denen zum mindesten der erste zur Einleitung des Gedankenganges unerläßlich ist, in allen Parallelfassungen mit Ausnahme von

D/F	H
D.a.1. . . .	
2. *bodhisattvo bodhisattva iti* [*yad idaṃ*] *Bhagavann ucyate,*	
3. *katamasyaitad dharmasyādhivacanaṃ yaduta bodhisattva iti?*	
4. *nāhaṃ . . . taṃ dharmaṃ samanupaśyāmi yaduta bodhisattva iti.*	H.a. *yo 'haṃ* [*etad eva*] *bodhisattva*[*nāmadheya*]*ṃ* (v.l. *bodhicittaṃ*) *na vedmi (Pañca: vindāmi) nopalabhe na samanupaśyāmi,*
b. [*tam apy ahaṃ . . . dharmaṃ na samanupaśyāmi yaduta prajñāpāramiteti.*]	b. [*prajñāpāramitām api na vedmi (Pañca: vindāmi) nopalabhe na samanupaśyāmi,*]
c.1. *so 'haṃ . . . bodhisattvaṃ* [*vā bodhisattvadharmaṃ vā*] [*avindan*] *anupalabhamāno 'samanupaśyan*	c.1. *so 'ham . . .* [*etad eva*] *bodhisattva*[*nāmadheya*]*m* (v.l. *bodhicittam*) *avindan anupalabhamāno 'samanupaśyan*
2. [*prajñāpāramitām apy avindan anupalabhamāno 'samanupaśyan*]	2. [*prajñāpāramitām apy avindan anupalabhamāno 'samanupaśyan*]
3. *katamaṃ bodhisattvaṃ* [*katamasyāṃ*] *prajñāpāramitāyām avavadiṣyāmy anuśāsiṣyāmi?*	3. *katāmaṃ bodhisattvaṃ* [*katamasyāṃ*] *prajñāpāramitāyām avavadiṣyamy anusasiṣyāmi?*
	d. . . .
d. [*api tu khalu punaḥ*] *saced* *evaṃ bhāṣyamāṇe deśyamāna* *upadiśyamāne* *bodhisattvasya cittaṃ* *nāvalīyate na samlīyate* [*na viṣīdati na viṣādam āpadyate*] *nāsya vipṛṣṭhībhavati manasaṃ* [*na bhagnapṛṣṭhībhavati*] *nottrasyati na saṃtrasyati* *na saṃtrāsam āpadyate,*	e. *api tu khalu punaḥ . . . .* f. *saced bodhisattvasya mahasattvasya evaṃ* [*gambhīrāyāṃ*] *prajñāpāramitāyāṃ bhāṣyamānāyāṃ* [*deśyamānāyām upadiśyamānāyāṃ cittaṃ nāvalīyate na saṃlīyate* etc. wie *D. d.,* [*adhimucyate 'dhyāśayena*],
e. (*Rgs I,5d: caratī sugatāna prajñām*)	
eṣa eva [*bodhisattvo mahāsattvaḥ prajñāpāramitāyām anuśāsanīyaḥ; eṣaivasya*] *bodhisattvasya* [*mahāsattvasya prajñāpāramitā veditavyā; eṣo*] *'vavādaḥ prajñāpāramitāyām;* [*saced evaṃ tiṣṭhati,*] *eṣaivā*[*syāvavāda*]*nuśāsanī.*	g. [*avirahito bodhisattvo mahāsattvaḥ prajñāpāramitāyā veditavyaḥ*]
F.a. *ataś ca bodhisattvo mahāsattvo 'vivartanīya*[. . .] *upaparīkṣitavyah,*	h. *sthito 'vivartanīyāyāṃ bodhisattvabhūmau,*
b. *avirahitaś ca bodhisattvo mahāsattvaḥ prajñāpāramitāyā veditavyaḥ.*	(*s. g!*)
	i. [. . .]

K.I	*K.II*	*K.III*
		a. [. . .] *b.*1. *⟨bodhisattvo⟩ bodhisattva iti Bhagavann ⟨ucyate⟩*;
a. api tu khalu punaḥ . . . . . . (Neufassung!) cf. *b.x.: [nāhaṃ . . . tam dharmaṃ samanupaśyāmi yasyaitan nāmadheyaṃ yaduta 'bs.' iti.]* cf. *b.y: [prajñāpāramitām api na samanupaśyāmi nopalabhe.]*	*a. bodhisattvam eva tāvat sakalam na samanupaśyāmi nopalabhe⟩*	*b.*2. *(Pañca(D):api tu khalupunar) nāmadheyamātram etat (yaduta bodhisattva iti, Pañca(D)).* *c. [prajñāpāramiteti. . . nāmadheyamātram etat.]* *d.* [. . .] *e.-g.* . . .
*b.*1. *evaṃ .[. . sarveṇa sarvaṃ sarvathā sarvaṃ bodhisattva[dharma]ṃ anupalabhamāno [x,y,z] 'samanupaśyan*		
2. *⟨katamaṃ bodhisattvaṃ [katamasyāṃ] prajñāpāramitāyām avavadiṣyāmy anuśāsiṣyāmi?⟩*	*b. (Pañca:) tat katamaṃ bodhisattvaṃ [katamasyāṃ] prajñāpāramitāyām avavadiṣyāmy anuśāsiṣyāmi?*	*h. tat kim anabhinirvṛttim [anabhinirvṛttyām] prajñāpāramitāyām avavadiṣyāmy anuśāsiṣyāmi?* *i.* . .

K.IV

a. saced . . .
[evaṃ bhāṣyamāṇe evaṃ deśyamāne]
evam upadiśyamāne
bodhisattvasya [mahāsattvasya] cittaṃ
navalīyate na saṃlīyate
etc. wie *D.d,*
b. [evaṃ veditavyaṃ—]
caraty ayaṃ bodhisattvo mahāsattvaḥ prajñāpāramitāyām, [. . .].

K.III, wo sich (in b.1) eine Entsprechung für D.a.1 findet, fehlen. Für die sehr rudimentäre Fassung K.II mag dies nichts besagen, und im Falle von H mag das Fehlen der Anfangssätze dadurch erklärbar sein, daß die gleichlautenden Formulierungen des vorhergehenden Abschnittes D noch als erinnerlich vorausgesetzt werden konnten. Im Falle des erst gegen *Ende* des 1. Kapitels der *Aṣṭa* auftretenden Textstückes K.I jedoch

ist eine solche Erklärung ausgeschlossen, es sei denn, man setzte voraus, daß K.I irgendwann einmal unmittelbar auf H folgte. Eine solche Hypothese läßt sich aber beim derzeitigen Stand der Untersuchung nicht begründen. Im Gegenteil: Die Anfangsworte des Abschnittes K[178] (*api tu khalu punar Bhagavan pūrvāntato bodhisattvo nopaiti* . . .) würden bei einem unmittelbaren Anschluß von K.I an H nicht sonderlich gut passen; denn worauf sollte sich dann der durch das (immerhin von T. 226, *Pañca*(*G*), *Śata* und *Pañca*(*D*) klar bezeugte[179]) *api tu khalu punaḥ* (etwa: "andererseits (*punaḥ*) jedoch (*api tu*)—so hat man sich klarzumachen (*khalu*)— . . .") ausgedrückte Gegensatz[180] beziehen? Der Abschnitt K.I schließt aber auch an den Kontext, in dem er nicht nur im überlieferten Sanskrit-Text, sondern bereits in der ältesten chinesischen Version (T. 224), der *Gr.PP.* und der *Rgs* (I, 23a-b ≡ K.I. a; im übrigen belegt die *Rgs* aus K nur den Schlußsatz K.IV.b ≡ *Rgs* I,23d!) steht, sehr schlecht an: Der Abschnitt K folgt nämlich auf eine Erklärung des Begriffes 'Mahāyāna', genauer eine daran anschließende kurze Bekräftigung, daß diese Erklärung des Begriffes 'Mahāyāna' im Rahmen der (in *Aṣṭa* 2,1–3?) geforderten Erklärung der Prajñāpāramitā berechtigt ist. Darauf setzt, formal und inhaltlich völlig unvermittelt, der Abschnitt K mit der Behauptung ein, daß ein Bodhisattva nicht feststellbar sei. Ein Gegensatz dieser Behauptung zum Vorhergehenden, auf den die Konjunktion *api tu khalu punaḥ* bezugnehmen könnte, ist auch hier nicht ersichtlich.

Sucht man nun im vorhergehenden Text nach einer Stelle, an der ebenfalls der *Bodhisattva* thematisch ist, so muß man bis *Aṣṭa* 9,22–27 zurückgehen. Dort heißt es:[181] *bodhisattvo* [*mahāsattva*][182] *iti Bhagavann ucyate; tatra bodhisattva iti Bhagavan kaḥ padārthaḥ*? etc. Es folgt eine etymologisierende Erklärung des Terminus 'Bodhisattva', und anschliessend Erklärungen der Termini 'Mahāsattva'[183], *mahāsaṃnāhasaṃnaddha*, *mahāyānasaṃprasthita* etc. sowie schließlich des Begriffes 'Mahāyāna'. Daran schließt sich, wie gesagt, unser Abschnitt K an. Es steht also zwischen K und der soeben zitierten Thematisierung des Bodhisattva, in der man leicht den in K.I fehlenden Anfangssatz des Kernstükkes von *D (= D.a.2) wiedererkennt, eine ihrer Thematik nach kohärente Gruppe von Begriffsklärungen, die—dader erste Begriff 'Bodhisattva' ist und seine Behandlung in diesem Rahmen offenbar ebenfalls mit dem Satz *bodhisattvo* (*bodhisattva*) *iti Bhagavann ucyate* begann[184]—offenbar an den D.a.2 entsprechenden alten Einleitungssatz von K.I angehangen wurden und ihn von seinem ursprünglichen Kontext

getrennt haben. An diesen Satz *bodhisattvo* (*bodhisattva*) *iti Bhagavann ucyate* würde auch das K.I einleitende *api tu khalu punaḥ* bestens anknüpfen: "[Einerseits] redet man, o Erhabener, von einem Bodhisattva. Andererseits aber ist doch ein Bodhisattva . . . gar nicht faßbar . . .". Der in *Aṣṭa* 9,23 folgende Satz *bodhisattva iti Bhagavan kaḥ padārthaḥ*, an den *api tu khalu punaḥ* nicht sinnvoll anschließbar wäre und der auch in K.III.b keine Entsprechung hat, kann eben deshalb nicht zum ursprünglichen Bestand von K.I gehört haben—und damit wird, trotz D.a.3, auch seine Zugehörigkeit zu *D fraglich—, es sei denn, man betrachtete *api tu khalu punaḥ* in K.I, trotz des gewichtigen Zeugnisses der *Gr.PP.* und T 226, als sekundär, weil es in mehreren chinesischen Übersetzungen nicht repräsentiert ist.

15.

Als Ergebnis der vorangehenden Untersuchung läßt sich festhalten, daß wir im 1. Kapitel der *Aṣṭa* mehreren Fassungen bzw. Bearbeitungen eines ganz bestimmten, in sich geschlossenen und ursprünglich gewiß selbständigen Textes *D begegnen. Die meisten dieser verschiedenen Fassungen—am stärksten K.III—unterscheiden sich von der im wesentlichen durch D/F (eventuell zuzüglich A, B und G als Rahmenelementen) repräsentierten ursprünglichen Form des Textes durch z. T. erhebliche Modifikationen und/oder Erweiterungen, die fortgeschrittenere Entwicklungsstadien des *Prajñāpāramitā*-Gedankengutes, zu deren wirkungsvoller Formulierung man sich offenbar der Wendungen des alten, autoritativen Textes *D bediente, bezeugen.

Die verschiedenen Fassungen des Textes *D bilden—soweit ich sehe—zusammen weder formal noch inhaltlich ein organisch strukturiertes und systematisch aufgebautes Ganzes. Sie folgen ferner in der überlieferten Anordnung nicht sämtlich aufeinander, sondern erscheinen in zwei Gruppen: D und H am Textanfang, die drei in K enthaltenen Fassungen gegen Ende des Kapitels. Es hat daher eher den Anschein, daß wir es mit verschiedenen, juxtaponierten Ausformungen des Textes *D zu tun haben.

Einige der Fassungen unseres Textes *D enthalten in der Form, in der sie uns vorliegen, heterogene Einschlüsse von z. T. beträchtlichem Umfang. Hervorgehoben zu werden verdient die Einschaltung von E in D/F sowie die Einbeziehung von *Aṣṭa* 9,23–12,28 in K.I. Bei einzelnen Teilen dieser eingeschobenen Partien handelt es sich deutlich um verwandtes Material.[185]

Ob die Sammlung der verschiedenen Fassungen von *D und die Einschaltung des heterogenen Materials als das Werk einer einzigen (dann allerdings kompositorisch nicht gerade übermäßig geschickten) Hand anzusehen ist oder aber das Ergebnis eines mehrere Etappen umschließenden Prozesses, in dessen Verlauf sich an einen ursprünglichen Textbestand (der vielleicht nur in D/F und den zugehörigen Rahmenelementen bestand?) sukzessiv weitere Elemente anlagerten[186] oder kleinere Teilkompilationen bzw. divergierende Überlieferungen einer solchen Teilkompilation zu einer größeren Einheit zusammengefaßt wurden, läßt sich—falls überhaupt—wohl nur im Gesamtkontext der Textgeschichte zum mindesten des gesamten 1. (und 2.?) Kapitels der *Aṣṭa* entscheiden. Hierzu aber wäre die genaue Analyse weiterer Textstücke erforderlich, doch kann diese aus Gründen der räumlichen und zeitlichen Beschränkung hier nicht geleistet werden.

Schon eine oberflächliche Lektüre zeigt, daß sich im 1. Kapitel der *Aṣṭa* noch weitere Textstücke finden, die gewisse Übereinstimmungen aufweisen. Die Ähnlichkeit ist zwar nicht so auffällig wie in den in dieser Arbeit untersuchten Abschnitten D, H und K; es finden sich aber doch mehrfach verschiedene Textstücke, die unverkennbar ein und denselben Typus repräsentieren. Das auf Abschnitt H folgende Textstück *Aṣṭa* 4,25–5,6 etwa weist trotz erheblicher Divergenzen thematisch und auch in einigen Formulierungen Übereinstimmungen mit dem auf K folgenden Textstück 13,20–14,7 auf, ferner mit *Aṣṭa* 6,15–7,12 und auch mit p. 18, 1 ff. im 2. Kapitel der *Aṣṭa*. *Aṣṭa* 6,7–14 läßt sich mit 8,18–22 (sowie Kap. 2, p. 22,2ff.) vergleichen. Bevor auch diese Stücke einer gründlichen Analyse und genauen textkritischen Überprüfung an Hand der chinesischen Übersetzungen und des Parallelmaterials in der *Gr.PP.* unterworfen worden sind, fehlt ein ausreichend gesichertes Fundament für die Aufstellung einer gesicherten und zugleich umfassenden Hypothese zur Textgeschichte des 1. (und eventuell auch des 2.) Kapitels der *Aṣṭa*. Es dürfte aber evident geworden sein, daß—wenn überhaupt—allein durch eine Analyse dieser Textgeschichte die verschiedenen Schichten des von CONZE, HIKATA und LANCASTER herausgeschälten “echten Kernes” der *Aṣṭa* aufgedeckt und die Frühstufe der Entwicklung der in ihr verkündeten Ideen in wissenschaftlich gesicherter Form rekonstruiert werden kann. Der vorliegende Beitrag ist—so hoffe ich—trotz seiner offenkundigen Unvollkommenheit und Unvollständigkeit ein erster Schritt in Richtung auf dieses Ziel.

ANMERKUNGEN

1) *Abkürzungen: AAA*, ed. Vaidya (in *Aṣṭa*); *Aṣṭa*, ed. Vaidya, Darbhanga, 1960; *Pañca*(D), ed. Dutt, Calcutta, 1934; *Pañca*(G), Gilgit-Hs. der *Pañca*, Facsimile-ed. in *Śatapitaka* Vol. 10(3); *Rgs.* ed. Obermiller, repr. 1960; *Śata*, ed. Ghoṣa, Calcutta, 1902ff.

2) Cf. CONZE, ***Prajñ. Lit.***, p. 16 f.; ders., ***Perfection of Wisdom in 8000 Lines*** (1973), p. X f.—CONZE scheint der Ansicht zuzuneigen, dass im Falle der beiden ersten Kapitel die *Rgs*, im übrigen hingegen die *Aṣṭa* älter ist.

3) CONZE, "The Composition of the *Aṣṭa*" (s. A. 4), p. 169; ***Prajñ. Lit.***, p. 16; ***Perfection of Wisdom in 8000 Lines*** (1973), p. IX.

4) CONZE, ***Thirty Years of Buddhist Studies***, pp. 168 ff.

5) Die tibetische Version der *Aṣṭa* ist für die Textgeschichte unergiebig, da sie bis ins Detail der überlieferten Sanskrit-Version entspricht.—Eine Verwendung von Skt-Hss. war mir aus zeitlichen Gründen nicht möglich; aus der mir zur Kenntnis gelangten Literatur lässt sich jedoch der Eindruck gewinnen, dass sie durchweg dem gedruckten Text entsprechen und ihre Konsultation im Rahmen einer textgeschichtlichen Untersuchung nicht erforderlich ist.

6) LANCASTER, op. cit. (A. 9), p. 13.

7) Zu weiteren von CONZE als sekundär betrachteten Elementen vgl. A. 13.

8) R. HIKATA, ***Suvikrāntavikrāmi-paripṛcchā*** (1958), Introd., p. XXXXIII (*sic!*).

9) L. LANCASTER, "An Analysis of the *Aṣṭasāhasrikāprajñāpāramitāsūtra* from the Chinese Translations," Diss. Wisconsin 1968.

10) Zum Folgenden s. LANCASTER, op. cit., pp. 11 ff.

11) LANCASTER, op. cit. pp. 315—317.

12) "The Composition . . ." (s. A. 4), p. 168.

13) D. h. abgesehen von den von CONZE zusätzlich angenommenen Veränderungen in Kap. 8, 9, 13, 20—21 und 22—24 (CONZE, "Composition" [s. A. 4] pp. 175–177; ***Prajñ. Lit.*** p. 16).

14) CONZE, ***Thirty Years of Buddhist Studies***, pp. 123 ff.

15) Op. cit. (A. 14), p. 130.

16) Op. cit. (A. 14), p. 124.

17) HIKATA, op. cit. (A. 8), p. XXXX.—Das Werk KAJIYOSHIs ist mir nicht zugänglich.

18) HIKATA, loc. cit. (A. 17).

19) Man beachte in diesem Zusammenhang die von HIKATA (op. cit., p. XXXXI) hervorgehobene Schlussformel in Kap. 13 der *Aṣṭa*.

20) Vgl. S. 35f.

21) Die wichtigsten Textabweichungen der *Gr. PP.* und der chinesischen Übersetzungen sind in den Fussnoten vermerkt.—Das Auffinden der entsprechenden Stellen in den chinesischen Übersetzungen wird erleichtert durch die Konkordanz bei LANCASTER (op. cit. [A. 9], pp. 329 ff.), auf die ich den Leser verweisen darf. Für die Versionen der *Gr. PP.* gilt folgende Tabelle:

Abschnitt der Inhaltsanalysen	*Pañca (D)*	*Pañca (G)*	*Śata*
B	98, 6		324, 1
C	98, 8		324, 4
D. a	99, 6	40R9	324, 17
D. d	115, 12 ff.; cf. 116, 5 f.		472, 14
D. e	116, 14 f.	50V7	473, 6f.
E	121, 5	52V4	490, 14
F	123, 3		503, 1
G	123, 6	53R10	503, 3
H	123, 14	53V1	504, 1

22) Om. *Gr. PP. u. Sin.* (= alle chines. Übersetzungen).

23) Om. *Gr. PP.*

24) Der ursprüngliche Wortlaut ist doppeldeutig, da nicht *a priori* entscheidbar ist, ob *iti* beide oder nur ein *bodhisattvaḥ* regiert. Das nachträglich eingeschobene *yad idam* setzt die erstere Alternative voraus. Vgl. auch Aṣṭ 24, 2 f. (*naitad . . . dharmasyādhivacanam . . . yaduta 'sattvaḥ, sattva' iti*) und 24, 8 f. (*kalpān api vitiṣṭhamānaḥ 'sattvaḥ, sattva' iti vācaṃ bhaṣeta*). Die Wiederholung des von *iti* regierten Inhaltes der Rede dürfte iterativen Sinn haben. Vgl. auch analoge Pali-Stellen wie *Majjh* I, 46. —Anders T. 224 u. 226 in A. 81.

25) Om. *Gr. PP.*

26) Om. *Pañca* (*D*), *Pañca*(*G*) (*Śata* hingegen: *prajñāpāramiteti vā*), T.224, 226, 227.

27) Om. *Gr. PP.* u. T. 224–227.

28) Om. *Gr. PP.* u. Sin. ausser T. 228.

29) Om. *Gr. PP.*

30) Om. *Pañca* (*G*) u. *Śata.*

31) Om. T. 224.

32) Om. *Pañca* (*G*) u. *Śata*; statt dessen wird als weiteres Objekt *tac ca bodhisattvanāma* eingefügt.

33) Om. *Pañca* (*D*).

34) Om. T. 224–227.

35) In T. 227, T. 220 (5, 4) u. T. 228 möglicherweise vor *evaṃ bhāṣyamāṇe.*

36) Om. T. 227.

37) Om. *Gr. PP.* u. T. 227, 220 (5, 4) sowie (?) T. 224, 226 u. 228.

38) *Gr. PP.*: *na vipratisārībhavati.*

39) Om. T. 224.

40) Scheint in T. 224 zu fehlen.

41) Om. T. 227 (Textlücke?).

42) So auch *Pañca* (*D*); *Pañca* (*G*) u. *Śata* om. *ca.*

43) *Pañca* (*G*) u. *Śata*: *avaivartika*(*ḥ*).

44) Om. *Gr. PP.* sowie T. 224, T. 226 (u. T. 227: s. A. 41).

45) Om. *Pañca* (*D*), T. 224–226.

46) Om. *Pañca* (*G*), T. 224, 226, 227, 220(5).

47) Dieser Absatz (oder H.c.1 ?) fehlt in T. 224, 226, 227.

48) *Gr. PP.* u. T. 225, ggf. (cf. A. 47) auch T. 227: *bodhisattvaṃ*; T. 220(5), ggf. (cf.

A. 47) auch T. 224 u. 226: *bodhi(sattva?)-cittam.*

49) Om. *Gr. PP.*

50) Om. T. 224–227 u. 220(5).

51) *Gr. PP.*: *vindāmi.*

52) Om. *Pañca* (*D*) u. T. 220(4).

53) *Pañca* (*G*), *Śata*, T. 227 (hier oder in H. a), sowie T. 220(5) (im Gegensatz zu H.a!): *bodhisattvaṃ*; T. 224 u. 226 (hier oder in H.a): *bodhi(sattva?)cittaṃ.*

54) Om. *Pañca* (*D*), T. 224–227 u. T. 220(4).

55) Om. T. 224–227 u. T. 220(5) (!).

55A) Wörtl.: "Einnahmen und Ausgaben machen".—Andere (m. E. sekundäre) Deutungen s. DE JONG, "Notes on *Prajñāpāramitā-Texts*," Indologica Taurinensia II/1974, 109.

56) *Gr. PP.* u. T. 220(5,4) add.: *prajñāpāramiteti vā.*

57) Zu *sthā* + *vi* vgl. *Aṣṭa* 24, 8: *sacet . . . gaṅgānadīvālukopamān kalpān api vitiṣṭhamānaḥ* . . ..

58) Om. *Pañca*(*G*), *Śata* u. *Sin.* (ausser T. 225(?) u. 228).

59) Om. *Sin.* (ausser T. 228); *Pañca*(*G*), *Śata*: *nādhiṣṭhitam.*

60) Om. *Pañca*, *Śata*, T. 224, 226–227 u. 220(5).

61) Om. *Pañca*, *Śata*, T. 224, 226–228 u. 220(5).

62) Om. *Pañca*, *Śata*, T. 224–227 u. 220(5).

63) Om T. 224.

64) *Rgs* I, 2 fügt einen in der *Aṣṭa* fehlenden Vergleich hinzu!

65) Das Wort *pratibhā-* ("entgegenleuchten")—auch für die dichterische Intuition verwendet—enthält im Buddhismus die Bedeutungsmomente der Inspiration und der Fähigkeit, diese in adäquate Worte zu kleiden.

66) Cf. A. 21.

67) Die *Śata* divergiert: cf. A. 26.

68) Vgl. auch *Aṣṭa* 100, 2–5 (späterer Zusatz, cf. LANCASTER, op. cit., p. 117): *prajñāpāramiteti . . . nāmadheyamātram etat* (cf. *Aṣṭa* 13, 8 u. S. 64 des vorl. Aufsatzes!); . . . *sāpi prajñāpāramitā na vidyate nopalabhyate* . . ..

69) Vgl. aber auch A. 32.

70) Stellenangaben s. A. 21.

71) T. 221, p. 12 c 17 f.

72) S. 66.

73) Vgl. z. B. auch *Pañca* 135, 1 *sa nirvāṇenāpi na manyate* (*Aṣṭa* 5, 17 f: *sa nirvāṇam api na manyate*); *Aṣṭa* 7, 16; Pv 265, 18 (*tena ca vīryārambhena manyate*) u. 20 f. (*tā āsvādayan manyate*). Pali: z. B. *Majjh* III, 4.

74) Hsüan-tsang verwendet an der vorl. Stelle die Wiedergabe 執著 "sich anklammern"; vgl. auch Haribhadra, *AAĀ* p. 292, 2 f.: *na manyeta: abhiniveśaṃ na kuryād ity arthaḥ.*

75) T. 223, p. 233 c 21; T. 1509, p. 362 b 21.

76) Vgl. auch CONZEs Wiedergabe der vorliegenden Stelle (***Perfection of Wisdom in 8000 Lines*** [1973], p. 84: ". . . does not pride himself . . .").

77) Haribhadras Deutung (*AAĀ* p. 292, 1 ff.) ist offensichtlich eine systematisierende Umdeutung.

78) Abschnitt J.a.2 (vgl. S. 49 u. A. 82) u. H.a bzw. H.c. 1 (vgl. S. 58 sowie A. 48 u. 53). In H.a hat auch T. 220(5) 菩薩心, nicht jedoch T. 227.

79) Für die—vermutlich nicht sehr genaue und das Demonstrativum *tenāpi* überspielende—Wiedergabe von T. 224 u. T. 226 gilt das nicht.

80) In T. 227 findet sich nur der Schluss von a. 3 (oder a. 2?) sowie a. 4 (grössere Textlücke?).—Der Abschnitt J findet sich in der *Gr. PP.* an folgenden Stellen: *Pañca(D)* 172, 23 ff.; *Pañca(G)* 72B1; *Śata* 1278, 16 ff.

81) Nach T. 224 u. 226 lautet dieses Textstück im Gegensatz zum umfangreicheren Skt.-Text wie folgt: "Subhūti sprach zum Erhabenen: Was den Mahāsattva angeht—weshalb wird er 'Mahāsattva' genannt?" (*kenārthena mahāsattvo mahāsattva ity ucyate* o. ä.).

82) T. 224 u. T. 226 haben auch hier 菩薩心, womit aber angesichts des einhelligen Zeugnisses der übrigen Versionen sowie des *bodhi-* (und nicht *bodhisattva-*) voraussetzenden etymologischen Hintergrundes des vorl. Textstückes (vgl. S. 52) doch wohl *bodhicitta* (und nicht *bodhisattvacitta*) wiedergegeben wird. Vgl. auch das Synonym *sarvajñatācitta* in J. a. 3, das auch von T. 224 u. 226 bezeugt wird.

83) Om. T. 228.

84) Om. T. 224 (Lücke?).

85) Entsprechung in T. 224 (u. 226) unsicher.

86) Fehlt in der *Gr. PP.* (*Pañca(D)* 173, 2 [cf. A 87!]; *Śata* 1278, 22; *Pañca(G)* Lücke); in *Sin.* ohne Entsprechung.

87) Nur von *Śata* (1278, 22), T. 224 und T. 220(4) gestützt; *Pañca(D)* om., *Pañca (G)* lückenhaft.

88) Om. *Pañca* u. *Sin.*

89) Om. T. 224–227 u. T.220(5).

90) In der *Gr. PP.* findet sich nur die Antwort, u. zw. lediglich als Rückverweis (Pratīka) in einem an die Entsprechung zu J anschliessenden kommentarartigen Stück: *yad api tad āyusmān Subhūtir evam āha—acittatvāt tatrāpi citte 'sakta iti, . . . Pañca(D)* 174, 11 f.; *Śata* 1292, 3). In dem "Grundtext", auf den man diesen Verweis beziehen muss—d. h. in der Wiedergabe von J in der *Gr. PP.* (*Pañca(D)* 172, 23—173, 3 etc.)—fehlt der Satz aber. Sollte etwa dem in der *Gr. PP.* auf die Entsprechung zu J folgenden "Kommentar" zu J (*Pañca(D)* 173, 4 ff.) ursprünglich eine andere Textfassung von J zugrundegelegen haben als die, welche als "Grundtext" inkorporiert wurde??

91) T. 224 u. T. 226: *bodhi(sattva?)citte*; T. 225: *sarvajñatācitte* (oder *bodhicitte*?).

92) Om. *Gr. PP.* u. *Sin.* (allenfalls mit Ausnahme von T. 228).

93) Om. *Gr. PP.* u. *Sin.* ausser T. 220(4) u. 228.

94) Cf. *AAĀ* p. 292, 20 f.

95) *Pañca(D)* 121, 15 ff. (*Śāriputra āha—kā punar . . . cittasya prabhāsvaratā? Subhūtir āha—yad . . . cittaṃ na rāgeṇa saṃyuktaṃ na visaṃyuktaṃ, na dveṣeṇa . . ., na mohena . . .,* etc., *iyam . . . cittasya prabhāsvaratā)* u. 122, 11 *(yā sarvadharmāṇāṃ dharmatā, iyam ucyate 'cittatā).*

96) Cf. A. 80.

97) Beachte aber auch A. 90.

98) Cf. A. 90.

99) Cf. A. 83.

100) Möglicherweise liegt eine Haplographie aufgrund des zweimaligen *tatrāpi citte 'saktaḥ* zugrunde. Andererseits erregt gerade diese Wiederholung des (in der

von *Pañca(D)* gebotenen Fassung des Absatzes J.a.3 recht ungeschickt anschliessenden!) *tatrāpi citte 'saktaḥ* den Verdacht, dass die dazwischenstehende Begründung ein Einschub sein könnte. Man beobachtet ja oft, dass bei Texteinschüben das dem Einschub unmittelbar vorhergehende Ende des alten Textes nach dem Einschub noch einmal wiederholt wird.

101) Vgl. auch *Rgs* I, 16.—In. T. 224 allerdings finde ich keine eindeutige Entsprechung für *asakta-*; nach T. 224 lautet die Stelle vielmehr: "(Weil er) sich in allen Dharmas (= Lehrtexten) übt und alle Dharmas (= Lehrtexte) vollkommen versteht (Wz. *budh-*), deshalb nennt man ihn 'Bodhisattva'."—Zur Wiedergabe von *dharma* in T. 224 vgl. auch LANCASTER, op. cit., p. 155 ff.; möglicherweise beruht die gelegentliche Wiedergabe von *dharma* mit 經法 ("*sūtra-dharma*") auf der Bedeutung *dharma* = "Formulierung der (buddh.) Lehre", "Lehrtext" (cf. z. B. BHSD p. 277a; *Dharmadharmatāvibhāga* [ed. NOZAWA], p. 46, 14 f.: *sūtrānta-dharmadhātu-*).

102) Cf. SPEYER, *Sanskrit Syntax* § 124, 2.

103) Cf. EDGERTON, *BHSG* § 4. 11.

104) Sollte diese ingeniöse Erklärung eine einfachere—etwa *bodhisattva* = *bodhi-sakta* = "(nur) der Erleuchtung verhaftet"—verdrängt haben (etwa deshalb, weil die in dieser letzteren Erklärung vorauszusetzende positive Verwendung des gewöhnlich negativen Begriffes *sakta* im nachhinein als störend empfunden worden wäre)?

105) Vgl. S. 70.

106) Die Tatsache, daß ein Textstück kompositorisch als Einschub erscheint, impliziert zwar *nicht notwendig* textgeschichtliche Heterogenität, erhöht aber doch deren *Wahrscheinlichkeit*.

107) Vgl. S. 45f.

108) Vgl. S. 58f. (u. A. 124).

109) Zum Lok. des Abstr. bei "verbs of appointing, choosing, designing to some rank etc." cf. SPEYER, Sanskrit Syntax, § 238.

110) *upaparīkṣ-* wirkt sehr stark hier; T. 224 u. 226: "dann erhält er die Bezeichnung '*avaivartika*' ".

111) Vgl. S. 46.

112) Es verdient Erwähnung, dass sich in den chinesischen Versionen T. 220(5) und T. 220(4) vor F.a ein D.d entsprechender Zusatz findet. In T. 227 steht dieser Zusatz vor F.b, während F.a fehlt. T. 220(5) hat nach dem genannten Zusatz vor F.a ausserdem noch den weiteren Satz: "Wenn er wie beschrieben verharrt, wandelt er in der Prajñāpāramitā." Es lässt sich nicht ausschliessen, dass in diesen Versionen der ursprüngliche Kontext von F bewahrt ist (beachte auch den Schlußsatz von A. 100!). Wahrscheinlich handelt es sich jedoch bei diesen Zusätzen nur um Erweiterungen, die dem Gespür für die Inkohärenz des auch von T. 224 belegten abrupten Überganges von E.e nach F.a entsprungen sind.—Ganz sicher eine spätere Änderung ist der in T. 220(5) und T. 220(4) zwischen F.a und F.b anstelle des überlieferten *upaparīkṣitavyaḥ* eingefügte Satz: "Wenn der Bodhisattva . . . in dieser Weise *das Nicht-citta-sein des citta* betrachtet, . . .".

113) Diese Terminologie wird bezeichnenderweise im vorliegenden Textstück *nicht* verwendet.

114) Op. cit. pp. 44 f. u. 158.

115) Es fehlen vor allem die Worte *upāyakauśalyasamanvāgatena sarvabodhisattvadharmasamudāgamāya* (4, 6) sowie der gesamte Text von 4, 8 (*anuttarāyām api samyaksambodhau śikṣitukāmena . . .*) bis zum Schluss des Abschnittes.

116) *Pañca(D)* 123, 6 ff(; der ebd. sowie in *Śata* 503, 12 ff. im Gegensatz zu T. 224 auftretende Satz *buddhabhūmāv api* etc. fehlt in *Pañca(G)* und T. 221 (p. 13 c 17–22).

117) Dieser Ausdruck ist allerdings in T. 224 u. 226 nicht repräsentiert!

118) Vgl. S. 45.

119) Zu beachten ist allerdings auch S. 45, 4. Absatz!

120) Vgl. A. 44. Der Zusatz könnte aus Kap. 17 der *Aṣṭa* (pp. 161 ff.) stammen.

121) Die Authentizität des Textes im einzelnen ist allerdings unsicher, da die Überlieferung zu divergieren scheint. T. 224 ist leider an dieser Stelle schwer zu beurteilen, T. 226 offenbar lückenhaft.

122) Vgl. S. 48.

123) YUYAMAs Deutung von *citta* als Nom. Sg. (*A Grammar of the **Prajñā-pāramitā-Ratna-guṇa-saṃcaya-gāthā**,* Canberra 1973, § 8.19, ist kaum richtig. M. E. handelt es sich um einen Genitiv (EDGERTON, *BHSG* § 8.10); oder das vorhergehende, mit *bodhisattva* komponierte *upalabdhi* ist zugleich auch—nach Art eines "split compound"—mit *citta* zu verbinden (*upalabdhi . . . citta = citta-upalabdhi*).

124) *yasmin na prajñāvarapāramitopalabdhi na ca bodhisattva-upalabdhi na citta bodheḥ / evaṃ śruṇitva na ca muhyati nāsti trāso so bodhisattva carate sugatāna prajñāṃ //*

125) *AAĀ* p. 294, 20 ff.

126) Sollte ursprünglich eine leicht missdeutbare Formulierung in Prakrit oder Misch-Sanskrit zugrundegelegen haben?

127) Cf. CONZE, *Prajñ. Lit.*, p. 15.

128) *Pañca(D)* 244, 18 ff.; *Pañca(G)* 109R15 ff.; *Śata* 1642, 15 ff.

129) Nur in der *Gr. PP.* und T. 226 bezeugt.

130) *AAĀ* p. 322, 28 f.: . . . *saptamyantāt tasiḥ 'pūrvāntata' ityādau jñeyaḥ.*

131) *upaiti* wird hier offenbar im Sinne von *saṃkhyām upaiti* verwendet; die *Śata* hat *upalabhyate* statt *upaiti.*

132) Cf. *Aṣṭa* 23, 26 f. (*na hi sattvasyānto vā madhyaṃ vā paryavasānaṃ vopalabhyate*) u. 24, 1 ff.

133) Om. *Gr. PP.* u. *Sin.* ausser T. 220(4) u. T. 228.

134) Cf. *Aṣṭa* 23, 18 ff., spez. 23, 22—24 (*rūpasya hi . . . nānto na madhyaṃ na paryavasānam upalabhyate / evaṃ vedanāyāḥ* etc. . . . / *anena . . . paryāyeṇa ārambaṇānantatayā*.. . .).

135) Om. *Gr. PP.*; in *Sin.* nicht fassbar.

136) In T. 224 u. 226 nur im Rahmen des Zusatzes K. III. e. 3. *γ*.

137) In T.227 erst nach III. e. 3. *β*.

138) Om. *Gr. PP.* u. *Sin.*

139) *Gr. PP.*: *evam.*

140) Om. *Gr. PP.* u. *Sin.*

141) Om. *Gr. PP.* u. *Sin.* (ausser T. 220(4) u. 228, wo sich die Absätze y u. z finden.

142) Nur in *Pañca(G)*, *Śata* u. T. 224–227; beachte aber auch A. 145.

143) Om. T. 225 u. 227.

144) So auch T. 220(5) u. 220(4) im Rahmen von K. III. e. 3. γ.—Auch T. 224-228 bezeugen Lesarten, in denen *bodhisattvam* fehlt und statt dessen *dharma-* auftritt.

145) So auch T. 220(5) u. 220(4), die aber möglicherweise K.I.b 2 wiedergeben.

146) Om. *Sin.* u. *Pañca*(*G*) (!!, aber gegen *Śata*).

147) Om. *Gr. PP.* u. *Sin.* (lediglich T. 220(5) u. 220(4) belegen den Satz im Rahmen von K. III. e. 3. γ).

148) Ergänzt nach *Pañca*(*G*) (cf. T. 224, 226, 227 u. 220(5)); *Pañca*(*D*) om. K. III.b.1; *Śata: bodhisattvo mahāsattva iti Bhagavann ucyate.*

149) *Pañca*(*D*): *api tu khalu punar nāmadheyamātram etad yaduta bodhisattva iti.*

150) Om. *Gr. PP.* u. *Sin.* (ausser T.228); im Rahmen von K.III.e.3.γ auch in T. 220 (5 u. 4) belegt.—Vgl. auch A. 68; *Aṣṭa* 100, 2—5 war vielleicht der Anlass für die Zufügung von K.III.c.

151) Vgl. z. B. *Aṣṭa* 102, 12: *anutpattipāramiteyam . . ., sarvadharmānabhinirvṛttitām upādāya.*

152) Om. *Gr. PP.* u. *Sin.* (ausser T. 228).

153) *Pañca* (*G*) u. *Śata*: *atyantānabhinirvṛttaś cātmā.*

154) *Śata* fügt vor K.III.e.2 ein: *evam Bhagavan 'bodhisattva' . . . ity ucyate, atyantānabhinirvṛttaś ca bodhisattvaḥ.*

155) Zum Genit. abs. statt Lok. abs. vgl. *Aṣṭa* 12, 12 neben *Pañca* 229, 16.

156) Om. *Gr. PP.* sowie T. 226 u. 220(5 u. 4).

157) In T.224 u. 226 wird im Zusammenhang mit dem letzten der 5 Skandhas (sc. *vijñāna*) der gesamte Text von K.I.a. 2 bis III.e.3.α wiederholt, wobei aber stets *rūpa* durch *vijñāna* ersetzt ist. Auch T. 227 und T. 220(5 u. 4) folgen dieser Überlieferung, beginnen jedoch den Zusatz mit K.I.a.3 (α + β!)—einem Absatz, der in T. 227 in Teil I fehlt. In T. 225, T. 228 sowie allen von mir eingesehenen Versionen der *Gr. PP.* (*Pañca*(*D*), *Pañca*(*G*), *Śata* u. T. 221) fehlt das Textstück K.III.e.3.γ, das m. E. als eine frühe Auswucherung zu beurteilen ist, da es gegenüber dem durch die *Gr. PP.* u. T. 225 bestätigten textgeschichtlich plausibleren Aufbau des überlieferten Skt.-Textes eine strukturelle Verwirrung darstellt.

Nach T. 224 u. 226 ergäbe sich folgende Gliederung des Abschnittes K:

I. = Skt. I.a.1
II. = Skt. I.a.2 (α) + I.a.3(α) + I.b + II + III.b u. e.1—3β
III. = Skt. I.a.2 (β[$\mapsto$ *vijñāna*]) + I.a.3 (β[*vijñ.*]) + I.b + II + III.b. u. e.1, 2 u. 3β (*vijñ.*)
IV. = Skt. III.f — IV.b

Nach T. 227 u. 220(5 u. 4):

I. = Skt. I.a.1—2
II. = Skt. [I.a.3 (T. 227 om!)] + I.b + II + III.b + III.e.1-3β + I.a.3.α
III. = Skt. I.a.3.β + I.b + II + III.b + III.e.1, 2 u. 3β(*vijñ.*)
IV. = Skt. III.f — IV.b

158) Om. *Gr. PP.*

159) In T. 224 — 227 keine Negation (u. kein Abstraktum [?]).

160) Der Wortlaut in der *Gr. PP.* weicht etwas ab, vgl. z. B. *Pañca*(*G*): *yac ca Bhagavann anabhinirvṛttaṃ, na tad rūpaṃ, nā sā vedanā,* etc.

161) Cf. *Aṣṭa* 94, 9 f.: *anabhinirvṛttir, Bhagavan, prajñāpāramitā.*
162) *Śata: -ttam.*
163) *Pañca(D): -ttau; Śata: -ttāyāṃ.*
164) Om. *Pañca(G)* (!) u. T. 221 sowie T. 225 u. 227.
165) *Pañca(D), Śata: --tteḥ.*
166) Om. *Gr. PP.* u. *Sin.* (ausser T. 220(5 u. 4) u. T. 228).
167) Om. *Gr. PP.* u. *Sin.* (ausser T. 228).
168) Om. *Gr. PP.*; in *Sin.* nicht fassbar.
169) Om. T. 224–226.
170) Om. T. 224–227.
171) Om. T. 224–227 u. 220(5).
172) Cf. D.d u. H.f.
173) Om. *Gr. PP.* u. T. 224 u. 226.
174) Om. *Gr. PP.* u. *Sin.* (ausser T. 228).
175) Nicht aber T. 221.
176) Der heterogene Charakter von K.I.a wird stilistisch auch durch die Verwendung der 3. Pers. Sg.—im Gegensatz zu der (zu D.a passenden) Verwendung der 1. Pers. Sg. in K.I.b (≡ D.c)—angezeigt.
177) Vgl. auch *Aṣṭa* 24, 2–4: . . . *katamasyaitad dharmasyādhivacanaṃ yaduta sattvaḥ sattva iti? . . . naitad . . . dharmasyādhivacanam . . .; āgantukam etan nāmadheyaṃ prakṣiptam, avastukam etan nāmadheyaṃ prakṣiptam . . .*
178) Das unmittelbar vorhergehende *buddhānubhāvād Bhagavan* fehlt in der *Gr. PP.* und *Sin.* (ausser T. 228). Die einleitende Floskel *evam ukte* etc. kann als formales Gestaltungsmittel des Kompilators ausgeklammert werden.
179) Vgl. auch die Lesung der *Pañca(D)* in dem K.I.a funktional entsprechenden Absatz K.III.b.2 (s. A. 149)!
180) Vgl. auch *Crit. Pali Dict.*, Vol. I. p. 288 (s.v. *api ca kho pana*).
181) Die vorhergehenden Worte vom Anfang der Z.20 an sind nach Ausweis von *Pañca* u. *Sin.* (ausser T. 228) ein später Zusatz.
182) *Pañca* (160, 15) u. T. 221 (18 b 14) sowie T. 225 u. T. 226: *bodhisattva*; T. 224, 227, 220(5) u. 228 om.
183) Vgl. S. 51.
184) Die Behandlung des Begriffes 'Bodhisattva' in *D liesse sich sehr wohl als eine absichtliche, auf dem Hintergrund der *Prajñāpāramitā*-Ontologie vollzogene Umgestaltung der—dann natürlich älteren—etymologisierenden Erklärung (die jedoch im nachhinein ebenfalls in die Kompilation aufgenommen wurde) verstehen (vgl. auch S. 52. f.).
185) Vgl. S. 49. ff.
186) Ein solcher Vorgang dürfte auf jeden Fall weiteren Parallelen, die sich in späteren Kapiteln der *Aṣṭa* finden, (z. B. pp. 100, 2–5; 217, 14–16; 218, 5–10; 220, 24 ff.; 221, 2 ff.;, zugrundeliegen.

II

Vajracchedikāprajñāpāramitā

Secret of The *Heart Sutra*

Alex Wayman

Introduction

Commentaries on the ***Heart Sūtra:*** There are two distinct types of commentaries of the ***Heart Sūtra (Prajñāpāramitāhṛdayasūtra)***: the Asian sectarian commentary, and the Western non-sectarian commentary. Here there is easily a misunderstanding, to wit, that when an Asian talks in the West on the ***Heart Sūtra*** he communicates his Asian lore, say, as an Asian Buddhist monk. This is not necessarily the case. For example, when Daizetz Suzuki wrote about the ***Heart Sūtra***, it must be granted that he wrote out of his knowledge of sources especially in his native Japanese. But what he said, for example,[1] "as far as we can ascertain, the Bodhisattva Avalokiteśvara does not appear in any of the Prajñāpāramitā Sūtras . . ." is not what would have ever been said in the traditional Asian commentary on the ***Heart Sūtra***: it would have been considered impertinent and impugning the validity of the Sūtra. In the Western sense this is a most helpful remark. It is quite apparent that most of what Suzuki writes about the ***Heart Sūtra*** is not the rendition of Asian commentary but rather what he thinks the Westerner, assumed to be an outsider to the topic, needs to be told so that, hopefully, he will understand this scripture. It is almost inevitable that an Asian (whether Chinese, Japanese, or Tibetan), were he to lecture to a Western audience on the ***Heart Sūtra*** would start by assuming—and ordinarily quite correctly—that his audience members are ignorant of the fundamental teachings of Buddhism; and so, without ever intending to depart from the ***Heart Sūtra***, would end up spending the time lecturing on general Buddhism and never really explaining the ***Heart Sūtra*** itself. Such lectures themselves may be quite informative of other matters.

In contrast, the Asian sectarian commentary is the type found in the Tibetan Tanjur collection, and among Chinese and Japanese native commentaries. A good illustration from the Far East is Kūkai's "Secret Key to the ***Heart Sutra***."[2] In this case also, it is a sectarian commentary filled with allusions to the special tenets of Kūkai's own school (the Shingon)—such as the Diamond Realm and the Lotus Realm, and

indicating that portions of the Sūtra refer respectively to the Śrāvakas, Pratyekabuddhas, and the Mahāyāna Bodhisattvas. Hence it is valuable for showing Kūkai's position.

There is easily another misunderstanding, namely, that when a Westerner talks on the ***Heart Sūtra*** he cannot help but give a Western-type treatment, or could not be expected to speak as an Asian would. But just as the Asian can speak as a Westerner, so also the Westerner can speak as an Asian. My present commentary is probably to be described as an Asian-type commentary composed by a Westerner. That is, it follows a certain type of explanations from sources in Asian languages, and could be understood by persons with the appropriate background. This background is especially in the Buddhist theory of meditation, for which I have used some Yogācāra passages of Asaṅga (who understood), Vasubandhu (who popularized), and Sthiramati (who clarified), but the illustrious Mādhyamika Āryadeva also is helpful, as is the Vinaya master Vinītadeva.

Background of the present commentary: Around the middle 1950's when I was a student at the University of California, Berkeley, the poet Gary Snyder had received a scholarship from the First Zen Institute of New York to participate in the training of a Zen monastery in Kyoto, Japan. After a while he wrote me a note saying that while the monks recite the ***Heart Sūtra*** every day, he had been unable to find anyone who could explain what it meant, and asking me if I could find out what it means. In those days I used to spend much time reading in the Tibetan canon, the Kanjur and Tanjur in the Derge edition at Berkeley. So I consulted the Tōhoku catalog of the Derge canon and located the six Tanjur commentaries on this sūtra in the section devoted to *Prajñāpāramitā* scripture commentaries. One feature of these commentaries on the ***Heart Sūtra*** struck me quite forcibly: each commentary seemed so different from the others, and yet they seemed all to show in greater or less degree the influence of the Mādhyamika school of Buddhist philosophy. The writers seemed to be experiencing some difficulty in exposition, as though they were not writing through having inherited a tradition about this scripture going back to its original composition, but rather were simply applying their particular learning in Buddhism to the terminology of the sūtra. That would account for the great variety of their comments. Then, for the most part being followers of the Mādhyamika, they would show this sectarian position by their kind of citation. It occurred to me that perhaps the ***Heart Sūtra*** had a different theo-

retical basis than what these commentaries were impressing upon it, and that the basis might actually be of Yogācāra nature. Certain commentaries gave explanations of the concluding mantras, and attempted to relate the structure of the sūtra to what are called in Buddhism the 'three gates to liberation'—voidness, wishless, and non-sign-source. Accordingly, I made my own translation of the sūtra, using the Max Müller and Bunyiu Nanjio edition of the shorter version and taking into account some remarks from certain Tanjur commentaries. In those days I communicated my understanding of the sūtra to the Berkeley Buddhist Church. Later I incorporated my interpretation of the ***Heart Sūtra*** within a published paper, "The Buddhist 'Not this, Not this' ".[3] From my present vantage ground, the interpretation of the ***Heart Sūtra*** in this early essay suffers from various faults, such as a misapplication of the three gates to liberation; and I cannot commend it. There are perhaps only two important points that I saw or rendered correctly in those days, namely, 1) that the Tanjur commentaries, while helpful on this or that phrase, still were not really explaining this sūtra; and that it would be more fruitful to consult Asaṅga's works; and 2) that the commentary by the author calling himself Vajrapāṇi correctly related parts of the concluding *mantra* to earlier sections of the ***Heart Sūtra***. The present interpretation in based on certain findings in a recent research paper on Buddhist meditation;[4] and in the case of the concluding *mantra,* based on a recent paper about *mantras*.[5] Furthermore, I now find Conze's editions of the longer and shorter ***Heart Sūtra*** preferable to the editions of Müller and Nanjio.[6] For the purposes of my present explanation I have translated the shorter version and added in parentheses certain sentences from the longer version that I deem essential for understanding this sūtra.

As to translation of individual words, the rendition that most needs defending is my 'afterwards' for *tasmāt,*which is usually and quite properly rendered as 'therefore', 'hence', and 'for this reason' as the 'conclusive' interpretation of the ablative *tasmāt,* for which see Speijer.[7] This is the reasoned conclusion, which is a sort of logical afterwards for what went before. As is well attested, the purely temporal interpretation of the ablative in Sanskrit, i.e. as 'after', is rare; but as I have occasionally noticed, when the 'after' interpretation is demanded by a context it may be overlooked for that very reason of rarity. Anyway, in the context of the ***Heart Sūtra***, the usual translation of the two *tasmāt*-s as

'therefore' strikes a jarring note, since there is no obvious antecedent to appeal to as the reason for saying 'therefore'.

Doctrinal introduction: This commentary of mine, called "Explaining the Difficulties," would not be comprehensible to the usual Western reader, unless prepared by introductory teachings, at least as concerns the Buddhist three worlds and the theory of two *dharma*s.

a. Cessation of 'motivations' in the three worlds. The second member of Buddhist dependent origination (*pratītyasamutpāda*) is 'motivation' (*saṃskāra*), and one explanation of this member in the old Buddhist canon (the Pāli scriptures) is that it has the varieties of body, speech, and mind. The Buddhist theory of three worlds (desire, form, and formless) is also ancient. In my recent paper on Buddhist meditation[8] I have gathered the textual sources to show how the three kinds of motivation successively cease in various parts of the three worlds. The following lay-out will show the main elements of the solution:

SUMMIT OF EXISTENCE (*bhavāgra*)

3. Cessation of ideas and feelings = cessation of 'motivation of mind' (*manaḥ-saṃskāra*); cessation of constructed *dharmas.*

FORMLESS REALM

— — —

REALM OF FORM

2. *Fourth Dhyāna*:	free from inbreathing and outbreathing; = cessation of 'motivation of body' (*kāya-saṃskāra*).
Third Dhyāna:	pleasure by way of body
1. *Second Dhyāna*:	free from inquiry (*vitarka*) and investigation (*vicāra*) = cessation of 'motivation of speech' (*vāk-saṃskāra*).
First Dhyāna:	inquiry and investigation

REALM OF DESIRE

— — —

b. The two *dharma*s. One may contrast the older and later religious aims of Buddhism. For the ancient view there is the verse in the ***Saṃyuttanikāya:***[9]

As the tortoise in its own shell withdraws its limbs, so may

> the monk (withdraw) his mind's (outgoing) conjectures; resortless, not harming another, denouncing no one, proceed to *Parinirvāṇa.*

However, with the rise of the Mahāyāna ideal of the Bodhisattva, who has opted to stay in the world for the benefit of other beings rather than pursue the personal aim of liberation, there were in effect two goals—the older one of liberation from the cyclical flow (*saṃsāra*), and the newer one of deliberately postponing this liberation to serve mankind and later to achieve complete enlightenment. The two are stated this way in Āryadeva's ***Catuḥśataka,*** XII, 23 (= verse 298), available in Sanskrit:

> The Tathāgatas have stated in short that the Dharma is non-harming (of others), and that voidness is Nirvāṇa. Here there are only these two.

As Candrakīrti explains in part this passage, "Non-harming and voidness—these two *dharma*s attain heaven (*svarga*) and liberation (*apavarga*)."[10] The Tibetan author Red-mda'-ba, in his lectures on the ***Catuḥśataka,*** refers to this very passage along with a citation,[11] "The Nirvāna with remainder is explained as the two Formal Bodies [i.e. Saṃbhogakāya and Nirmāṇakāya]; the Nirvāṇa without remainder as the Dharmakāya." Accordingly, non-harm leads to heaven (*svarga*), and in the Mahāyāna sense to the two Formal Bodies; while voidness leads to liberation (*apavarga*), and in the Mahāyāna sense to the Dharmakāya. In the ***Prasannapādā,*** where the verse is cited amidst the commentary on Chap. XVIII, 4,[12] the discussion appears limited to the voidness *dharma,* since XVIII, 4, is concerned with this side. The Bodhisattva path is the other one of the pair, with the *dharma* 'non-harm.' The ***Heart Sūtra***, with its stress on voidness, mainly presents the '*dharma* of voidness', but has hints of the other *dharma.*

It is in connection with those two *dharma*s that this essay is entitled "Secret of the *Heart Sūtra.*" Jñānagarbha explains the term 'secret': "Because for immature sentient beings, the profound Dharma is secret."[13]

*The **Prajñāpāramitāhṛdaya-sūtra**, translated from the longer and shorter versions, with the commentary "Explaining the Difficulties"*

(AND AT THAT TIME, YOU SHOULD KNOW, THE LORD WAS EQUIPOISED IN THE SAMĀDHI 'PROFOUND APPEARANCE').

THE NOBLE BODHISATTVA AVALOKITEŚVARA, WHILE ENGAGED IN THE PRACTICE OF PROFOUND PRAJÑĀPĀRAMITĀ, INSPECTED AND OBSERVED THAT THE FIVE PERSONALITY AGGREGATES ARE VOID OF 'SELF-EXISTENCE'. (THE NOBLE BODHISATTVA GREAT BEING AVALOKITEŚVARA SPOKE AS FOLLOWS TO THE VENERABLE ŚĀRIPUTRA).

There are three persons mentioned: **the Lord**, i.e. the Buddha, is the enlightened one, the inaugurator of Buddhism; **Avalokiteśvara**, one of the great **Bodhisattvas**, the sons of the Buddha, is especially noted for surveying the sentient beings in compassionate manner; **Śāriputra**, one of the great early disciples of the Buddha, is especially noted for preeminence of his insight (*prajñā*, in Pāli, *paññā*). The ***Heart Sūtra*** represents the Buddha, while in the ***Samādhi* 'Profound Appearance,'** inspiring Avalokiteśvara to instruct Śāriputra. It is claimed in Mahāyāna Buddhism that the Buddha teaches Avalokiteśvara with a body called the Sambhogakāya, and teaches the disciples like Śāriputra with a body called the Nirmāṇakāya. So the Buddhist master Vasubandhu explains in the ***Buddhānusmṛtiṭīkā***:[14] "According to the scripture (*āgama*), the Lord (*bhagavat*), with the Sambhogakāya, staying in the abode of the *Akaniṣṭha* [heaven], teaches the Mahāyāna Doctrine to Avalokiteśvara and the other great beings on the Tenth Stage, and with his Nirmāṇakāya, staying in the range of desire for as long as the cyclical flow (*saṃsāra*) lasts, observing the streams of consciousness of the noble Śāriputra, and so on, and of other fortunate sentient beings, with the three kinds of marvels (*prātihārya*) teaches the true nature of the Śrāvakayāna exactly according to their expectations and their potentialities." Since Avalokiteśvara teaches Śāriputra, the Nirmāṇakayā is here represented by Avalokiteśvara.

Concerning the ***Samādhi* 'Profound Appearance'**, the Sanskrit expression is *gambhīra-avabhāsa*. The Pāli equivalent to *avabhāsa* is *obhāsa*; and Gautama Buddha spoke thus to the monks in a passage preserved in Pāli in the ***Aṅguttaranikāya (Book of Eights)***. The additions 'profound' and 'far-spread' are bracketed in my translation:[15]

> Monks, before my awakening when being a Bodhisattva I was not completely enlightened, I conceived [profound] appearances (*obhāsa*) but did not see [far-spread] forms (*rūpa*). Monks, it occurred to me, "If I were both to conceive [profound] appearances and to see [far-

> spread] forms, in that case knowledge and vision would be better purified in me."

This expression 'knowledge and vision' (S. *jñāna-darśana*) is important in early Buddhism in the theory of advanced meditation. Vinītadeva explains the expression in his commentary on the Fourth Defeat of the Vinaya:[16] "'knowledge' (*jñāna*) is the insight (*prajñā*) involved in search; 'vision' (*darśana*) is the insight after search." Thus Vinītadeva's comment is directly applicable to that passage from the ***Book of Eights***, to help explain the ***Samādhi* 'Profound Appearances'**. That is, the opening of the ***Heart Sūtra*** represents the Buddha entering the ***Samādhi* 'Profound Appearances'** to inspire Avalokiteśvara with the pre-enlightenment stages called 'knowledge', i.e. when *prajñā* was involved in search, and was assisted by sentient beings.[17]

Besides, Avalokiteśvara as an advanced Bodhisattva has certain abilities in proceeding through what Buddhism calls the 'three realms': desire, form, and formless. As meditative attainments the realm of form is divided into the four *Dhyānas* (Pāli, *Jhāna*), and the formless realm with its four 'equipoises' (*samāpatti*) is surmounted by the 'summit of existence' (*bhavāgra*). Asaṅga's ***Samāhitabhūmi*** teaches that a yogin who is not pure can do no better than pass through these states sequentially, and likewise in reverse order. But that a yogin who is pure can leap over the second one, and not the third which is too far, and comparably in reverse order; for example, jumping from the *First Dhyāna* directly to the *Third Dhyāna*. And that, finally, Tathāgatas and Bodhisattvas of the last three stages, hence Avalokiteśvara and other great Bodhisattvas, can enter any of these stages from any other one.[18]

Finally, more can be said of Śāriputra from the Pāli canon with his Pāli name Sāriputta in the ***Majjhimanikāya*** (III, 29): " . . . speaking rightly he would say of Sāriputta—'He is the Lord's son, born from his heart and his mouth, born from the Dhamma, a creation of Dhamma, an heir of Dhamma, not an heir of material things'." Asaṅga explains some of the terms of this sūtra passage in the *Paryāya-saṃgrahaṇī* of the ***Yogācārabhūmi***:[19]

> 'Son of the Teacher' is the brief reference. 'Born from his heart' means among the inner sons, because omitting ordinary persons (*pṛthag-jana*) who are unadvanced. 'Born from his mouth' means born from the words which teach the Dharma. 'Born from the Dharma' means

born from orienting his mind methodically to the Dharma and accomplishing the Dharma accordingly.

Then Avalokiteśvara spoke to Śāriputra about how the Śrāvaka, Pratyekabuddha, and Bodhisattva contemplate the **five personality aggregates** (*skandha*) to realize 'non-self of personality' (*pudgala-nairātmya*):

"HERE, ŚĀRIPUTRA, FORM IS VOIDNESS, AND VOIDNESS VERILY IS FORM, VOIDNESS IS NOT DIFFERENT FROM FORM; FORM IS NOT DIFFERENT FROM VOIDNESS. WHAT IS FORM, THAT IS VOIDNESS; WHAT IS VOIDNESS, THAT IS FORM. THE SAME IS THE CASE WITH FEELINGS, IDEAS, MOTIVATIONS, AND PERCEPTIONS."

Here (iha) means the *Second Dhyāna* of the 'realm of form' where occurs the cessation of 'speech motivation' (*vāk-saṃskāra*), since here there is neither 'inquiry' (*vitarka*) nor 'investigation' (as development of discursive thought) (*vicāra*). And here the yogin especially contemplates revolting objects, such as the cadaver in decomposition, as suggested in the ***Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra***, XIX, 50, by mention of the sign-source in front; Sthiramati's subcommentary clarifies that this contemplation is meant to destroy the immemorial attachment to the sign-source of location (*pratiṣṭhānimitta*), the 'receptacle-realm' (*bhājanaloka*), or sensory objects (*viṣaya*).[20] **Form is voidness** may be understood from Vimalamitra's commentary this way:[21] it is void of self-existence whether form be a mode-of-being (*bhāva*) or a designation (*prajñapti*). The same would apply to the other aggregates—**feelings, ideas, motivations, and perceptions.**

Voidness verily is form means according to Vimalamitra the voidness of the 'city of gandharvas'—hence, also the voidness of a dream, of the 'moon in the waters (of earth)', and so on. Using his hint, the statement **voidness verily is form** and a like statement for the other personality aggregates, can be illustrated by combining Asaṅga's explanations from two places of his ***Yogācārabhūmi,*** for the similes of the ancient Buddhist canon:[22]

'a lump of foam' *verily is form.*

Asaṅga: because form (i.e. the body) has arisen from the element of water, appears as though it is a self while it is not a self, and is

incapable of behaving as it wishes.

'a bubble' *verily is feelings.*

Asaṅga: by way of a triple association, to wit, by way of cloud (sense object), soil (sense organ), and rain (sense perception).

'a mirage' *verily is ideas.*

Asaṅga: by way of the appearance of a knowable, and as though tormented (by thirst) and deluded.

'a plantain trunk' *verily is motivations.*

Asaṅga: by way of (the noble disciple's) cutting the root which is the reifying view (*satkāyadṛṣṭi*), which amounts to the diverse causes of many kinds of body ('upright shoots'); peeling it (pulling off the various volitions, *cetanā*) he does not find a core.

'an illusion' *verily is perception.*

Asaṅga: by way of perception being a 'magician' approaching (motivations) virtuous, unvirtuous, and unshaken; and being the 'traveler at the crossroads' based on four stations (i.e. form, feelings, ideas, and motivations).

Voidness is not different from form; form is not different from voidness means according to Vimalamitra: there is no respective external entity (*bāhyārtha*) of **form** and **voidness**, that is to say, **voidness** is not external to **form**, and vice versa. This agrees with the Mādhyamika position that positing **voidness** as an external entity would be reifying it. As with **form,** so also in the cases of **feelings, ideas, motivations, and perceptions.** As I take the two statements individually: **voidness is not different from form**—because if different in the sense that **voidness** possesses a **form**, likewise, **feelings, ideas, motivations, and perceptions**—then **'voidness'** would be reified as a self. And **form is not different from voidness**—because if different in the sense that **form** is a lay-out, so also, **feelings, ideas, motivations, and perceptions**, upon voidness as a base—then we could also say that the paints used for painting a picture are different from the picture, stand out as different from the picture which is the reified void base.

Then Avalokiteśvara spoke to Śāriputra about how the Pratyekabuddha and the Bodhisattva contemplate 'all *dharmas*' to realize 'non-self of *dharmas*' (*dharma-nairātmya*):

"HERE, ŚĀRIPUTRA, ALL NATURES (DHARMA) HAVE THE CHARACTER OF VOIDNESS; ARE NOT ORIGINATED AND

NOT DESTROYED; NOT DEFILED AND NOT PURE; WITHOUT SUBTRACTION AND WITHOUT ADDITION."

Here (*iha*) means the *Fourth Dhyāna*, free from the fault of inhalation and exhalation, i.e. the cessation of 'body motivation' (*kāya-saṃskāra*). Vasubandhu's ***Abhidharmakośa*** (VI, 24) states:

> The Teacher (i.e. the Buddha) and the rhinocerus (i.e. the Pratyekabuddha, up to (their individual) enlightenments at the upper end of (the Fourth) *Dhyāna*, have a single basis (i.e. of the four paths). Before that: what is conducive to liberation (i.e. the path of equipment).

Hence here there are the two *dharma*s—non-harm and voidness, as alluded to in Āryadeva's verse.

The character of voidness: Sthiramati, subcommentary on ***Sūtrālaṃkāra***, XIX, 48, uses the term **'character of voidness'** (*śūnyatā-lakṣaṇa*, Tib. *stoṅ pa ñid kyi mtshan ñid*) in connection with the verse's 'knowing as they really are' of the Bodhisattva starting with his First Stage.[23] Thus **'character'** (*lakṣaṇa*) points to the '*dharma* of non-harm', because it involves the Bodhisattva's path as contrasted with that of the Pratyekabuddha. The ***Madhyāntavibhāga*** says: "The unreality of the two (subject and object), and the reality of the unreality, is the character of the void (*śūnyalakṣaṇa*)."[24]

All natures (dharma) means the personality aggregates (*skandha*), the elements (*dhātu*), the sense bases (*āyatana*). The Mahāyāna scripture ***"Meeting of Father and Son" (Pitāputrasamāgama)*** has this: "O great king. Thus all *dharma*s are the gateway to liberation."[25] This points to the '*dharma* of voidness' for the Pratyekabuddha. According to Asaṅga, *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* of the ***Samāhitabhūmi***, the gates to liberation—voidness, wishless, and non-sign-source—distinguish the *Fourth Dhyāna*.[26] And further, in ***"Meeting of Father and Son"***:[27]

> Great King, when one understands it rightly as it really is, the eye-sense-base is void of the eye-sense-base. Why so? This eye-sense-base is a non-sign-source (*animitta*). Why so? When the sign-source of the eye-sense-base is void of the eye-sense-base—this is voidness. When the sign-source of the eye-sense-base is free of sign-source—this is the non-sign-source. When it makes no wish, this is the wishless. Great King, accordingly the eye-sense-base is the three doors of liberation.

> The eye-sense-base is directed toward liberation. . . . Likewise, all *dharmas* are directed toward liberation.

Are not originated and not destroyed means the voidness gateway—because the sign-source is void of the eye-sense-base, i.e. is comparable to a dream.[28]
Not defiled and not pure means the non-sign-source gateway—because it is sign-sources that are defiled or pure.[29]
Without subtraction and without addition means the wishless gateway—because there is nothing to subtract or add for the eye-sense-base to wish for.

Having told the two *dharmas* related to heaven (*svarga*) and liberation (*apavarga*), and since there is no other *dharma* in Buddhism than those two in the sense "born from the dhamma" (as was said of Sāriputta), Avalokiteśvara explained to Śāriputra the Truth of Cessation (*nirodha-satya*):[30]

"AFTERWARDS, ŚĀRIPUTRA, IN VOIDNESS THERE ARE NO FORM, NO FEELINGS, NO IDEAS, NO MOTIVATIONS, NO PERCEPTIONS;
NO EYE, EAR, NOSE, TONGUE, BODY, OR MIND; NO FORM, SOUNDS, SMELL, TASTE, TANGIBLE, OR MENTAL;
NO REALM OF EYE . . . [DOWN TO] . . . NO REALM OF MIND-PERCEPTION; NO NESCIENCE, NO EXTINCTION OF NESCIENCE . . . [DOWN TO] . . . NO OLD AGE AND DEATH, NO EXTINCTION OF OLD AGE AND DEATH;
NO SUFFERING, SOURCE, CESSATION, OR PATH;
NO KNOWLEDGE;
NO ATTAINMENT, NO NON-ATTAINMENT."

Afterwards (*tasmāt*): In the summit of existence (*bhavāgra*), there is cessation of 'mind-motivation' (*manaḥ-saṃskāra*)—referred to in the ancient Buddhist scriptures as 'cessation of feelings and ideas' (*saṃjñā-vedita-nirodha*). Since here there is cessation of all 'constructed natures' (*saṃskṛta-dharma*), this is not the state in which the Buddha discovered 'all *dharmas*' = five personality aggregates (**form** down to **perceptions**), twelve sense bases (**eye** down to **mind; form** down to **mentals**), eighteen realms (**realm of eye** down to **realm of mind-perception**); nor in which he discovered the twelvefold dependent origination and the manner in

which it is extinguished (**nescience** down to **old age and death**; **extinction of nescience** down to **extinction of old age and death**); nor in which he discovered the four Noble Truths (**suffering** down to **path**); nor in which he had the **knowledge** and the **attainment**. And in this condition there is **no non-attainment,** just as one cannot speak of darkness, if there is no light. According to the ***Mahāparinibbānasutta***, the Tathāgata took his leave of the monks and attained the *First Dhyāna,* and successively the various equipoises (*samāpatti*) up to the base of neither idea nor no-idea, and emerging from this base, reached the cessation of feelings and ideas. Then, according to the tradition, the venerable Ānanda said to the venerable Anuruddha, "Reverend Anuruddha, the Lord has passed into Nirvāṇa." "Nay, brother Ānanda, the Lord has not passed into Nirvāṇa; he has reached the cessation of feelings and ideas." Thereupon, you should know, the Lord emerging from the cessation, entered the base of neither idea nor no-idea, and successively the equipoises down to the *First Dhyāna*; and emerging from the *First Dhyāna*, proceeded again through the *Dhyānas* to the *Fourth Dhyāna*, and emerging from the *Fourth Dhyāna*, the Lord passed into Nirvāṇa.

Avalokiteśvara explained to Śāriputra that afterwards the Bodhisattva returns to attainment by recourse to *prajñāpāramitā:*

"AFTERWARDS, ŚĀRIPUTRA, BY REASON OF THE NON-ATTAINMENT, THE BODHISATTVA TAKES RECOURSE TO PRAJÑĀPĀRAMITĀ, AND DWELLS WITHOUT OBSCURATION OF THOUGHT."

Afterwards (*tasmāt*): After proving that there is no attainment, and so also no possibility of **non-attainment** in the cessation of feelings and ideas, the Bodhisattva of the upper three stages among the ten returns promptly to the realm of form. The ***Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra*** (XIX, 28, 29) explains:

> For the right praxis of the wise in the six perfections is the giving of the one without wish, the morality of the one without enthusiasm for re-existence, forbearance everywhere, the striving to bring forth all-good; likewise meditation (*dhyāna*) apart from the formless realm,[31] and insight (*prajñā*) tied to the means (i.e. the other five perfections).

The Bodhisattva's meditation is apart from the formless realm, for this realm leads to the **non-attainment** summit. Besides, there is a theory that among the *Dhyānas* of the realm of form, the Bodhisattva of the Eighth

Stage is in the *First Dhyāna*, the one of the Ninth Stage is in the *Second Dhyāna*, the one of the Tenth Stage is in the *Third Dhyāna*.[32]

takes recourse to prajñāpāramitā, and dwells without obscuration of thought: It is said, "He **takes recourse** to the wife of another," and explained: 'wife of another' is **prajñāpāramitā;** the 'other' is the Diamond being (Vajrasattva).[33] He dwells without the defilement obscuration, as a Bodhisattva of the upper three stages, although still with obscuration of the knowable. Then, in terms of the two kinds of 'insight' previously mentioned from Vinītadeva's Vinaya commentary, the one involved in search called 'knowledge' (*jñana*) and the one after search called 'vision' (*darśana*), this one is the 'vision'. And Gautama Buddha in that passage preserved in the ***'Book of Eights'*** explained that when he developed the 'vision' he saw the forms of the deities (*devatā*) of the different classes.[34]

Avalokiteśvara explained that the Bodhisattva has arrived at the Summit-Nirvāṇa:

"BECAUSE OF THE NON-EXISTENCE OF THOUGHT OBSCURATION, HE FEARLESS, HAVING TRANSCENDED WAYWARDNESS, IS AT THE SUMMIT-NIRVĀNA."

fearless: According to Sthiramati, subcommentary on the ***Sūtrālaṃkāra,*** there are two kinds of fear: 1) of temporal unexpectedness (*sadyas*), i.e. of rulers, robbers, fire, floods, etc., 2) of objective (spacial) domains (*viṣaya*), such as planes of yoga, and saṃsāra itself.[35] The Bodhisattva has no temporal fear for the two 'afterwards' (*tasmāt*), and no spacial fear for the two 'here-s' (*iha*).

waywardness: Waywardness (*viparyāsa*) means taking the impermanent as permanent, pain as pleasure, nonself as self, and the impure as pure. There are three stages of waywardness, to wit, of ideas (*samjñā*), then of views (*dṛṣṭi*) attached to the ideas, and finally of consciousness (*citta*) with secondary defilements going with the view attachment.[36] Since the Bodhisattva does not have thought obscuration (*citta-avaraṇa*) he cannot have the last stage of waywardness, that of consciousness (*citta*); and the sūtra intends this to mean the Bodhisattva has transcended waywardness.

the summit-nirvāṇa: He is at the summit (*niṣṭhā*) where the Buddha entered Parinirvāṇa, i.e. at the upper extreme of the *Fourth Dhyāna*. Besides, *Le Traité* gives the denotation of the word *pāramitā* (perfection) as applied to *prajñā*:[37] "She is called *pāramitā,* because she arrives at the

other shore (*pāra*) of the ocean of insight, because she arrives at the extremity (*anta*) of all the insights and attains the summit (*niṣṭhāgata*)."

Avalokiteśvara then made the Mahāyāna identification of Nirvāṇa and enlightenment:

"ALL BUDDHAS OF THE PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE, AFTER TAKING RECOURSE TO THE PERFECTION OF INSIGHT, COMPLETELY REALIZE THE INCOMPARABLE, RIGHT COMPLETE ENLIGHTENMENT."

With the Sambhogakāya, they realize the **Complete Enlightenment** at the top of the realm of form in the Akaniṣṭha heaven.

Avalokiteśvara then summed up all the foregoing by way of an incantation:

"THEREFORE ONE SHOULD KNOW THE GREAT INCANTATION OF PRAJÑĀPĀRAMITĀ. THE INCANTATION OF GREAT VIDYĀ, THE INCOMPARABLE INCANTATION, THE EQUAL-AND-UNEQUAL INCANTATION, THE INCANTATION WHICH ALLAYS SUFFERING, TRUE BECAUSE DEVOID OF FALSEHOOD, PROCLAIMED IN THE PRAJÑĀPĀRAMITĀ, AS FOLLOWS: GATE GATE PĀRAGATE PĀRASAṂGATE BODHI SVĀHĀ."

the great incantation of prajñāpāramitā, the incantation of great vidyā is **gate gate pāragate pārasaṃgate bodhi svāhā,** because *vidyā* means the female variety of incantation (*mantra*) and *svāhā* is the final *mantra* of a female formula.[38] Having referred to the *mantra* in general terms, the sūtra now treats the individual terms of the *mantra*:

the incomparable incantation is **gate gate,** because this means one has embarked (*tīrṇa*),[39] with cessation of speech motivation in the *Second Dhyāna.*

the equal and unequal incantation is **pāragate** because this means one is well on the way (*pāragata*), with cessation of body motivation in the *Fourth Dhyāna.* The Pratyekabuddha, and the Bodhisattva, is equal to the Buddha in attaining the cessation of body motivation in the *Fourth Dhyāna.* But these yogins are not equal to the Buddha as regards having attained the incomparable enlightenment in the Akaniṣṭha, with the Sambhogakāya.

the incantation which allays suffering is ***Pārasaṃgate***, because this means one has reached the dry land (*sthalagata*), beyond the swirling waters of *saṃsāra*. But is this cessation of mental natures to be called 'Nirvāṇa'?
true because devoid of falsehood is *bodhi*. 'Enlightenment' (*bodhi*) is true, because devoid of the various falsehoods, by suggestion of Praśāstrasena's commentary and partial adoption of his remarks: devoid of the falsehoods of body, speech, and mind.[40]
proclaimed in the Prajñāpāramitā is ***svāhā*** because this is the clarification at the end.[41]

Thus Avalokiteśvara finished his instruction to Śāriputra.

(THEN, YOU SHOULD KNOW, THE LORD EMERGED FROM THAT SAMĀDHI AND TOLD ĀRYA-AVALOKITEŚVARA, 'SĀDHU SĀDHU').

According to Vimalamitra,[42] while this sūtra was expressed by **Ārya-Avalokiteśvara,** it was in fact the Tathāgata's promulgation (*ājñā*); accordingly, **Avalokiteśvara** was empowered (*adhitiṣṭha*) by the Tathāgata in the ***Samādhi*** **"Profound Appearance"** (*gambhīra-avabhāsa*). So the Tathāgata, saying **sādhu, sādhu** (It is well, it is well) indicates concurrence with **Avalokiteśvara's** exposition.

SO ENDS THE 'HEART' OF NOBLE PRAJÑĀPĀRAMITĀ.

Heart: There are two kinds of 'heart' (*hṛdaya*) intended by this scripture. 1) there is the 'heart', i.e. the essence of Mahāyāna teaching with reference to Prajñāpāramitā as the mother of the Buddhas and Bodhisattvas. 2) there is the 'heart' with reference to the sons of the Buddha, as was Śāriputra, 'born from his heart'.

So ends the commentary, composed by Alex Wayman, called "Explaining the Difficulties" (*pañjikā-nāma*) of the ***Āryaprajñāpāramitā-hṛdaya-sūtra.***

NOTES

[1] Daisetz Teitaro Suzuki, ***Essays in Zen Buddhism*** (*Third Series*) London: Luzac and Company, 1934, p. 195.

[2] Yoshito S. Hakeda, ***Kūkai: Major Works*** New York: Columbia University press, 1972, pp. 262–75.

[3] ***Philosophy East and West***, 11:3, Oct., 1961, pp. 109–13.

[4] A. Wayman, "Aspects of Meditation in the Theravāda and Mahīśāsaka Buddhist Sects" (forthcoming in ***Studia Missionalia***, 1975).

[5] A. Wayman, "The Significance of Mantras, from the Veda Down to Buddhist Tantric Practice" (forthcoming in ***Brahmavidyā; The Adyar Library Bulletin***, Centenary Issue, 1975).

[6] For these editions, see Edward Conze, ***Thirty Years of Buddhist Studies*** (Columbia, S. C.: University of South Carolina Press, 1968), pp. 148–67; F. Max Müller and Bunyiu Nanjio, eds., "The Ancient Palm Leaves . . ." in ***Anecdota Oxoniensia***, Aryan Series, Vol. III (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1884), pp. 48–50.

[7] J. S. Speijer, ***Sanskrit Syntax*** (Kyoto: The Rinsen-Shoten Bookstore, 1968). Para. 444, p. 344.

[8] The one of note 4, above.

[9] ***Saṃyutta-Nikāya***, I, p. 9 (in the India Devanāgarī edition).

[10] Vidhushekhara Bhattacharya, ***The Catuḥśataka of Āryadeva*** (Calcutta: Visva-Bharati Book-Shop, 1931), p. 163: *mi 'tshe ba daṅ stoṅ pa ñid ces pa'i chos de gñis ni mtho ris daṅ byaṅ grol thob par byed pa ste.*

[11] Red-mda'-ba Gźon-nu-blo-gros, ***Commentary to Āryadeva's 'Four Hundred Verses'***, ed. by Jetsun Rendawa Shonnu Lodo. Sarnath: Sakya Students' Union, 1974, p. 157.

[12] J. W. de Jong, ***Cinq Chapitres de la Prasannapadā*** Paris: Paul Geuthner, 1949, pp. 10–13.

[13] T. T. Vol. 109, Jñānagarbha's ***Āryamaitreyakevalaparivartabhāṣya*** (commentary on the Maitreya chapter of the ***Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra***), 203b:8 to 203c:1.

[14] T. T., Vol. 104. 33e:5 to p. 34a:1.

[15] This is in the ***Book of Eights***, chapter on Earthquakes, *sutta* called "At Gayā," in ***The Aṅguttara Nikāya*** (Chakkanipāta, Sattakanipāta and Aṭṭhakanipāta), ed. by Bhikkhu J. Kashyap (Pāli Publication Board, 1960), p. 391. 4–9.

[16] Vinītadeva, ***Vinayavibhaṅgapadavyākhyāna***, T. T., Vol. 122:311: *śes pa źes bya ba ni rjes su 'tshol ba'i śes rab bo/mthoṅ ba źes bya ba ni rjes su tshol ba'i śes rab bo/.* Probably the term *rjes su tshol ba* translated a perfect form indicating completed action, even though there is evident clumsiness with a possibility that the second "*rjes su*" meant 'after'. This is made certain in Yüan-ts'ê's great commentary on the ***Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra***, Maitreya chapter, in the Tibetan translation, T. T. Vol. 106:219 when, in the course of giving numerous explanations for the term *jñāna-darśana*, he presents one that is the obvious expansion of Vinītadeva's gloss, 219:e: 5–6: "Also, any insight searching the *dharma*-s is knowledge; any insight discriminating (them) after search is vision" */ gźan yaṅ chos rnams yoṅs su tshol ba'i śes rab gaṅ yin pa de ni śes pa źes bya'o/yoṅs su btsal ba la(s) so sor rtog pa'i śes rab gaṅ yin pa de ni mthoṅ ba źes bya'o/.*

[17] The ***Mahāyānasutrālaṃkāra***, Chap. XVI devoted to the Perfections (*pāramitā*), agrees with this identification of *prajñā* with *jñāna* because in verses 36 through 40 each of the first five Perfections (giving, etc.) is said to stay in the world with the assistance of knowledge (*jñāna*); and when coming to verse 41 to deal with *prajñā-pāramitā* the text uses the word *jñāna* instead of *prajñā* and says "with the assistance of sentient beings" (*satvaparigraheṇa*).

[18] For this leaping of a Bodhisattva, cf. Edward Conze, ***The Large Sutra on Perfect Wisdom*** (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975), pp. 71–73, and p. 502, note, containing the reference to J. May's article CHŌJŌ (***Hobogirin*** IV, 1970), which also includes Asaṅga's treatment.

[19] T. T. Vol. 111:238a.

[20] T. T. Vol. 109:99b-c

[21] ***Ārya-Prajñāpāramitā-ṭīkā***, T. T. Vol. 94:280.

[22] ***Yogācārabhumi*** in the edition of the Derge Tanjur, *Sems tsam*, ***Vastusaṃgrahaṇī***, Zi, f. 147b-2 to 6; and ***Paryāyasaṃgrahaṇī***, 'i, f. 40a-5 to f. 40b-6.

[23] T. T. Vol. 109:98d.

[24] ***Madhyāntavibhāga-bhāṣya***, ed. by Gadjin M. Nagao. Tokyo: Suzuki Research Foundation, 1964, p. 22: *dvayābhāvo hy abhāvasya bhāvaḥ śūnyasya lakṣaṇaṁ/.*

[25] T. T. Vol. 23:208e

[26] T. T. Vol. 111:11d. I surveyed much of Asaṅga's ***Yogācārabhūmi*** for various explanations of the gates to liberation, and the particular one here presented seemed most to fit the context of the Heart Sūtra.

[27] T. T. Vol. 23:201b,c.

[28] Cf. ***Pitāputrasamāgamasūtra***, T. T. Vol. 23:201d:3–4 "O great king, the sense organs are illusory; the sense objects dream-like" (*rgyal po chen po de la dbaṅ po rnams ni sgyu ma lta bu/yul rnams ni rmi lam lta bur śes par bya ste/*).

[29] Cf. A. Wayman, ***Analysis of the Śrāvakabhūmi Manuscript.*** Berkeley: University of California Press, 1961, p. 61: "he does not take hold of sign-sources (*nimitta-grāhī*) or details by reason of which sinful, unvirtuous natures (*dharma*) would flow in his mind."

[30] ***The Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā***, ed. by Nalinaksha Dutt (London: Luzac & Co., 1934), pp. 46–47, sets forth approximately the same material as in the Heart Sūtra under the title "precept of cessation-truth" (*nirodhasatyāvavāda*). Conze, ***Thirty Years***, p. 158, calls attention to this similarity.

[31] *vinārūpyaṃ tathā dhyānaṃ.*

[32] This theory is presented in Yüan-ts'ê, commentary on ***Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra***, T. T. Vol. 106:209e where he combines the ***Daśabhūmikasūtra's*** deifying of the irreversible Bodhisattvas (those of the last three stages) with the *Dhyāna* tradition, since each of the four *Dhyāna* heavens has various types of deities. Thus, in the Eighth Stage the Bodhisattva is Mahābrahmā. This is not necessarily inconsistent with the previous information that Sthiramati associates the 'character of voidness' with the First Stage Bodhisattva, and my placement of the information under the *Fourth Dhyāna*. This is because the present reference to the irreversible Bodhisattvas has to do with their *return* to the realm of form, wherein are the four *Dhyānas*.

[33] ***The Collected Works of Bu-ston, Part 14*** (*Pha*) (New Delhi: Indian Academy of Indian Culture, 1969), the abbreviated survey of the Tantras (in Tibetan). Fol. no.

910. Bu-ston goes on to explain that Prajñāpāramitā is the *son mo* ('she who arrives') at the other side of *saṃsāra*, while Vajrasattva is the *son po* ('he who arrives') at the other side of *saṃsāra*.

[34] In the *sutta* called "At Gayā" (cf. note 15, above).

[35] T. T. Vol. 109: 19c:2, 3, 4, commentary on XVI, 52.

[36] Cf. ***The Lion's Roar of Queen Śrīmālā***; *a Buddhist Scripture on the Tathāgatagarbha Theory*, tr. by Alex Wayman and Hideko Wayman (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974). p. 102, and note.

[37] Etienne Lamotte, ***Le Traité de la Grande Vertu de Sagesse***, Tome II. Louvain: Bureaux du *Muséon*, 1949, p. 1066.

[38] Cf. Wayman, "The Significance of Mantras" (note 5, above).

[39] For these terms *tīrṇa, pāragata*, and *sthalagata*, see Franklin Edgerton, ***Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Reader***, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1953, "Conversion of Śāriputra and Maudgalyāyana," p. 31.

[40] Edward Conze, "Praśāstrasena's ***Ārya-Prajñāpāramitā-hṛdaya-ṭikā***," ***Buddhist Studies in Honour of I. B. Horner***. Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1974, pp. 58–59.

[41] This explanation of **svāhā** is from a tantric commentary by Ratnākaraśānti, cited in Wayman, "The Significance of Mantras" (note 5, above).

[42] T. T. Vol. 94:284e:5,6.

The *gotra, ekayāna* and *tathāgatagarbha* theories of the Prajñāpāramitā according to Dharmamitra and Abhayākaragupta

D. Seyfort Ruegg

In the course of his monumental work on the Prajñāpāramitā Sūtras E. Conze has written: 'It is quite a problem how the Dharma-element which is common to all can be regarded as the source of a variety of "lineages" [*gotra*]'.[1] It has been the endeavour of the present writer in a series of publications starting in 1968 to shed light on this very fundamental and interesting question. An article in the *Festschrift* dedicated to the late E. Frauwallner was devoted to the interconnexion between the single, unique and undifferentiated *dharmadhātu*, the naturally existent spiritual element or germ (*prakṛtisthaṃ gotram*) and the variously conditioned psycho-spiritual categories (*gotra*)[2] reoognized by the Buddhist texts as explained by Ārya Vimuktisena (ca. 500 ?) and his successor Bhadanta Vimuktisena in their commentaries on the ***Abhisamayālaṃkāra*** (i. 37–39), which they correlate with the topics of the ***Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā***.[3] And shortly afterwards there followed a more detailed study of this question as it relates to the notion of the *tathāgatagarbha* or *buddha*-nature in ***La théorie du tathāgatagarbha et du gotra: Études sur la sotériologie et la gnoséologie du bouddhisme*** (Paris, 1969) and ***Le traité du tathāgatagarbha de Bu ston Rin chen grub*** (Paris, 1973). In the last publications Haribhadra's commentaries on the Prajñāpāramitā were discussed, and the importance of the doctrine of the One Vehicle (*ekayāna*), was taken up at some length not only from the point of view of soteriology but also from that of gnoseology.

Between the two Vimuktisenas and Haribhadra (fl. c. 750–800) on the one side and the Tibetan exegetes on the other there lived a number of important Indian commentators whose work could be only briefly touched on in the ***Théorie.*** Amongst the most important of these later Indian masters of the Prajñāpāramitā are Dharmamitra and Abhayākaragupta, both of whom have been reckoned by Buddhist doxographers as being, for certain systematic reasons, close to the Svātantrika-Mādhyamika school, and Ratnākaraśānti (first half of the 11th century),

a Vijñānavādin (of the Alīkākāravāda branch) who appears to have undertaken a harmonization of the Vijñānavāda and the Madhyamaka in the manner of the synthesizing movements especially characteristic of later Buddhist thought in India.

One of Ratnākaraśānti's main works on the Prajñāpāramitā—the *Sārottamā* (or *Sāratamā* ?), a Pañjikā on the ***Aṣṭasāhasrikā***, which until recently was known only by its Tibetan version in the Bstan 'gyur—has now been recovered in an incomplete Sanskrit manuscript. Since the promised publication of this text is awaited with keenest interest by students of this literature, his work must be left for another occasion.[4] The present paper will therefore consider the discussions by Dharmamitra and Abhayākaragupta of the relation between the *gotra*, the *dharmadhātu*, the *ekayāna*, and the *tathāgatagarbha*.

Little reliable information is now available on the life of Dharmamitra. In the colophon of the Tibetan translation of his ***Prasphuṭapadā*** he is referred to as an Ācarya of the Madhyamaka born in Baṅ·la (Baṅgala ?). Tāranātha, who makes him a contemporary of Dharmottara (fl. ca. 800), Vimalamitra and Dharmākara, places him in the reign of the Pāla king Dharmapāla (rg. ca. 770–810), who was a patron of Haribhadra.[5] Dharmamitra's only extant work, included in the Bstan 'gyur, is the ***Prasphuṭapadā***, the full title of which is ***Abhisamayālaṃkārakārikāprajñāpāramitopadeśaśāstraṭīkā***; it takes the form of a commentary on Haribhadra's shorter commentary (*'grel chuṅ*), the ***Śāstravṛtti*** known as ***'Grel pa don gsal (*Sphuṭārthā)*** which is also available now only in a Tibetan translation.[6]

More is known about Abhayākaragupta, who was a scholar of the Vikramaśīlā seminary and a prolific polymath. He flourished at the time of King Rāmapāla (rg. ca. 1077–1130), in the thirtieth year of whose reign he composed his ***Munimatālaṃkāra***.[7] He is thus one of the last of the great Indian Buddhist masters whose works we possess; and his principal independent philosophical work, the ***Munimatālaṃkāra***, is an extensive treatise of somewhat encyclopaedic character in which he expounds Mahāyāna thought with special reference to the Prajñāpāramitā doctrine and with copious references to the basic sources of the Madhyamaka and Vijñānavāda. The commentary on the *Aṣṭa* entitled ***Marmakaumudī*** is the second of Abhayākara's works to be considered here. In addition, he wrote a number of important works on ritual and iconology (the ***Vajrāvalī*** and ***Niṣpannayogāvalī***), several Tantrik cycles and astronomical calculation (*gaṇana*, in his ***Kālacakrāvatāra***).



Dharmamitra's ***Prasphuṭapadā*** is of interest to the student of the Prajñāparamitā literature from many points of view. For our present purpose suffice it to say that Dharmamitra attributes to the Yogācārins (Vijñānavādins) the theory that there exists a category of persons whose *gotra* is cut off (fol. 56a). This tenet is considered a major point of difference between them, especially as their doctrines came to be codified by many of the Tibetan doxographers,[8] and the Mādhyamikas who on the contrary maintain the theory of the One Vehicle (*ekayāna*) and hold that all sentient beings are certain to attain supreme Awakening or buddhahood, an attainment that necessarily presupposes that the naturally existent (*prakṛtistha*) *gotra* can never be totally cut off.[9] In accordance with this Mādhyamika view Dharmamitra explains the scriptural allusions to a cut-off *gotra* or *agotra* as referring simply to the great difficulty some experience in attaining liberation.[10]

In this regard Dharmamitra quotes both the ***(Samādhirāja-)Candrapradīpasūtra*** and the ***Adhyardhaśatikā***, a Sūtra that explicitly mentions, evidently for the first time in the Prajñāpāramitā literature, the doctrine that all sentient beings are *tathāgatagarbha*.[11] And his ***Prasphuṭapadā*** is the first known commentary on the ***Abhisamayālaṃkāra*** to introduce the *tathāgatagarbha* notion into the discussion of the *prakṛtistha-gotra*. This doctrinal elaboration was prepared for example by Kamalaśīla (ca. 740–795), and it was continued by a host of later writers such as Abhayākaragupta.

Dharmamitra also refers to three characteristics (*lakṣaṇa*) taught in certain Sūtras, namely the imaginarily constructed (*parikalpita*), the dependent (*paratantra*) and the perfect (*pariniṣpanna*). These *lakṣaṇas*, otherwise known as natures (*svabhāva*), as such are of course special features of the school of the Yogācārins/Vijñānavādins, whose philosophical system is largely articulated round them. And they are mentioned in the context of Prajñāpāramitā philosophy by Dignāga in his ***Prajñāpāramitāpiṇḍārtha***.[12] But on the basis of this evidence alone it cannot be concluded that Dharmamitra was himself a Vijñānavādin in the strict sense. A parallel set of categories, termed *kalpita*, *vikalpita* and *dharmatārūpa*, is to be found in the Maitreya-chapter of two of the Prajñāpāramitāsūtras, the ***Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā*** and the ***Aṣṭādaśasāhasrikā***;[13] and they are also evidently referred to by Haribhadra in his commentary on the ***Aṣṭasāhasrikā***.[14] Dignāga's and Haribhadra's explanations of the *kalpita* and *vikalpita* differ somewhat from Dhar-

mamitra's interpretation of the first two *lakṣaṇas*.

It has also to be noted that Dharmamitra, like many other later masters who follow the synthetic Yogācāra-Madhyamaka established by Śāntarakṣita, makes abundant use of texts ascribed to Bhaṭṭāraka Maitreya(nātha), such as the ***Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra***.

As one of the last of the great masters of Indian Buddhism, Abhayākaragupta deserves particular attention, and his theory of the *gotra* is certainly of very considerable interest.

He clearly supports the assimilation of the *prakṛtistha-gotra* and the *tathāgatagarbha*.[15] And he points out that the *tathāgatagarbha* permeates the living (*jaṅgama*, i.e. sentient beings, *sattva*) only, to the exclusion of the insentient (*sthāvara*) world (which, according to certain East Asian Buddhist schools, is also destined to attain buddhahood since it too possesses the *buddha*-nature).[16] Unlike Dharmamitra, but like Haribhadra and the latter's predecessor Kamalaśīla, Abhayākara also devotes special attention to the doctrine of the *ekayāna*, the gnoseo-soteriological corollary of the theory of the *prakṛtistha-gotra* and of the *tathāgatagarbha* according to which all sentient beings as potential Buddhas are certain to achieve supreme and perfect Awakening (*anuttarasamyaksaṃbodhi*).[17] With regard to the *ekayāna* he quotes the ***Saddharmapuṇḍarīka*** and the ***Laṅkāvatārasūtra*** as well as Nāgārjuna's ***Niraupamyastava***.[18] Concerning the contrary view that postulates three ultimately separate and distinct vehicles, and which is associated with the Vijñānavāda and Maitreyanātha, Abhayākara explains it as based simply on the consideration that the doctrine of the *triyāna* serves to introduce beginning disciples to the teaching in conformity with their respective abilities, at which point it would not yet be appropriate to state that this doctrine is not absolutely and ultimately true and that only the *ekayāna* doctrine corresponds to the soteriological and gnoseological theory actually intended by the Buddha.[19]

Abhayākara furthermore clearly reveals how it is that the *ekayāna* is neither a mere polemical device serving to establish the claims of the Mahāyāna against the Hīnayāna nor even an exclusively soteriological concept, for philosophically it is the necessary corollary of the principle of the non-differentiation of the *prakṛtistha-gotra*. The *ekayāna* theory is in fact founded gnoseologically on the oneness of the knowledge of reality (*tattvajñāna*), which has as its 'object' the single undifferentiated reality (*tattva*) or *dharmadhātu*.[20] And it is of course intimately bound up with the non-differentiation of the *prakṛtistha-gotra* since this factor has

the nature of the single *dharmadhātu* according to the ***Abhisamayālaṃkāra*** (i. 5).[21]

Concerning the *tathāgatagarbha* Abhayākara refers to verse ix. 37 of the ***Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra*** quoted in the commentary on the ***Ratnagotravibhāga*** (i. 148), a passage which deals with the universal presence of Thusness (*tathatā*) in all incarnate beings, saying that by his use of the expression *tathāgata* the author of the verse accepts the naturally luminous *dharmadhātu* which has as its characteristic the non-substantiality of both the individual (*pudgalanairātmya*) and the factors of existence (*dharmanairātmya*).[22]

In this way Abhayākara links together in a remarkable manner the scriptural teachings on the *prakṛtistha-gotra,* the *ekayāna,* the *dharmadhātu,* and the *tathāgatagarbha,* as well as on *nairātmya* (: *śūnyatā*) and *niḥsvabhāvatā.*[23]

But it is to be noted that ***Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra*** ix. 37 concerns only one single aspect of the *tathāgatagarbha* theory, i.e. that form of it that is founded on the universal presence of *tathatā*.[24] Now, to the extent that the *tathāgatagarbha* theory is connected with this aspect only, it does not necessarily commit its advocates to the doctrine that *all* sentient beings are certain to achieve Awakening and hence to the basic principle of the *ekayāna* doctrine.[25] It is for this reason that a Vijñānavādin remains free, even while maintaining the theory in the particular form set out in this verse, to hold that some *sattvas* are without *gotra* (*agotra*) or that their *gotra* is cut off, and also that there are three distinct and ultimately separate vehicles only one of which actually culminates in supreme and perfect Awakening or buddhahood.[26]

The aspect of the *tathāgatagarbha* doctrine based on *tathatā* found in ***Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra*** ix. 37 presupposes an interpretation in which the compound *tathāgata-garbha* is to be analysed as an adjectival compound (*bahuvrīhi*) meaning 'having as embryonic essence the *tathāgata*, containing the *tathāgata*'.[27] The ***Tathāgatagarbhasūtra***'s statement *sarvasattvās tathāgatagarbhāḥ* then means 'All sentient beings contain the *tathāgata*' (as a spiritual potentiality within them).[28] A corresponding interpretation of the term is found in the explanation of *tathatā* as one of the three meanings intended by the scriptural statement *sarvasattvās tathāgatagarbhāḥ* given in the commentary on the ***Ratnagotravibhāga*** (i. 148, where we find the analysis *tathāgataḥ tathataiṣām garbhaḥ sarvasattvānām*), and also seemingly in the explanation of the *gotra* in the same commentary (i. 149–152, where we read *tathāgatadhātur eṣāṃ gar-*

bhaḥ sarvasattvānām, where *dhātu* has the meaning of element[29]).

This formulation of the *tathāgatagarbha* doctrine based on an interpretation of the term as an exocentric compound is parallel to, and in fact it may have been influenced by, a statement like the following one in the ***Aṣṭasāhasrikā prajñāpāramitā*** where *dhātu* in the expression *tathāgatadhātu* refers to a relic contained in a *stūpa* (iii, p. 62): *yaḥ kaścit kulaputro vā kuladuhitā vā tathāgatasyârhataḥ samyaksambuddhasya parinirvṛtasya pūjāyai koṭiśaḥ saptaratnamayāṃs tathāgatadhātugarbhān stūpān kārayet, kārayitvā ca tān yāvajjīvaṃ . . . divyābhiḥ pūjābhiḥ satkuryād . . . tat kiṃ manyase, Kauśika, api nu sa kulaputro vā kuladuhitā vā tato nidānaṃ bahupuṇyaṃ prasavet/ Śakra āha: bahu, Bhagavan, bahu, Sugata . . .* 'If a son or daughter of family constructed by tens of millions *stūpas* made of the seven precious substances[30] and containing the relic (*dhātu*) of the Tathāgata[31] for the sake of worshipping the Tathāgata-Arhat-Samyaksambuddha who has passed into Nirvāṇa, and if they honoured these *stūpas* as long as they lived by all kinds of divine worship . . . , do you think, Kauśika [i.e. Śakra], that this son or daughter of family would accordingly produce much merit?—Śakra replied: Much, Lord, much, Sugata . . .' Inasmuch as this notion of the *stūpa* as *tathāgatadhātugarbha* is thus found in the Prajñāpāramitā literature, it could indeed be supposed that at least one forerunner of the classical *tathāgatagarbha* theory is attested in this body of texts. But, as already observed, the *tathāgatagarbha* doctrine in the more strict sense actually appears explicitly in this literature only in an apparently later work, the ***Adhyardhaśatikāprajñā pāramitā.***

According to the parallel and alternative interpretation, *tathāgatagarbha* is to be analysed as an endocentric nominal compound the first member of which has the value of a genitive (*ṣaṣṭhīsamāsa*) and which therefore means 'embryonic essence of the *tathāgata*'. This value is found for example when the theory refers to the *dharmakāya*, as explained in the commentary on the ***Ratnagotravibhāga*** i. 146–147 (*tathāgatasyeme garbhāḥ sarvasattvāḥ*) and also in a number of Sūtra-texts.[32]

It is interesting to observe that the same multivalence, due to the fact that a compound word can properly be interpreted either as a *bahuvrīhi* or as a *tatpuruṣa*, is also to be found in the case of the word *dhātugarbha*, which may be either an epithet of the *stūpa* ('containing the relic') or a noun designating the *stūpa* (cf. also Sinhalese *dāgaba/dāgäba/dāgoba*).[33]

This *dhātu* of the Buddha is frequently regarded as being strictly equi-

valent to him and offerings made to a *stūpa* containing such a *dhātu* are then effective.[34] Harm intentionally done to a *stūpa* is correspondingly a most heinous act.[35]

Concerning the doctrinal background of the link between the *gotra*, *ekayāna* and *tathāgatagarbha* theories, it is to be observed that the Yogācāra-Mādhyamika master Kamalaśīla, who maintains that the *ekayāna* is of explicit and certain meaning (*nītārtha*), at the same time expounds both the *gotra* and *tathāgatagarbha* doctrines and holds that all sentient beings without exception are certain to attain Awakening. While we have no commentary by him on any of the larger Prajñāpāramitā-Sūtras or on the ***Abhisamayālamkāra*** to which we could turn for an exposition of these points, Kamalaśīla's fundamental ***Madhyamakāloka*** provides very important observations on this complex of topics.[36]

Dharmamitra's and Abhayākaragupta's expositions of the subject are given below. It is to be noted that, unlike his predecessor Haribhadra (in his ***Abhisamayālaṃkārālokā***) as well as his successor Abhayākaragupta, Dharmamitra in his explanation of the second chapter of the ***Abhisamayālaṃkāra*** (following Haribhadra's ****Sphuṭārthā***) has not gone into the question of the *ekayāna* in detail, although he has treated related topics.

DHARMAMITRA, *Prasphuṭapadā*
[T.T. vol. 91 (Ña: fol. 52b–56a)]

The teaching concerning the factors of penetration (*nirvedhabhāgīya*) having been analysed [53a],[37] the *gotra* which is the ground (*ādhāra*) for practice (*pratipatti*) is now to be investigated.

[54a4] If the *gotra* is accordingly the ground for all [practice of the paths], why is it not taught at the very beginning? This [sequence which discusses the *gotra* after its effects, was adopted] so that the result might be known through its cause [i.e. the *gotra*], in accordance with the statement: 'By reason of the cause of the *cittotpāda* [indicated in ***Abhisamayālaṃkāra*** i.18] and the other factors [indicated in the following verses], both *sambhāramārgas* are practised and the *prayogamārga* is then attained, and this is reckoned as being resident in *gotra* (*gotrastha*)'.[38] [But] others explain: Since this procedure has reference to the *gotra* that is effected (*abhisaṃskṛta*), whereas it would have been correct to speak at the very beginning of the *gotra* with respect to that *gotra* which is exist-

ent by nature (*prakṛtistha*), what has been taught here serves to make it known that there are two *gotras*.[39]

If these practices (*pratipatti*) have been indicated first because the *gotra* is the support (*pratiṣṭhā*) for practice, what is meant by saying that the *gotra* is the support for practice? What is termed *gotra* is therefore to be understood under the rubrics of (i) proof of its existence, (ii) nature, (iii) varieties, (iv) inferential mark, [53b] (v) good qualities, (vi) disadvantages, and (vii) the hermeneutic etymology.

(i) There are the elemental natures (*dhātu*), convinced adhesion (*adhimukti*), objectification of various practices, objectification of various results (*phala*), and exposition of the existence (*astitva*) of the *gotra*.[40]

(ii) Concerning the nature of the *gotra* it has somewhere been stated to be the *dharmadhātu* [as in the following scriptural statement]: 'O Jinaputras, what is termed the *gotra* of the *bodhisattva* assumes the *dharmadhātu*, it is as extensive as space (*ākāśa*), and it is naturally luminous (*prakṛtiprabhāsvara*); the *bodhisattvas* residing in it are born in the family of the Buddha-Bhagavats of the past . . . future . . . and present'.[41]

An objection [against the doctrine of the varieties of the *gotra*] has been raised since it has been stated that, because there is no differentiation in the *dharmadhātu*, the *gotra* cannot contain differences.[42] It has also been stated: 'O Mañjuśrī, if the *dharmadhātu* is one and if the *bhūtakoṭi* is one, how can one suppose that there are recipients (*bhājana*) and non-recipients?'[43]

Moreover, it is known that what is termed *gotra* has been considered by some to be certainly a particularity of the sense-bases (*āyatanaviśeṣa*).[44] In the Abhidharma it has been stated: 'Some [Arhats, vi. 56a] are of their *gotra* from the outset, while others become so by a process of perfection'.[45]

Also, with regard to the Mahāyāna, it is stated in the ***Daśadharmaka-sūtra***: 'Just as one knows [the presence of] fire [by inferring it] from smoke and [the presence of] water [by inferring it] from aquatic birds, similarly one knows [the presence of] the *gotra* of the intelligent *bodhisattva*[46] by means of [its] inferential mark (*liṅga*)'.[47] Concerning the inferential mark in this context, [54a] this refers to the fact that there are certain particular natural marks in a case where there exists some person possessing a particular sense-base (*āyatana*). But it is not correct to speak of an inferential mark in this case where there is existence of the

dharmadhātu, because the *dharmadhātu* is universal (*sāmānyavartin*).[48] Hence the Lord (*bhaṭṭāraka*, viz. Maitreyanātha) has stated that here the *gotra* has the *dharmadhātu* as its nature.[49] Nevertheless, it is not the case that there are [therefore] no varieties [of the *gotra*]; although it is settled that in reality the *gotra* is one, still what the comparison has indicated to be the intended meaning is that the postulation of difference as such depends on people's special *āyatanas* due to nature or to the process of perfection.[50]

(iii) As for these varieties, it has indeed been already stated in principle in the ***Laṅkāvatārasūtra*** [ii, p. 63] that they are the Mahāyāna [i.e. the Bodhisattva], the Pratyekabuddha, the Ārya-Śrāvaka, the undetermined (*aniyata*), and the non-*gotra* (*agotra*). However, this allusion to a cut-off *gotra* refers simply to the difficulty of attaining liberation. Otherwise how does one interpret the scriptural statements in the ***Adhyardhaśatikā Prajñāpāramitā***, 'Bodhisattva Samantabhadra, all sentient beings are *tathāgatagarbha*(s)'[51] and the ***(Samādhirāja-) Candrapradīpasūtra***, 'There exists here no sentient being who is not a recipient (*bhājana*): all these living beings without exception will become Awakened'?[52]

(iv) With respect to the inferential marks (*liṅga*), a verse mentions compassion (*kāruṇya*), convinced adhesion (*adhimukti*), constancy (*kṣānti*), and the realization of the wholesome (*śubha*) as the marks of the *gotra*.[53]

(v-vi) [The advantages (*anuśaṃsa*) of the *gotra* are furthermore mentioned in verse iii. 8 and the disadvantages (*ādīnava*) in verse iii. 7 of the ***Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra***.][54]

(vii) [54b2] With regard to the hermeneutic etymology (*nirukta*), the word *go-* has the sense of protecting a region or the earth; this is because it has been stated that the scholar is to know that the word *go-* has the meanings of mountain, light, earth, vajra, heaven, cow, and water.[55] Also, the word *kula* derives from the fact that [the Bodhisattva born in the *kula* 'family' of the Buddha] descends (*lī-*) into evil (*ku*) forms of existence, such as hell, in his compassion. Others follow the explanation on linguistic roots, where it has been said that a *kula* is so called because it is the support of an assemblage of qualities.[56] As to the meaning of the term, *gotra* is so called because it realizes qualities (*guṇottāraṇa*),[57] for it has the meaning of 'germ' (*bīja*) and 'capacity'.[58]

[Haribhadra's] statement '[The *gotra*] has the nature of the *dharmadhātu*'[59] has in mind the fact that in the initial summary it was stated that

[the *gotra*] is the ground for practice and has the nature of the *dharmadhātu* [***Abhisamayālaṃkāra*** i. 5]. The *dharma* thus explained comprises the fourfold practice (*pratipatti*), etc.[60]

As for being a ground (*ādhāra*), the *dharmadhātu*, it has been stated that what is termed *gotra* indicates the thirteenfold *bodhisattva* whose nature is connected with this by comprehension (*adhigama*).[61] Concerning the *bodhisattva*, the path leading to attainment of the Immortal (*amṛta*) is not this [*bodhisattva per se*]; but by being made to eschew evil ways and to adopt the superior way, sentient beings understand the bad opinions after having seen [it]. For this reason one speaks of a *bodhisattva*; and hence, because the *sattva* is for the sake of establishment in Awakening (*bodhi*), the *bodhi-sattva* is so named [55a].

Concerning what is termed the thirteenfold [*bodhisattva*], the thirteen are counted in the following manner. First there are the four [*nirvedhabhāgīyas*] comprised in the *prayogamārga*; the fifth is the *darśanamārga*; the sixth is the *bhāvanāmārga*; the seventh and ninth are disconnexion and the attainment of disconnexion; the eighth is from the [third] Prabhākarī stage (*bhūmi*) to the sixth [stage]; the tenth is the seventh [stage]; the eleventh is from the Acalā [or eighth stage] to the Dharmameghā [or tenth stage]; the twelfth is the one having only one more birth (*ekajātipratibaddha*) and the one in his final existence (*caramabhavika*); and the thirteenth is the *viśeṣamārga*, the *vajropamasamādhi*.[62]

Since the [*bodhisattva*] on the stage involving only one more birth assists living beings by the Buddha-activity, ordinary disciples (*vineya*) are established in the teaching (*śāsana*), so that it is stated: 'Thereafter, by means of [four kinds of] oblique expressions (*abhisaṃdhi*) such as introduction to the teaching (*avatāraṇābhisaṃdhi*) in accordance with one's disposition . . .'[63] In this connexion, in order to introduce some living beings to this teaching, [the Blessed One] has spoken concerning the *parikalpita*, the *paratantra* and the *pariniṣpanna-lakṣaṇa*,[64] [teaching] first that there exists a self (*ātman*), an individual (*pudgala*) and an element (*khams* = *dhātu*) as a means for eliminating the obstacles (*āvaraṇa*) of these [living beings], [next] that all *dharmas* are nonexistent (*med pa*) and that they originate in dependence, and [then] that all *dharma*s are free from error (*viparyāsa*) and are naturally luminous (*prakṛtiprabhāsvara*). . .[65]

[Dharmamitra then goes on to mention other teachings that are intentional (*ābhiprāyika*) inasmuch as they refer to a certain meaning without expressing it directly and explicitly (fol. 55a8–56a4).]

[56a4] Saying: 'In accordance with objectification in graded stages of comprehension belonging to the Vehicle of the Auditors (*śrāvakayāna*) and the other Vehicles. . . .',[66] [Haribhadra] gives the stated teaching, namely that since the Auditors (*śrāvaka*) do not maintain, as do the Yogācārins, that there are different *gotras* and that there is a cut-off *gotra*, they therefore hold that all sentient beings are of undetermined (*aniyata*) *gotra*.[67] Following this doctrine, the *gotra* of your [*Śrāvaka*] system is of one nature; but the *gotras* may still be different simply because of the different comprehensions (*adhigama*) brought about by conditions. Similarly, while we also hold that the nature of the *gotra* is in accord with the exclusively single *dharmadhātu*, we still hold the differentiated *gotras* to be thirteen consequent on the graded stages of comprehension of this [*dharmadhātu*]. This is what is meant by the well-known example mentioned in the treatise.[68]—'As a simple teaching' (*sla chos ñid du*),[69] namely the example well-known in common usage that is simple to set forth and understand.[70]

ABHAYĀKARAGUPTA, *Marmakaumudī*
[T.T. Vol. 92 (da: fol 54a-57a)]

In his commentary on the ***Aṣṭasāhasrikā***, the ***Marmakaumudī***, Abhayākaragupta takes up the theme of the *gotra* when commenting on the first chapter, the *Sarvākāra-jñatācaryā-parivarta*. On the subject of the non-differentiation of the *bodhisattvagotra* in particular he has the following to say (fol. 56b1–57a3).

The *bodhisattvagotra* is pure by nature (*prakṛtiviśuddha*) [although] hidden in adventitious impurities (*āgantukamala*). The *tathāgatagarbha*, the dispersal of the darkness of factors such as ignorance, termed naturally existent, is the support (*pratiṣṭhā*) of the twenty-two progressive productions (*utpāda*) of the thought (*citta*) [of Awakening].[71] And accordingly Ārya Vimuktisena has interpreted it as relating to the four factors of penetration (*nirvedhabhāgīya*), etc., with respect to the *cittotpāda*, etc.[72] As a consequence, that Haribhadra's *nirvedhabhāgīyas* are the support of the *dharmadhātu* is incorrect.[73]

Concerning this [*prakṛtisthagotra* of the *bodhisattva*], the absence of own being (*niḥsvabhāvatā*) of all *dharmas*, since [its] characteristic is the series of *āryadharmas*, it is the *dharmadhātu*.[74] And that this is being taught here is shown by the treatise which states: 'Because of the non-

differentiation of the *dharmadhātu* the *gotra* cannot be differentiated'.[75] —Objection: How can one then differentiate, saying that this is the *buddhagotra*, this the *pratyekabuddhagotra*, and this the *śrāvakagotra*?[76]— The treatise has given the following answer: 'By virtue of the differentiation of the supported factors (*ādheyadharma*) one speaks of its differentiation',[77] i.e. because of possession of the supported factors of the *buddha* and so forth.[78] This *dharma* is [indeed] without differentiation; yet there is differentiation of the *gotra* here owing to differentiation of the [supported factors]—'just as in the undifferentiated sky (*ākāśa*) there are all those proceeding along [various] ways such as the way of the sun, that of a bird, that of a butterfly'. . .[79]

'What is the support-object?'[80]—because of what sort of *gotra* does one objectively speak of existence [of the *bodhisattva*]?—'There is no support-object'[81]—i.e. a *gotra* of the [*bodhisattva*] does not exist as a thing.[82] And such is the meaning of *dharmadhātu*.

[57a] Whatever group (*skandha*), etc., may be the object (*viṣaya*) of the customary expression Bodhisattva, there is absence of own being (*niḥsvabhāvatā*), Emptiness (*śūnyatā*), and *dharmatā*; perfected in pure nature in its *dharmadhātu* this will be comprehended, and the name "*bodhi*" is given to this. What is *gotra* consequently is no thing. This *śūnyatā* is due to the characteristic of no thing. Or again, with regard to Awakening, there is no support in what is *gotra*. By surface convention (*saṃvṛti*) and by mutual non-differentiation there is no [real] differentiation into a support and a supported (*ādhārādheyabhāva*), for this [differentiation] is fabricated by designation (*prajñapti*) [only].

'How so?'[83]—how being *dharmadhātu* is it precisely *bodhi-gotra*?[84]— All factors (*sarvadharma*) have been set out with reference to the six *adhigamadharmas*.[85]

Abhayākaragupta then goes on to comment on the *Aṣṭa*'s statement (i, p. 18): 'The Bodhisattva-Mahāsattva exercises himself in non-attachment (*asaktatāyāṃ śikṣate*)', and he next turns to explain the object (*ālambana*, ***Abhisamayālaṃkāra*** i. 40) as 'all *dharmas*' (fol. 57bl sq.).

ABHAYĀKARAGUPTA, *Munimatālaṃkāra*
[T.T. Vol. 101(Ha)]

In Abhayākaragupta's independent treatise entitled the "Ornament of the Sage's Doctrine" we find a more detailed discussion of the *gotra*

in connexion with the question of the *ekayāna*, both in Chapters i and ii which treat of the *bodhicitta* and its realization (*bhāvanā*) and in Chapter iii which deals with the eight *abhisamayas* under the first of which, the *sarvākārajñatā*, the *gotra* theory is explained by the commentators, as has already been noticed above.

Chapter i of the ***Munimatālaṃkāra*** contains the following observations on these interrelated topics (fol. 182b6–183a8).

The Prajñāpāramitā itself, the Bhagavatī, is the essence of the Mahāyāna, the *ekayāna* precisely. The system postulating (three)[86] different vehicles (*yāna*) was set out by the Blessed One (*bhagavat*) in order to introduce the childish (*bāla*) (progressively to the teaching); it is not of certain meaning (*nītārtha*).[87] This is what has been stated in the ***Laṅkāvatārasūtra***: 'No system postulating (different) vehicles indeed exists (in certain meaning): I teach that the vehicle is one (ultimately). [But] in order to attract the childish I speak of different vehicles'.[88] [183a] Although [a difference is] postulated according to whether one has little preparation (*sambhāra*) or immeasurable preparation, the *yāna* is not different [in reality]; for the *dharmadhātu* is without differentiation. This (difference of vehicles) is taught [then merely] as a gate of entry (to the Mahāyāna). And the Ārya [Nāgārjuna] has declared: 'O Lord, because of the non-differentiation of the *dharmadhātu* there is no difference of vehicles; you have spoken of these vehicles in order to introduce sentient beings' (progressively to the teaching).[89]

Consequently (it is objected), it is the teaching concerning the one vehicle that is intentional (*ābhiprāyika*), and [only] because of the equivalence (which [the teacher] has in mind) of the vehicle having the characteristic of the *dharmadhātu* (the intended foundation, *dgoṅs gźi*), etc., has the oneness (of the vehicle) been taught.[90]—[Reply:] As for this objection, it has been expressly stated in the ***Saddharmapuṇḍarīkasūtra***: 'O Śāriputra, in the future you will be the Samyaksambuddha named Padmaprabha'[91] And [an interpretation which postulates several ultimately different vehicles] is not in accordance with this explicit canonical statement (of certain meaning).

In the ***Daśadharmakasūtra*** it is stated that, in order to indicate the teaching of the three vehicles as (being) an expedient (*upāya*), the Blessed One taught the *ekayāna* intentionally to beings to be trained (*vineya*) (as an indirect meaning);[92] for (if it be asked why three vehicles were taught) it would have been impossible to introduce these disciples

saying that this teaching of three vehicles is [nothing but] an expedient employed by the Blessed One, and that it is not true. It is [then simply] in accordance with this [consideration] that Ārya Maitreya has taught in the ***Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra*** (in the *Dharmaparyeṣṭi* chapter) that the teaching of the *ekayāna* is intentional (*ābhiprāyika*).[93]

Abhayākaragupta next proceeds to discuss the gnoseo-soteriological questions that arise with respect to the *bodhi* of the Śrāvaka and Pratyekabuddha, the 'conversion' of their two vehicles into the Bodhisattvayāna or Buddhayāna, and their final attainment of buddhahood. He then writes the following (fol. 186a7–186b7).

In the ***Prajñāpāramitā*** the [Blessed One] has stated: 'If they were to produce the thoughts (*citta*) directed toward complete and perfect Awakening, I place no obstacle in the way of the [resulting] wholesome root'.[94] And in the ***Samādhirājasūtra*** it is stated: 'All these living beings will become Awakened: [186b] there exists here no sentient being who is not a recipient (*bhājana*)'.[95] Owing to the adventitiousness of the impurities and because of the natural luminosity of the *citta* (since it is *śūnya*) (because it is exempt from the unitary and multiple, the nature of *citta* which is unborn in own being is luminous, and it is stated that all the darkness of mental construction is illuminated), there indeed exists in all living beings the capacity[96] for Buddhahood, as has been correctly explained to be the intended meaning. Thus, by saying in the Sūtra 'All sentient beings are *tathāgatagarbha*(s)',[97] the Blessed One has fully set out the capacity that all have for comprehending (or: attaining) the level (*pada*) of supreme Awakening. (According to the above mentioned scripture, whereas the *tathāgatagarbha* does not permeate (*vyāp-*) all the insensible (*sthāvara*) as well as the living (*jaṅgama*), it permeates the conscious series (*cittasaṃtāna*) of the living.)[98] For in the ***Ratnagotravibhāga(-Commentary)***, where it is said [i. 148] (quoting the Bodhi-chapter of the ***Mahāyānasutrālaṃkāra***):[99] 'Although in all without differentiation, Thusness (*tathatā*) once it has reached purity (from adventitious impurities) (is) this *tathāgata*-ness; all living beings therefore have this (*tathāgata*) as embryonic essence' etc., (teaching that all living beings possess the *buddhagarbha*), Ārya Maitreya too has, by using the expression *tathāgata* (in this text), accepted the statement that the *dharmadhātu*, having the characteristic of non-substantiality (*nairātmya*) of the individual (*pudgala*) and the *dharmas*, is naturally luminous

(*prakṛtiprabhāsvara*).[100]

Abhayākaragupta then takes up the question of the gnoseological foundation of the *ekayāna* theory (fol. 186b7–187a6).

Moreover, the word *yāna* denotes the path (*mārga*) leading to the place of *nirvāṇa*, i.e. the nature of knowledge of reality (*tattvajñāna*) (the means of progression), and *nirvāṇa* (the goal of progression). . .[101] [187a] For liberation (viz. *nirvāṇa*) is attained by knowledge of reality only, and not otherwise. Now this reality (*tattva*) (comprehended by transcending discriminating knowledge [*prajñā*]) is only (*eva*) one; although theory (*dṛṣṭi*) is differentiated (in virtue of this or that theory), the real (*vastu*) [i.e. the 'object' of *tattva-jñāna*] is not objectified as diverse realities, for this would involve over-extension (*atiprasaṅga*). Therefore, (there being no multiplicity in reality,) gnosis (*jñāna*) that has as its object reality having a single nature is also only one in (the mode of) nature. It being in fact gnosis consisting of the *buddha*'s and *bodhisattva*'s exact knowledge of reality, it has reality as its object; for it is the counteragent against confusion (*sammoha*) in all its forms. Partial (*prādeśika*) knowledge (of the Śrāvaka and the other) [on the contrary] will not comprehend reality; for this (namely understanding reality through partial knowledge) would involve over-extension, and thus (by comprehension through partial knowledge) everybody would see reality. Therefore, (the *yāna* being the *mārga* and this being established as one,) that very gnosis which directly knows (*sākṣātkṛ-*) reality consisting in non-substantiality (*nairātmya*) of *pudgala* and *dharmas* is the exact path allowing *nirvāṇa* to be attained, and there is no other [such path]. In view of the preceding, the vehicle is only (*eva*) one.

After having discussed the three natures (*svabhāva*) and non-substantiality (*nairātmya*) in connexion with the *pariniṣpannasvabhāva* (fol. 187b–188a), Abhayākaragupta concludes his first chapter with the following observation (fol. 188b4–6):

Thus (or: therefore) the nature of the Mahāyāna is established as being only the one vehicle (*ekayāna*) and the absolute (*paramārtha*) absence of own being (*niḥsvabhāvatā*) of all *dharmas*. This (the Great Vehicle) is the Bhagavatī Prajñāpāramitā. This (Prajñāpāramitā) is to

be known as the absolutely real (*pāramārthika*) *bodhicitta*, which consists of the non-differentiation of the Empty (comprehension of *śūnyatā*) and compassion.

Chapter ii of the ***Munimatālaṃkāra*** begins explaining the process of realization (*bhāvanā*) of the *bodhicitta* by recalling that all living beings are endowed with the certain capacity[102] to eliminate the obstructions, viz. the *kleśāvaraṇa* and the *jñeyāvaraṇa* (fol. 188b7).

[188a8] Furthermore, the teaching concerning the *ekayāna* being thus quite certain, it has been established that apart from the *dharmadhātu* having the nature of the non-dual gnosis (*advayajñāna*) of transcending discriminative knowledge (*prajñā*) and means (*upāya*),[103] [189b] there exists no other vehicle of liberation. Therefore (if it be asked why different forms of *bhāvanā* have nevertheless been taught), when the Blessed One teaches *bhāvanā* by introducing divisions in the true (*satya*) (and the Prajñāpāramitā and Mantra), this involves differentiation in name only (*nāmamātra*) in accordance with the different convictions (*adhimukti*) of beings to be trained (*vineya*); and this serves as an introduction. Consequently, while reality (*tattva*) itself is without differentiation, in order to conform to the spiritual propensities of sentient beings toward one thing or another (e.g. the impermanent) with this or that term (*nāman*) (e.g. impermanent) in the Sūtras and Abhidharma, the Buddha-Bhagavats have given instructions while proceeding as if there were differentiations.

Abhayākaragupta explains that this procedure involves teaching impermanence to persons whose faculties are weak (*hīnendriya*) by eradicating any imputation (*samāropa*) of reality, only self-awareness (*svasaṃvedana*) to persons with middling faculties by eradicating the imputation of [a real duality between] object and subject (*grāhya-grāhaka*), and *śūnyatā* or absence of discursive development (*prapañca*) to persons with sharp faculties by eradicating all imputation whatsoever. This is what Dharmakīrti was referring to when he wrote in his ***Pramāṇavārttika*** (ii. 253cd): 'But release results from the theory of *śūnyatā*, and the realization of the remainder [viz. *anitya*, *duḥkha* and *anātman*] has that purpose' (fol. 189b).[104] Also, the postulating of a single cause such as a creator (*īśvara*), the Sāṃkhya's *pradhāna*, or the philosopher-grammarian's *śabdabrahman* rests on names only, which have then to be

surmounted by certain teachings serving as counteragents (*pratipakṣa*) (fol. 190a).

In his treatment of *sarvākārajñatā*, the first of the eight *abhisamayas* which are the subject of Chapter iii of the ***Munimatālaṃkāra***, Abhayākaragupta provides a fuller statement of his theory of the *gotra* (fol. 217b2–219a5).

[217b2] Because (according to the commentary on the *Pañca*) the *dharmadhātu*, which has precisely as its characteristic the absence of own being (*niḥsvabhāvatā*) of all *dharmas*, is the [motivating] cause (*hetu*) of the *āryadharmas*,[105] use is made of the verbal equivalents (*paryāya*) *gotra* existent by nature (*prakṛtistham gotram*), ground (*gźi* = *ādhāra*) base ([*ñe bar*]*rton pa* = *upastambha*), [motivating] cause (*rgyu* = *hetu*), foundation (*rten* = *niśraya*), *upaniṣad* (*ñe bar gnas pa*), precursor (*sṅon du 'gro ba* = *pūrvaṃgama*), residence (*gnas* = *nilaya*), germ (*sa bon* = *bīja*),[106] element (*khams* = *dhātu*), and nature (*raṅ bźin* = *prakṛti*).[107] It is thus that this *gotra*, which is very pure by nature (*prakṛtiviśuddha*) [although] concealed by adventitious impurities (*āgantukamala*), once it has become freed from all impurities (owing to the absence of the hindrances, viz. repetition of passions, evil friends, lack, and dependence[108]) shines forth; it is then like the ore of iron, copper, silver and gold in rocks (as is said in the ***Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra***).[109] This very *dharmatā*, the *ātma-gotra* (*bdag ñid kyi rigs*) (existing in the *śūnyatā* [of] the conscious series of the sentient being) is termed (in the Sūtra) *tathāgatagarbha*.[110] Although this *gotra* of nature (*prakṛti*) exists, living beings so long as they are covered by adventitious impurities such as ignorance (*avidyā*) are not completely Awakened. [But] once they are freed from all the impurities of dichotomizing conceptualization (*vikalpa*) (by constant practice of the path), there is achieved Awakening wherein the very pure *dharmadhātu* (because of freedom from the adventitious impurities) shines forth. Therefore (buddhahood not being achieved in virtue of the bare existence of the *dharmadhātu*), [218a] the saint (*ārya*) in particular (free from the four disadvantages)[111] (is) *gotra*;[112] and as the 'cause of application' (*pravṛttinimitta*) of the word '*bodhisattva*',[113] (the *gotra*) is referred to as the ground (*ādhāra*) for the twenty-two *bodhicittotpādas*[114] and of the practices (*pratipatti*) of the outfit (*saṃnāha*) connected with wish (*chanda*) as the particularity of this (viz. the *cittotpāda*).[115] So the *gotra* is to be known as the support (*pratiṣṭhā*)

of the six factors of comprehension (*adhigamadharma*, nos. 1–6),[116] the counteragent (*pratipakṣa*, no. 7) and elimination (*prahāṇa*, no. 8), surmounting (*yoṅs su gtugs pa* = *paryupayoga*, no. 9) the preceding, *prajñā* accompanied by compassion (no. 10), superiority over the Auditors (*śiṣya* [= *śrāvaka*], no. 11), progressive action for the benefit of others (*parārthānukrama*, no. 12), and effortless action (*ayatnavṛtti*) of gnosis (no. 13). This is what has been stated in the relevant verses of the ***Abhisamayālaṃkāra*** [i. 37–38], as well as by Ārya Vimuktisena in his commentary on the text of the *Pañca*. Consequently, concerning the *cittotpāda*, with respect to the four *nirvedhabhāgīyas* [of the *prayogamārga*], the *darśanamārga* and the *bhāvanāmārga* [i.e. nos. 1–6] the *bodhisattva* in each case has been called '*bodhisattva*' by the Blessed One.[117] The counteragent [no. 7] is the Prajñāpāramitā; elimination [no. 8], namely (elimination) of the obstacles (*vipakṣa*), is the *dharmadhātu*, the characteristic of complete purity (from any adventitious impurities). (According to the ***Śuddhimatī***,[118]) *paryupayoga* 'surmounting' [no. 9] of both counteragent and elimination is progression to the ultimate limit, i.e. ultimate perfection of the perfect counteragent and ultimate exhaustion of the obstacle. Haribhadra indeed explains *paryupayoga* as the condition of elimination of dichotomizing conceptualization connected with origination (of the counteragent) and stoppage (elimination).[119]

Now the *prakṛtistha-gotra* comes from beginningless time (*anādikālāgata*) and is attained in virtue of *dharmatā* (*dharmatāpratilabdha*) [218b]. The developed (*samudānīta*) [*gotra* on the other hand] is attained by the continual practice of the previous wholesome roots. The temporarily determined (*niyata*) (not ultimately determined) [*gotra*] is the *gotra* of the Śrāvaka and Pratyekabuddha. The permanently determined (*niyata*) one is the *tathāgata-gotra*. The *gotra* of the Śrāvaka, Pratyekabuddha and Tathāgata may be (temporarily) undetermined since it is removable (*hārya*) through conditions (*pratyaya*). But that the *gotra* is by reason of this statement [really] differentiated is not correct.[120] For the Blessed One also has stated:[121] 'O Mañjuśrī, if the *dharmadhātu* is one, if the *tathatā* is one and if the *bhūtakoṭi* is one, how is it that one speaks of one who is a recipient and one who is not a recipient?' (such a designation is not correct). This is true.[122] And thus, because of difference in the factors of the Śrāvaka and Pratyekabuddha, the supported (*ādheya*), the *gotras* of the Śrāvakas and the others (the Pratyekabuddhas) are differentiated in customary usage; for example, in the case of the

sky (*ākāśa*) which is without differentiation, with respect to the different [entities] who have their [various] ways [in it] one speaks of the way of a being, the way of the birds, and the way of the sun.[123] Hence, when the comprehension (*adhigama*) of great Awakening is preceded by the comprehensions of the Awakenings of the Śrāvakas and the others (the Pratyekabuddhas) these [the two latter] have been indicated as temporary, as a consequence of which it has been taught that they are connected with the *gotra* of the Śrāvakas and the others (the Pratyekabuddhas). According to customary usage, those persons who progressively cultivate supreme *bodhi* attaining the Pramuditā and the other [stages of the Bodhisattva] to start with (without depending on another [path]) are said to have the *mahāyāna-gotra*. A differentiation of the *gotra* is therefore not [in fact] inconsistent [with the theory of the undifferentiated *gotra* and the *ekayāna*]; but this (differentiation of the *gotra*) is not real (*tattvataḥ*).

As has been stated (concerning the non-differentiation of the *gotra*): 'Where there are no conditionings (*saṃskāra*) whatsoever, there is the unconditioned (*asaṃskṛta*). It is equal to the *gotra* of the Āryas; this *gotra* is without differentiation in virtue of equality (*samatā*) with space (*ākāśa*); this *gotra* [219a] is permanent (*nitya*) in virtue of the fact that all *dharma*s are of one value (*ekarasa*); and because this *gotra* is always *dharmatā*, it is knowledge, etc.'[124]

Concerning the hermeneutic etymology (*nirukta*), because the good qualities are realized—produced—from it,[125] it is *gotra*. Again, because they go (*gam-*) sentient beings are *go-*; and because of protecting them (*trā-*) it is *go-tra-*. Again (according to the ***Śuddhimatī***),[126] here *gam-* (the root of *go-*) is used in the sense of being present; for example, the *ākāśa* is universally present, and accordingly *go-* meaning 'to go, be present' [is] the supported factor (*ādheyadharma*). And because of protection, holding unshakeably (indestructibly), one speaks of a *go-tra*, viz. (what is termed) support.[127]

Question: Now how is the *dharmadhātu*, which is without own being (*svabhāva*), the support (*pratiṣṭhā*) of the *cittotpāda*?[128]—[Reply:] For example, (it having been stated by Ārya Nāgārjuna in his ***Vigrahavyāvartanī*** that 'All things prevail for somebody for whom this *śūnyatā* prevails, [but] nothing prevails for somebody for whom *śūnyatā* does not prevail'),[129] this is like (being the support of) the removal of darkness by the rays of moon and sun [in] the sky (*ākāśa*) which is [nevertheless] without own being.[130]

With Dharmamitra the *tathāgatagarbha* doctrine enters clearly and definitively into the commentarial literature on the ***Abhisamayālaṃkāra*** in connexion with the explication of the theory of the undifferentiated *prakṛtisthagotra*. These two theories were of course already associated in the ***Ratnagotravibhāga***. And in the canonical literature of the Prajñāpāramitā-Sūtras the *tathāgatagarbha* theory is attested in the ***Adhyardhaśatikā***, evidently a later Prajñāpāramitā text showing certain Tantrik influences.[131] Previous to Dharmamitra, a synthesis of the *prajñāpāramitā* and the *tathāgatagarbha* was elaborated by Kamalaśīla.

The *tathāgatagarbha* notion may well be linked with the concept of the *stūpa* or *caitya* as *tathāgatadhātugarbha* which is to be found also in the Prajñāpāramitā literature, but the connexion has not been made altogether explicit in our sources.

Emphasis on the *ekayāna* (which is lacking in Dharmamitra's ***Prasphuṭapadā***) is to be found in both Haribhadra's great commentary and, earlier, in Kamalaśīla's ***Madhyamakāloka***. Its significance as a gnoseo-soteriological principle was worked out in a final form for Indian Buddhism by Abhayākaragupta in the context of the theory of the *prakṛtisthagotra* and *tathāgatagarbha*. The association between the *ekayāna* and the *tathāgatagarbha* theories goes back at least as far as the ***Śrīmālādevīsiṃhanādasūtra***.[132]

In Abhayākaragupta's comments it is especially interesting to find the assimilation of the *tathāgatagarbha* with the *prakṛtisthagotra* whose nature is *dharmadhātu*, in other words non-substantiality (*nairātmya*) of both *pudgala* and *dharma*s, absence of own being (*niḥsvabhāvatā*) and Emptiness. The ***Marmakaumudī*** thus mentions absence of own being and *śūnyatā* in connexion with the *prakṛtisthagotra*, which has the nature of *dharmadhātu*.[133] The ***Munimatālaṃkāra*** explains that the *dharmadhātu* has the characteristic of non-substantiality of *pudgala* and *dharmas*, and that it is naturally luminous.[134] The *ekayāna* also is linked with absolute absence of own being.[135] (And a note in small letters in the Peking edition of the Tibetan translation of the ***Munimatālaṃkāra*** specifies that there is natural luminosity of *citta* since it is empty (*śūnya*) of all impurities.[136]) Abhayākaragupta's comments accordingly support the connextion of the *prakṛtisthagotra* of the Prajñāpāramita literature not only with the *tathāgatagarbha* and *ekayāna,* but also with non-substantiality, absence of own being and *śūnyatā*.[137]

Apart from the 'Tathāgatagarbha School' represented by certain Mahāyāna sūtras (such as the ***Tathāgatagarbha***, the ***Śrīmālādevīsiṃhanāda*** and the ***Mahāparinirvāṇa***) and the ***Ratnagotravibhaga*** together with its commentary, this complex of problems seems to have come to the fore in India above all in the synthetic Yogācāra-Mādhyamika school which was firmly established in the eighth century by Śāntarakṣita, and whose masters were responsible for several important commentaries on the ***Abhisamayālaṃkāra***.

It is probably due at least in part to the great influence of the Yogācāra-Mādhyamika school in Tibet from the time of Śāntarakṣita and his disciple Kamalaśīla that the *gotra* and *ekayāna* (as connected in particular with the Prajñāpāramitā literature) and the *tathāgatagarbha* (connected earlier with a distinct corpus of Sūtras and Śāstras) came together to play such a prominent and important part in Tibetan Buddhist thought.[138] This theory evidently had a deep influence on the later Prāsangika-Mādhyamikas too, in particular on the Tibetan representatives of this school who lay special emphasis on these three concepts which they explicate in the framework of the *śūnyatā* theory as elaborated by them.

NOTES

[1] E. Conze, ***The Large Sūtra on Perfect Wisdom*** (London 1961), p. 105 note 2. References hereunder to the folios of Tibetan translations of Indian texts contained in the Bstan 'gyur relate to the Peking edition as reproduced in the Japanese reprint published by the Tibetan Tripiṭaka Research Institute (Tokyo and Kyoto). Prints of other editions of the Bstan 'gyur were unfortunately unavailable during the writing of the present paper.

[2] On the meanings of the term *gotra*, and in particular on the two meanings '(spiritual) element, germ, capacity' and '(spiritual) lineage, class, category' which might be described respectively as the intensional and extensional meanings of the word when the *gotra* as germ determines the classification of persons possessing it in a *gotra* as category, see the present writer's article in *BSOAS* 39 (1976) p. 341sq.

[3] "Ārya and Bhadanta Vimuktisena on the *gotra*-theory of the Prajñāpāramitā," ***Beiträge zur Geistesgeschichte Indiens (Festschrift für Erich Frauwallner)***, *WZKSO* 12–13 (1968/1969), pp. 303–317.

[4] Ratnākaraśānti's other work on the subject, a commentary on the *AA* entitled ***Śuddhimatī***, (or: ***Śuddhamatī***) will be referred to below.

[5] Tāranātha, ***Rgya gar chos 'byuṅ*** (ed. A. Schiefner), p. 171. Dharmākara(datta) was the religious name of Arcaṭa (ca. 730–790?) (cf. Durvekamiśra, ***Arcaṭāloka*** [GOS ed.], p. 233).

Tāranātha accordingly distinguishes our Dharmamitra from another master having the same name whom he describes as a Vaibhāṣika, and who wrote a commentary (*Ṭīkā*) on Guṇaprabha's ***Vinayasūtra***. This earlier Dharmamitra is in fact reported to have been a pupil of Guṇaprabha (see Bu•ston, ***Chos 'byuṅ*** II, p. 161), which would make him approximately a contemporary of Ārya Vimuktisena.

[6] Cf. Bu•ston, ***Chos 'byuṅ*** II, p. 140; Tāranātha, ***Rgya gar chos 'byuṅ***, p. 153.

[7] According to the colophon of the Tibetan translation in the Bstan•'gyur. Cf. Tāranātha, *op. cit.*, pp. 189 sq., 198–199.

[8] Exceptions to this classification were for example Ña•dbon•Kun•dga'•dpal (cf. ***Théorie***, p. 140) and other masters of the so-called Great Madhyamaka (*dbu ma chen po*) who undertook a harmonization of the Madhyamaka and the Vijñaptimātra.

[9] See e.g. Ña•dbon•Kun•dga'•dpal's ***Yid kyi mun sel***, fol. 237a (translated in ***Théorie***, p. 140).

[10] T.T. Fol. 54a.—Cf. for example Tsoṅ•kha•pa, ***Legs bśad gser phreṅ.*** fol. 210a ***Théorie***, p. 122).

[11] On the meanings of this statement see below, pp. 287–8.

[12] Dignāga, ***Prajñāpāramitāpiṇḍārtha*** 27–29:
prajñāpāramitāyāṃ hi trīn samāśritya deśanā /
kalpitaṃ paratantraṃ ca pariniṣpannam eva ca //
nâstityādipadaiḥ sarvaṃ kalpitaṃ vinivāryate /
māyopamādidṛṣṭāntaiḥ paratantrasya deśanā //
caturdhā vyavadānena pariniṣpannakīrtanam /
prajñāpāramitāyāṃ hi nânyā buddhasya deśanā //

[13] Chapter 83 of the Tibetan version. Cf. E. Conze and S. Iida, in ***Mélanges d'indianisme à la mémoire de Louis Renou*** (Paris 1968), p. 238.

These three aspects cannot, however, according to many commentators be simply equated with the three *lakṣaṇas* or *svabhāvas* of the Vijñānavāda. Cf. ***Théorie***, pp. 325–327, 343, 147–148.

[14] *AAĀ* 1.28–30 (p. 47): *tat punas trividhaṃ rūpam | kalpitaṃ rūpam grāhyagrāhakarūpeṇa kalpitatvāt| vikalpitaṃ rūpam asadbhūtaparikalpena jñānam eva tathā pratibhāsate iti vikalpitatvāt| dharmatārūpaṃ tattvato 'rūpam eva śūnyatārūpeṇa pariniṣpannatvāt|*

[15] ***Marmakaumudī***, T.T. fol. 56b.

[16] See ***Munimatālaṃkāra***, T. T. fol. 186b. On this point see ***Théorie***, p. 152 note.

[17] On the link between the *ekayāna* and *tathāgatagarbha* doctrines see also the ***Śrīmālādevīsiṃhanādasūtra*** (***Théorie***, p. 182 sq.; ***Le traité du tathāgatagarbha***, (Publications de l'École française d'Extrême Orient Vol. LXXXVIII, Paris. 1973) p.142 sq.).

[18] ***Munimatālaṃkāra***, T. T. fol. 183a.

[19] ***Munimatālaṃkāra***, T. T. fol. 183a.

[20] ***Munimatālaṃkāra***, T. T. fol. 186b-187a. Cf. ***Théorie***, pp. 180, 185.

[21] ***Marmakaumudī*** T. T. fol. 56b; ***Munimatālaṃkāra***, fol. 182b sq.; 218b-219a.

[22] ***Munimatālaṃkāra***, T. T. fol. 186b.

[23] The connexion between the *ekayāna*, the *prakṛtistha-gotra* and the *tathāgatagarbha* on the one side and *nairātmya*, *niḥsvabhāvatā* and *śūnyatā* on the other is especially noteworthy. The question of the relationship between the *tathāgatagarbha* and *śūnyatā* is taken up in the *RGV* (J) i. 154 sq., as well as in some of the relevant Sūtras. Cf. ***Théorie,*** p. 313 sq.; ***Le Traité du tathāgatagarbha*** Index. s. v. *śūnya (tā)*.

[24] See *RGV* (J) i. 148.

The other two aspects on which the theory is based are (the irradiation, *spharaṇa*, of) the *dharmakāya* and the *prakṛtistha-gotra*. See *RGV* (J) 1.27–28; 148–152; ***Théorie,*** pp. 34, 275 sq., 424; ***Le Traité du tathāgatagarbha***, pp. 10, 96 sq.

[25] This was already observed by Kamalaśīla, ***Madhyamakāloka*** T. T. fol. 159b. Cf. ***Théorie,*** pp. 34, 276–277; ***Traité du tathāgatagarbha***, p. 99.

[26] See *MSA* chapters iii and xi; ***Théorie***, pp. 179 sq.; 185 sq.

[27] See *MSABh* ix. 37.

[28] This meaning of the compound *tathāgata-garbha* can be rendered in Tibetan by means of the particle *can*, which serves *inter alia* to translate Sanskrit *bahuvrīhi* compounds; the same particle also translates the Sanskrit suffixes-*mant-*|*-vant–*, etc.

[29] Rather than of 'relic' (see below).

[30] Cf. for example *SP* chapter xi, which enumerates at the beginning *suvarṇa*, *rūpya*, *vaiḍūrya*, *musāragalva*, *aśmagarbha*, *lohitamukti* and *karketana*.

[31] Haribhadra glosses (*AAĀ* ii. 18, p. 218): *tathāgatadhātumadhyān* 'having in their core the Tathāgata-relic'.

For the idea compare e.g. the word *aṅgārastūpa* (in the ***Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra***, ed. E. Waldschmidt, § 51.20) and the phrase *stūpaḥ . . . aṅgāragarbhaḥ* '*stūpa* containing carbonised [relics]' (in E. Waldschmidt, ***Sanskrithandschriften aus den Turfanfunden*** I, 931bAd). See also ***Samādhirājasūtra*** 33, p. 456.6; ***Divyāvadāna*** 26, p. 369.1.

[32] On these two senses of the compound *tathāgata-garbha* see ***Théorie,*** p. 507sq.;

Le Traité du tathāgatagvarbha p. 52 sq.

[33] Cf. *aṅgārastūpa* mentioned above, note 31.

[34] See ***Abhidharmakośabhāṣya***, iv. 73 (but cf. iv. 121); compare e.g. ***Mahāvaṃsa*** xvii. 65. Cf. A. Bareau, ***Les sectes bouddhiques du Petit Véhicule*** (Paris 1955), pp. 154 (Mūlasarvāstivādins), 192 (Dharmaguptakas) (the thesis that this cult of the *stūpa* can produce good fruit was combatted by other schools such as the Caitīyas, Pūrvaśailas, the later Mahīśāsakas, and the Aparaśailas); E. Lamotte, ***Histoire du bouddhisme indien*** (Louvain 1958), p. 702–703.

[35] ***Abhidharmakośa*** iv. 107.

[36] ***Madhyamakāloka*** T. T. fol. 159b, 267a, 271b-272b.

[37] The four *nirvedhabhāgīyas* are *ūṣman* (*ūṣmagata*), *mūrdhan*, *kṣānti*, and *laukikāgradharma*, all of them being assigned to the *prayogamārga*. Together with the following *darśanamārga* and *bhāvanāmārga* they constitute the six *adhigamadharmas* (see below, p. 297). See *AA* i. 5; 25 sq.; 37; ***Abhidharmakośa*** vi. 17 sq.

[38] This point has already been mentioned by Ārya Vimuktisena, who speaks of a didactic sequence (*pratipādanānupūrvī*) as distinct from the actual sequence (*arthānupūrvī*); see his *Vṛtti* (ed. C. Pensa p. 78). Similarly, Haribhadra speaks of a sequence founded on the stages of understanding (*adhigamānukrama*) (*AAĀ* i. 37–38, p. 77).

On the *gotra* as a *motivating* cause, as distinct from a productive cause, cf. ***Théorie***, pp. 119 note, 131, with *WZKS* 12–13 (1968), p. 316. See also below, note 73; p. 308.

[39] That is, the sequence adopted in the *AA* indicates that it is the effected or caused (*abhisaṃskṛta*) *gotra* that is in question, rather than the fundamental and universal *prakṛtistha-gotra*. (The second *gotra* would then correspond to the *samudānīta* or *paripuṣṭagotra*, which may be considered as a *productive* cause since it is conditioned [*saṃskṛta*].) This alternative explanation of the sequence adopted in the *AA* has not been mentioned by the Vimuktisenas and Haribhadra; but Ārya Vimuktisena's *Vṛtti* (p. 76–77) does mention a *gotra* that is *pratyayasamudānīta* and functions as a cause (*kāraṇa*). See below, p. 300

[40] See *MSA* iii. 2. 300.

[41] On this see ***Théorie***, p. 141 note 5.

[42] *AA* i. 39ab: *dharmadhātor asambhedād gotrabhedo na yujyate* |

[43] The Sanskrit text of this passage is quoted by Ārya Vimuktisena (p. 77): *yadi mañjuśrīr eko dharmadhātur ekā tathatā ekā bhūtakoṭis tat kathaṃ bhājanam abhājanam vā prajñāpayatha* (?). Here *pra-jñāpay* has been translated into Tibetan by *brtags*; but in Abhayākaragupta's ***Munimatālaṃkāra*** it has been written more correctly *gdags* (see below, p. 300).

[44] Cf. *WZKS* 11–12, p. 309–310; ***Théorie***, p. 103.

[45] ***Abhidharmakośa*** vi. 57cd: *tadgotrā āditaḥ ke cit, ke cid uttāpanāgatāḥ* ||

[46] When the term *bodhisattva* is used in the sense of a spiritual principle that is no *padārtha* (see below, p. 292), rather than a (type of) person, it is written here as an italicized technical term. Cf. Ārya Vimuktisena, *Vṛtti*, p. 73.

[47] Cf. ***Théorie***, pp. 109, 89.

[48] Haribhadra, ***'Grel pa don gsal***, T. T. fol. 105b8; *AAĀ* 1.39 (p. 77). Cf. Ārya Vimuktisena, p. 77.5.

If the *liṅga* (or *hetu*) 'logical reason' is present in all cases (as is necessarily the case with the universal *dharmadhātu*), there could be no heterologous examples (*vipakṣa*) in which it would be absent; but this lack of absence (*vyatireka*) makes it impossible to make a valid inference (*anumāna*) following the rules of logic widely accepted by the Buddhists after Dignāga.

[49] *AA* i. 5cd: *ādhāraḥ pratipatteś ca dharmadhātusvabhāvakaḥ* ||

[50] Cf. *AA* 1.39cd: *ādheyadharmabhedāt tu tadbhedaḥ parigīyate* || See also below, p. 294.

[51] ***Adhyardhaśatikā prajñāpāramitā*** (ed. P. L. Vaidya ***Mahāyānasūtrasaṃgraha*** I, p. 92). Cf. E. Conze, in ***Studies of Esoteric Buddhism and Tantrism*** (Koyasan University, Koyasan, 1965), pp. 101–115, and ***Short Prajñāpāramitā Texts*** (London, 1973), pp. 184–195, where Conze translates 'tathāgatas in embryo'.

[52] Cf. ***Théorie***, p. 209.

[53] *MSA* iii. 5.

[54] See also Ārya Vimuktisena, *Vṛtti*, p. 76.

[55] Cf. Ārya Vimuktisena, *Vṛtti*, p. 77–78, and *WZKS* 12–13, p. 311 note 34. (On such etymologies see also J. Gonda, *Lingua* 5 [1955–56], p. 61 sq.)

[56] Cf. ***Théorie***, p. 144.

[57] See *MSABh* iii. 4: *guṇottāraṇārthena gotraṃ veditavyaṃ guṇā uttaranty asmād udbhavantîti kṛtvā*, and the pāssage from the *Vṛtti* referred to above, note 55; cf. *WZKS* 12–13, p. 311 note 32.

[58] This definition of the *gotra* is adopted by Ābhidharmikas such as Yaśomitra (***Abhidharmakośavyākhyā***, p. 583–584); it is mentioned also by Sthiramati (***Madhyāntavibhāgaṭīkā*** iv. 13).

[59] ***'Grel pa don gsal***, T. T. fol. 105b7.

[60] The four *pratipattis* comprised by the four *mārgas* (*prayoga*°, *darśana*°, *bhāvanā*° and *viśeṣa-mārga*) (*AAĀ* i. 6, 43)?

[61] ***'Grel pa don gsal***, T. T. fol. 105b6–7. Cf. *AA* i. 5. On the *trayodaśavidho bodhisattvaḥ* see also *AAĀ* i. 37–38: *saṃvṛtyā punaḥ pratipattidharmasyâvasthāntarabhedena dharmadhātusvabhāva eva buddhadharmādhāro bodhisattvas trayodaśavidho gotram iti nirdiśyate*; Ārya Vimuktisena, *Vṛtti*, p. 77. And on the *dharmadhātu* as the cause of comprehension of the *āryadharmas* see *AAĀ* i. 39: *yadi dharmadhātor evâryadharmādhigamāya hetutvāt tadātmako bodhisattvaḥ prakṛtistham anuttarabuddhadharmāṇāṃ gotraṃ dharmatāsaṃjñakaṃ, tadā . . .*; *Vṛtti*, p. 76.

[62] Here Dharmamitra correlates all thirteen aspects with the stages of the Path, and he thus develops the explanations previously given by the Vimuktisenas and Haribhadra.

[63] ***'Grel pa don gsal***, T. T. fol. 105b4–5. Cf. *AAĀ* p. 77: *tato yathāśayaṃ avatāraṇādyabhisaṃdhidvāreṇa yānatrayapratiṣṭhāpanalakṣaṇaparārthānukramasya*[*ādhāraḥ*]. Cf. ***Théorie***, p. 165–166; ***Le Traité du tathāgatagarbha***, p. 83 sq.

[64] See above, p. 285.

[65] Dharmamitra thus clearly distinguishes this teaching—corresponding to that of the *tathāgatagarbha*—from that of a self (*ātman*) or *dhātu* (*khams*, not *dbyiṅs*), which he mentions first, in connexion with the *parikalpita*.

[66] ***'Grel pa don gsal***, fol. T. T. 106a1–2.

[67] Cf. ***Théorie***, pp. 140, 151, 154–155, where it is noted that this statement of the

Śrāvaka doctrine does not correspond with what is usually regarded as their doctrine.

[68] *AA* i. 39cd quoted above, note 50.

[69] ***'Grel pa don gsal***, T. T. fol. 106a3.

[70] As just observed, *AA* i. 39cd speaks of different contained factors (*ādheyadharma*)—the various particularized *gotras* differentiated in terms of the various conditional paths—instead of the single container/support (*ādhāra*)—the unparticularized *gotra* defined in terms of the single and unique *dharmadhātu*.

[71] The twenty-two *cittotpādas* are enumerated in *AAĀ* i. 19–20.

[72] Ārya Vimuktisena, *Vṛtti*, p. 73: *yata āha: cittotpādād ārabhya nirvedhabhāgīyeṣu darśanamārge bhāvanāmārge ca . . .*

[73] *seṅ ge bzaṅ po'i ṅes par 'byed pa'i cha daṅ mthun pa rnams ni chos kyi dbyiṅs kyi rten no źes pa ni mi 'thad do.* The meaning of this is unclear. Haribhadra has stated that the *gotra* is the *ādhāra* of the four *nirvedhabhāgīyas* etc., and that it receives the designation of *dharmatā* because the *dharmadhātu* is the cause (*hetu*) of the comprehension of the *āryadharmas* (*AAĀ* i. 37–39). Similarly, in the ***'Grel pa don gsal*** (T. T. fol. 105a) also, Haribhadra speaks of the *gotra* as the support of practice etc., adding (fol. 106a) that the *dharmadhātu*, which is really without differentiation, functions as a cause for the comprehension of the *āryadharmas*.

[74] *AAĀ* i. 37–39; Ārya Vimuktisena, *Vṛtti*, p. 76.17–18.

[75] *AA* i. 39ab (above, note 42).

[76] This objection is found also e.g. in *AAĀ* i. 39.

[77] *AA* i. 39cd (above, note 50).

[78] Viz. the Ārya-Śrāvaka and Pratyekabuddha.

[79] ***Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā prajñāpāramitā*** in the version edited by N. Dutt, p. 160; Cf. *infra*, p. 300–01.

[80] *gźi'i don :padārtha.* See ***Aṣṭasāhasrikā prajñāpāramitā*** i, p. 18: *tatra bodhisattva iti bhagavan ka padārthaḥ?*

[81] ***Aṣṭasāhasrikā prajñāpāramitā*** i, p. 18: *apadārthaḥ subhūte bodhisattvapadārthaḥ.* Cf. ***Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā***, version edited by N. Dutt, p. 160.

[82] Ārya Vimuktisena, *Vṛtti*, p. 73: *na tu vastubhūtaḥ padārthaḥ.*

[83] ***Aṣṭasāhasrikā prajñāpāramitā*** i, p. 18: *tat kasya hetoḥ?*

[84] *byaṅ chub kyi rigs.* Cf. *AAĀ* i. 39 (p. 77) *prakṛtistham anuttarabuddhadharmāṇāṃ gotraṃ dharmatāsaṃjñakam.*

[85] See *AA* i. 37. Cf. *AAĀ* p. 76: *yasmāt sarvadharmāṇāṃ vastutannimittābhiniveśābhāvena 'asaktatāyāṃ' satyām anyathâdhigamānupapattyā buddhadharmādhigamāya māyāpuruṣa iva śikṣate, tasmāt kathaṃ tattvataḥ pratiṣṭhārthaḥ iti bhāvaḥ/ saṃvṛtyā punaḥ pratipattidharmasyâvasthāntarabhedena dharmadhātusvabhāva eva buddhadharmādhāro bodhisattvas trayodaśavidho gotram iti nirdiśyate . . .*

[86] Here and in the following extracts the notes printed in small letters in the Peking text of the Tibetan translation of the ***Munimatālaṃkāra*** have been placed in parentheses in the present English rendering. These notes are not found in the Sde-dge edition.

[87] On the *avatāraṇābhisaṃdhi* etc. see above, p. 292.

[88] ***Laṅkāvatārasūtra*** x (Sagāthaka) 445:

yānavyavasthā naivâsti yānam ekaṃ vadāmy aham |

parikarṣaṇārthaṃ bālānāṃ yānabhedaṃ vadāmy aham | |
Cf. ii. 203.

[89] *Niraupamyastava* 21:
dharmadhātor asambhedād yānabhedo 'sti na prabho |
yānatritayam ākhyātaṃ tvayā sattvāvatārataḥ | |

[90] On *tulyatva* 'equivalence' of *dharma*, *nairātmya* and *mukti* between the *yānas* as a justification for the intentional teaching of the *ekayāna* according to the Vijñānavāda, see *MSA* xi. 53 and Bhāṣya. This objection reflects then the position of the Vijñānavāda as described by many of the doxographers. Cf. ***Théorie***, pp. 187, 195.

[91] ***Saddharmapuṇḍarīka,*** chapter iii (ed. N. Dutt, p. 50). Cf. *AAĀ* ii, p. 133; ***Théorie***, p. 194.

[92] See *AAĀ* ii, p. 133–134; ***Théorie,*** p. 194.

[93] *MSA* xi. 53 sq.

[94] ***Aṣṭasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā*** i, p. 34: *sacet te 'py anuttarāyāṃ samyaksambodhau cittāny utpādayeran nâhaṃ kuśalamūlasyântarāyaṃ karomi.*

[95] See above, p. 291.

[96] *ruṅ ba*; *ruṅ ba ñid* = *bhavyatā* (cf. commentary on *RGV* (J.) i. 41). On *abhavya* 'incapable (of attainment)' see ***Aṣṭasāhasrikā*** ii, p. 34, *AA* viii. 10, and ***Bodhisattvabhūmi*** § 1.1

[97] ***Tathāgatagarbhasūtra***: *sarvasattvās tathāgatagarbhāḥ.* On the interpretation of this statement, in which *tathāgatagarbha* is a possessive compound meaning 'containing the *tathāgata*' (as a potentiality within), see above. p. 287–8

[98] Cf. ***Théorie,*** p. 152.

[99] *MSA* ix. 37:
sarveṣām aviśiṣṭâpi tathatā śuddhim āgatā /
tathāgatatvaṃ tasmāc ca tadgarbhāḥ sarvadehinaḥ //
'Thusness, although without differentiation for all, once it has attained purity is *tathāgata*-ness; all incarnated beings therefore have it as their embryonic essence [i.e. contain it]'. The notion of the *tathāgatagarbha* in question here is founded on the interpretation that takes the compound as a *bahuvrīhi*; see above.

[100] *'phags pa byams pas kyaṅ theg pa chen po rgyud bla mar ('i 'grel par / mdo sde rgyan gyi byaṅ chub kyi skabs su gsuṅs par draṅs pa) / thams cad la ni khyad med kyaṅ // de bźin ñid ni (glo bur gyi dri ma) dag gyur pa // de bźin gśegs ñid (yin pa) de yi phyir // 'gro kun (de bźin gśegs pa) de'i sñiṅ po can // źes pa la sogs pas (kun saṅs rgyas kyi sñiṅ sems can du bstan pas) so // (gźuṅ de'i) de bźin gśegs pa'i sgras kyaṅ chos kyi dbyiṅs gaṅ zag daṅ chos kyi bdag med pa'i mtshan ñid can raṅ bźin gyis 'od gsal ba brjod par bźed pa ñid kyi phyir ro //*

[101] Compare the explanation of the different senses of *yāna* in *MSABh* ix. 53.

[102] *skal pa* = *bhavya.*

[103] On *advayajñāna* and the Prajñāpāramitā, see also Dignāga's ***Prajñāpāramitāpiṇḍārtha.***

[104] ***Pramāṇavārttika*** ii. 253:
yā ca naḥ pratyayotpattiḥ sā nairātmyadṛgāśrayā /
muktis tu śūnyatādṛṣṭeḥ, tadarthā śeṣabhāvanā //
(Cf. the quotation of this verse in Guṇaratna's commentary on Haribhadrasūri's ***Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya*** 11.) The four aspects of the *duḥkhasatya* are *anitya*, *duḥkha*,

anātman and *śūnya*. (cf. ***Abhidharmakośa*** vi. 17, vii.12).

[105] See above, note 38, and note 73.

[106] See ***Bodhisattvabhūmi*** 1.1; ***Théorie***, p. 87–88.

[107] On the *dhātu* see also ***Munimatālaṃkāra***, fol. 277b, where it is defined as an *upādānakāraṇa* (cf. *supra*, notes 38 and 39).

[108] See *MSA* iii. 7, and Ārya Vimuktisena, *Vṛtti*, p. 76.

[109] *MSA* iii. 9. Cf. Sthiramati, ***Madhyāntavibhāgaṭīkā*** i. 15 (***Théorie***, p. 97); *RGV*-commentary i. 2.

[110] That is, in the ***Tathāgatagarbhasūtra***. On the use of *bdag ñid* = *ātman* in the *tathāgatagarbha* texts see the indices in ***La Théorie du tathāgatagarbha*** and ***Traité*** under *ātman*.

[111] See above, note 108.

[112] (*chos ñid yod tsam gyis saṅs rgyas mi 'grub pa*) *de ñid kyi phyir khyad par du 'phags pa* (*ñes pa bźi daṅ bral źiṅ sad* [?] *pa*) *ni rigs* (*yin*) *te*. The syntactic construction here is somewhat unclear, the usual expression in Sanskrit being *āryagotra*.

[113] The (*bodhisattva*)*gotra* is what is referred to by the word '*bodhisattva*'. See Ārya Vimuktisena, *Vṛtti*, p. 73: *ṣaṇṇāṃ pāramitānāṃ dharmatālakṣaṇo viśeṣo gotraṃ bodhisattvapravṛttinimittaṃ na tu vastubhūtaḥ padārthaḥ iti vedayati*. Cf. *AAĀ* 1.35, p. 71.

[114] See above, note 71.

[115] *AA* i. 43.

[116] Viz. *ūṣman*, *kṣānti*, *mūrdhan*, *laukikāgradharma* (all on the *prayogamārga*), *darśanamārga, and bhāvanāmārga*.

[117] Ārya Vimuktisena, *Vṛtti*, p. 73. 6–8.

[118] Ratnākaraśānti, ***Śuddhimatī***, T. T. fol. 116b5.

[119] *AAĀ* i. 37, p. 76: *tayor vipakṣapratipakṣayor nirodhotpādayuktavikalpāpagamasya* [*ādhāraḥ*]. See also Ārya Vimuktisena, *Vṛtti*, p. 75. Cf ***Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā***, Dutt, p. 163.

[120] *AAĀ* i. 39, p. 77 (from which the text of the ***Munimatālaṃkāra*** differs slightly).

[121] See above, note 43.

[122] Ārya Vimuktisena, *Vṛtti*, p. 77: *satyam evam etat . . .*

[123] ***Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā***, version edited by Dutt, p. 160; cf. *supra*, p. 294.

[124] *gaṅ 'du byed cuṅ zad kyaṅ med pa de ni 'dus ma byas pa ste de ni 'phags pa rnams kyi rigs su mtshuns la rigs de ni nam mkha' daṅ mñam pa ñid kyis khyad par med pa'o// rigs de ni chos thams cad ro gcig pa ñid kyis rtag pa ste/ rigs de ni thams cad kyi tshe chos ñid yin pas śes pa la sogs pa'o//* The Sanskrit text quoted in Pensa's ed. of Ārya Vimuktisena's *Vṛtti* (p. 77) differs slightly: *yatra na kecit saṃskārās tad asaṃskṛtam/ yad asaṃskṛtam tad āryāṇāṃ gotram/ samaṃ tad gotram ākāśasamatayā/ nirviśeṣaṃ tad gotraṃ dharmaikarasatayā/ nityaṃ tad gotraṃ sadā dharmatathatayā/* (This corresponds to what we find in ***Kāśyapaparivarta*** §§102–104; cf. the commentary on the *RGV* (J) 1. 86). But the Tibetan translation of the ***Munimatālaṃkāra*** agrees with the Tibetan translation of Vimuktisena's *Vṛtti* (T. T. fol. 68b) except at the end: . . . *rigs de ni thams cad kyi tshe chos kyi de bźin ñid yin pas chos kyi ro gcig tu gyur pa ñid kyis rtag pa'o//* In these versions of the passage nothing corresponds to *śes pa* at the end of the ***Munimatālaṃkāra*** passage.

[125] See above, note 55 and note 57.

[126] Ratnākaraśānti, ***Śuddhimatī***, T. T. fol. 114b1–2: *go źes bya ba ni 'gro ba daṅ gnas pa la 'jug pa'o // 'dir ni gnas pa na 'jug pa ste / rten pa źes bya ba'i don te / dper na nam mkha' ni thams cad du 'gro ba źes bya ba lta bu'o // mi g-yo ba'i tshul gyis 'dzin pas skyob pa ste / des na rigs ni rten no //*

[127] See ***Marmakaumudī***, T. T. fol. 57a7–8.

[128] See above, pp. 293–2

[129] By this annotator's reference to ***Vigrahavyāvartanī*** 70 in the present context the *prakṛtistha-gotra*, whose nature is *dharmadhātu* and which is acquired in virtue of *dharmatā*, is evidently assimilated with *śūnyatā*. This assimilation is of importance also for the theory of the *tathāgatagarbha* since the latter has been connected with this *gotra*.

That the pronouns *yasya . . . tasya* in ***Vigrahavyāvartanī*** 70, as well as in the parallel ***Mūlamādhyamikakārikā*** xxiv. 14, refer not to a thing but to a person is shown both by the context and the commentaries.

[130] Cf. ***Marmakaumudī***, T. T. fol. 57a8: *nam mkha' ci yaṅ med pa la zla ba daṅ ñi ma'i 'od zer gyis mun pa zad par byed pa.* (Compare the ***Prajñāpāramitāsūtra*** on the *pratipakṣādhāra*, the *prajñākaruṇādhāra* and the *asādhāraṇaguṇādhāra*, e.g. in Dutt's edition of the ***Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā***, p. 163–164.)

Like the empty sky, then, the *dharmadhātu* is without own being, yet it serves as a 'support' for certain things.

[131] This work is quoted in Candrakīrti's ***Prasannapadā***; cf. Haribhadra's *AAĀ* ii, p. 132.

[132] Cf. ***Le Traité du tathāgatagarbha***, p. 142 sq.

[133] ***Marmakaumudī***, T. T. fol. 56b-57a (above, p. 294).

[134] ***Munimatālaṃkāra***, T. T. fol. 186b (above, p. 296). See also Dharmamitra, ***Prasphuṭapadā*** quoted above (pp. 290, 292).

[135] ***Munimatālaṃkāra***, T. T. fol. 188b (above, p. 297)

[136] ***Munimatālaṃkāra***, T. T. fol. 186b1 (above, p. 296).

[137] The philosophical links mentioned here by Abhayākaragupta between the *tathāgatagarbha* theory and *nairātmya*, *niḥsvabhāvatā* and *śūnyatā* clearly establish that this idea is not simply a Tibetan development characteristic especially of the Dge•lugs•pas (as has seemingly been argued by L. Schmithausen, *WZKS* 17 [1973], p. 132 sq.; the question whether such an interpretation is 'schlüssig', raised by Schmithausen [p. 133], is not at issue here, only whether such interpretations were actually maintained by important Indian Buddhist masters). The connexion referred to with the concept of the luminosity of mind is also remarkable (Schmithausen has reservations also on this subject expressed *op. cit.*, p. 140–141); no doubt the luminosity notion of the Āgama/Nikāyas (see ***Aṅguttaranikāya*** I, p. 10) was not in its origins connected with the *śūnyatā* theory (cf. also J. W. de Jong, *AM* 1971, p. 110: 'The *cittam acittam* of the ***Prajñāpāramitāsūtra*** is not identical with the *śūnyatā* of the Madhyamaka'), but that the theories did in fact converge in the development of Indian Buddhist thought is shown also by this section of the ***Munimatālaṃkāra***. Concerned as he evidently was in his article cited above with the 'original' alone, Schmithausen did not take into account the fact that the interpretations offered by the Dge•lugs•pa school are usually based on an Indian source and that, in any case, the developments of the *tathāgatagarbha* and *gotra* doctrines in the

Indo-Tibetan exegetical traditions can be of as much interest to historians of Buddhism as 'original' doctrines. Even if it may be felt that these later interpretations are not 'schlüssig', still what must concern the historian of these traditions is not their 'conclusiveness' but their existence and the question of the influence they had in the history of Buddhist thought in India and elsewhere.

[138] Some of these problems have also occupied an important place in the history of Buddhism elsewhere in Central Asia (e.g. Khotan) and in China, where the Yogācāra-Mādhyamika school is not known to have been an influential school, so that the significance attached to them must be assumed to have other origins too. (The Chinese documents on the subject in particular are now in urgent need of systematic study.)

Mahāyāna Literature in Sri Lanka: The Early Phase

Heinz Bechert

It is well known that Mahāyāna Buddhism had spread in Ceylon (Sri Lanka) during the early mediaeval period, and that there were several occasions when the followers of Mahāyāna were suppressed on the instigation of orthodox Theravāda monks. The term used for Mahāyāna in the historical literature of the Sinhalese was *Vetullavāda*. This is the Pāli term for Mahāyāna, the word *vetulla* being the Pāli form of *vaitulya*, a synonym of *vaipulya*, and both *vaitulya* and *vaipulya* are known from Indian Mahāyāna texts. For general information on traces of Mahāyāna influence in Ceylon I may refer here to Professor Mudiyanse's monograph[1]. A number of other authors have also written on Mahāyānism in Ceylon, but it will suffice here to mention Dr. Paranavitana's study which was the first major contribution dealing with the subject[2].

Most of the available evidence for Mahāyāna influence in ancient Ceylon is rather unspecific so that we do not know much of the particular forms of Mahāyāna which spread on the island. From the information derived from the chronicles and from other traditional sources it was concluded that the influence of Mahāyāna extended to the monks of the Abhayagirivāsa (or Dharmarucika) and of the Jetavanavāsa (or Sāgalika) sects only, whereas the Mahāvihāra school is believed never to have deviated from strict "hīnayānistic" orthodoxy. In many studies, it is claimed "that the use of Sanskrit rather than Pāli by the monks of the Abhayagiri fixed yet another distinction between them and their rivals of the Mahāvihāra" i.e. that these two sects used Sanskrit and not Pāli as the sacred language of their tradition, and this erroneous belief is reproduced even in some very recent publications on the subject[3]. I have discussed this question elsewhere[4] so that it may suffice here to lay stress upon the fact that we have ample evidence to show that the Abhayagirivāsin did use the same collection of sacred scriptures in Pāli which has been handed down to us by the orthodox tradition of the Mahāvihāravāsin with very minor variations. The Pāli Tripiṭaka formed the common heritage of all three *nikāya*s (sects) of Buddhism in Sri Lanka. There are legends in political history as well as in religious and

literary history which tenaciously persist defying all evidence to the contrary, and the belief that the Abhayagirivāsin used a Tripiṭaka in Sanskrit is one of these legends.

Another legend of this type is the belief that the monks of the Abhayagirivāsa and the Jetavanavāsa sects were mostly followers of Mahāyāna, whereas the monks of the Mahāvihāra sect are believed to have based their interpretation of the doctrine on the Theravāda tradition as introduced from India at the time of king Aśoka without being much influenced by the further development of doctrine and literature in India. It has been long since known, however, that late canonical and post-canonical Pāli literature was heavily influenced by Indian Buddhist literature and philosophy of other schools.[5] On the other hand, the available evidence clearly gives proof that though Mahāyānist tendencies were at times tolerated in the Abhayagiri and Jetavana communities, Mahāyāna was never made the official creed of these two sects.

There is, unfortunately, still much confusion on the nature of Buddhist "sects" or "schools" in spite of the enormous amount of writing that has been done on Buddhist sects. This confusion is caused by confounding different types of sects. In the first instance, a *nikāya* or sect can be described as a group or community of monks that mutually acknowledge the validity of their *upasampadā* or higher ordination and therefore can join together in the performance of *vinayakarma*s, i.e., legal acts prescribed by Vinaya or Buddhist ecclesiastical law. All members of such a so-called "Vinaya sect" recognized the authority of a particular redaction of the Vinaya texts being the laws governing their monastic life. Naturally the controversies leading to the formation of these sects did not completely stop after the final codification of the various "sectarian" recensions of the Vinaya scriptures, but turned to minor matters not clearly regulated in the texts and to disputes on the interpretation of the texts. The *nikāya*s formed in this way should be termed "sub-sects", and the three *nikāya*s in mediaeval Ceylonese Buddhism are "sub-sects" of Theravāda in this sense.

A *nikāya* did not necessarily originate from a split in the Sangha. It could also develop from the organizational consolidation of local traditions or missionary groups. However, when the period of doctrinal dissensions and controversies had begun, particular notions on the issues under discussion were accepted in the different *nikāya*s which turned only now into communities which were distinguished not only as different "Vinaya sects", but also as upholders of certain doctrines.

The ***Kathāvatthu*** in the ***Abhidhammapiṭaka*** in the scriptures of Theravāda is a document of this period of doctrinal diversification and demarcation. Again, the information on these doctrinal controversies was subject to a considerable degree of schematizing. At least we can say that only a few of the sects mentioned in the context of the early doctrinal controversies succeeded in developing a consistent system of philosophy which had its impact on the progress of philosophical thought in India. Later sources usually list four schools of Buddhist thought, viz. Sarvāstivādin (or Vaibhāṣika), Sautrāntika, Śūnyavādin (or Mādhyamika) and Vijñānavādin (or Yogācāra). The first two of these are Hīnayāna schools, the other two professed Mahāyāna.

There should be no confusion of these philosophical schools with the earlier doctrinal and the early Vinaya sects. A Sarvāstivādin in the sense of the follower of the Sarvāstivāda philosophy, could well be a member of a rather different Vinaya sect, particularly of a sect which had no philosophical tradition of its own. There is a well-known Vinaya sect which adopted not only the philosophy but also the name of the Sarvāstivāda viz. the Mūlasarvāstivādin. This sect was not a sub-sect of the Sarvāstivādin but it had a Vinaya tradition of its own.

In this context we understand the influence of the philosophical tenets of the two main systems of Indian Buddhist philosophy of Hīnayāna, viz. Sarvāstivāda and Sautrāntika philosophy, on the development of Theravāda philosophical thought in Ceylon as represented in the writings of the great Pāli commentators. D. J. Kalupahana has proposed to conclude from the evidence he found for this influence that the Abhayagirivāsin and Jetavanavāsin had become followers of Sarvāstivādin and Sautrāntika *nikāya*s respectively.[6] This conclusion is, however, not acceptable. Orthodoxy in ancient Ceylon was not always as intolerant in dogmatical matters as it is generally supposed. The evidence for Sarvāstivāda influence on the philosophical opinions of Buddhaghosa and his contemporaries fits well with the evidence for the influence of Mūlasarvāstivāda literature on some of the narrative portions of the commentaries including details of the life-story of the Buddha. There is not the least trace that any of the three great sub-sects of Ceylon Buddhism adopted a non-Theravāda Vinaya and thus became part of Sarvāstivāda or Sautrāntika *nikāya*. On the contrary, Abhayagirivāsin and Jetavanavāsin always remained Theravāda sub-sects.[7]

The formation of Mahāyāna Buddhism was an innovation of a new kind, quite dissimilar from the formation of Buddhist sects. It was an

event taking place not on the basis of the understanding of monastic discipline nor of doctrinal controversies of the traditional kind, but on a different level, viz. by a new definition of the goal of the religious life. Instead of attaining to personal liberation as a follower of the advice given by the Buddha, a Mahāyānist has decided to go along the path of a Bodhisattva, but a *bhikṣu* of Mahāyāna Buddhism did not at all cease to be a member of one of the *nikāya*s, because nobody could become a *bhikṣu* except by an *upasampadā* based on the Vinaya tradition of one of the *nikāya*s. When Mahāyāna developed, there originated two factions in most of the ancient Buddhist *nikāya*s or sects: a mahāyānistic and a hīnayānistic faction.[8]

Considering these general developments, it becomes quite obvious that Mahāyāna ideas could also have developed in the frame-work of Theravāda in ancient Ceylon. The Theravādin who accepted Mahāyāna could be called Mahāyāna-Sthaviravādin, a term used by Hsüan-tsang for communities of this kind in India. Since Pāli was the sacred language of the Theravādin, not Sanskrit, Mahāyāna-Sthaviras can be expected to have used Pāli for literary works of their school. I have shown elsewhere that a particular work written by Mahāyāna-Sthaviras in Ceylon was included in the Pāli canon and thus survived the destruction of Mahāyāna literature in Ceylon. This work is the ***Buddhāpadāna,*** the first part of the ***Apadāna*** of ***Khuddakanikāya***. It was composed in the 1st century or in the beginning of the 2nd century A.D., before mahāyānistic tendencies were suppressed by King Vohārikatissa (215–237 A.D.). The ***Buddhāpadāna*** therefore, can be considered the earliest reliable source of information on particular views held by the Mahāyāna Buddhists of Ceylon. It testifies to the development of some of the ideas known from a group of Indian Mahāyāna works represented by the ***Sukhāvatīvyūha*** and similar texts, but the ***Buddhāpadāna*** is clearly a work of indigenous Ceylonese origin, and not imported from India. Its unique importance is due to this fact.[9]

The earliest known reference to a Mahāyāna work brought from India to Ceylon refers to the reign of King Silākāla (522–535). From the ***Mahāvaṃsa*** (41.37–40) we learn that, in the 12th year of the reign of this king, a book called ***Dhammadhātu*** (skt. ***Dharmadhātu***) was brought by a merchant from a journey to Kāsipura (Varanasi) and presented to the king. The king had it placed in a particular temple near the palace and installed a festival in honour of the book. In the ***Nikāyasaṅgrahaya*** by Jayabāhu Dharmakīrti (ed. Don M. de Zilva Wickremasinghe, Colom-

bo 1890, p. 16) the name of the merchant is given as Pūrṇa. The Mahāvihāravāsin rejected the ***Dhammadhātu*** as false doctrine. The continuation of the cult of the ***Dharmadhātu*** in Ceylon for a rather long period is attested by a 10th century Sinhalese copper plaque inscription reading *Dahamdā de patek* ("two leafs of the ***Dharmadhātu***") which was discovered near Anuradhapura.[10] The cult of the ***Dharmadhātu*** is also referred to in two other 10th century inscriptions.[11] We can safely assume that ***Dharmadhātu*** was used as the name of a Mahāyāna work of Indian origin which was written in Sanskrit, but all attempts to identify this book with a particular text known to us have failed or remained pure speculation. This must be said also of Paranavitana's opinion that ***Dharmadhātu*** is nothing else than the ***Saddharmapuṇḍarīkasūtra***.[12]

Historical sources from Ceylon refer to particular Mahāyāna works by name only in connection with records on the later part of the mediaeval period, i.e. for the period from the 9th century onwards. From a detailed report of the introduction of Tantric Buddhism during the reign of king Matvalasen or Sena I (833–853) which is found in the ***Nikāyasaṅgrahaya*** (pp. 18 f.) we learn that the ***Ratnakūṭa*** was brought to Ceylon at that time along with the doctrines and a number of texts of the Vajraparvatas i.e. of Vajrayāna. The ***Nikāyasaṅgrahaya*** is, of course, much later than these events, but Paranavitana's discovery of fragments from the ***Kāśyapaparivarta,*** one of the texts of the ***Ratnakūta*** group, amongst the so-called Indikaṭusäya copper plaques which he dated in the 8th or 9th century,[13] is a most welcome confirmation of the reliability of Dharmakīrti's record.

We can, therefore, safely rely on the information that works of the Ratnakūṭa class, though they originated in India much earlier, were introduced in Sri Lanka not earlier than in the first half of the 9th century, and consequently we can date these copper plaques more accurately to the 9th century and not the 8th century. It now becomes rather evident that the appearance of fragments from other Mahāyāna texts in the Indikaṭusäya copper plaques and in the Vijayarāma copper plaques as well as in some other inscriptions of 9th and 10th century[14] cannot be made use of for conclusions on the nature of Mahāyāna in Ceylon before King Sena I. These documents in all probability represent the tradition of Mahāyāna and Tantric doctrines and practices introduced in Ceylon during the 9th century rather than earlier local traditions. This refers also to the fragments from *Prajñāpāramitā* texts written on some of the Indikaṭusäya copper plaques, most of which were identified

as extracts from the ***Pāñcaviṃśatisāhasrikāprajñāpāramitā*** by T. Matsumoto and S. Paranavitana.[15]

There are only three Ceylonese documents in Sanskrit from the earlier period of Mahāyāna in Ceylon: the Kuccaveli Rock Inscription, the Tiriyāy Rock Inscription and the Trikāyastava Inscription of Mihintale. These three inscriptions are written not in Sinhalese script, but in a particularly Ceylonese form of the Grantha script. The Kuccaveli inscription is found near Trincomalee, and it can be dated between the 5th and 8th century according to S. Paranavitana. The inscription consists of two Sanskrit stanzas expressing the author's wish to become a Buddha without more specific details.[16] The text of the rock inscription found at Tiriyāy, a place not far from Kuccavēli, consists of a stotra in 11 Sanskrit stanzas with the story of the Girikaṇḍikacaitya which is said to have been founded by successors to the legendary merchants Trapussaka (Pāli Tapassu) and Vallika (Pāli Bhalluka). Avalokiteśvara and Mañjuvāk (i.e. Mañjuśrī) are named as residing in the *caitya*, and the inscription was dated in the 2nd half of the 7th or beginning of the 8th century for palaeographic reasons.[17] The third of these inscriptions also originated in the 7th or 8th century. Its text was identified as the ***Trikāyastava*** by Sylvain Lévi. The ***Trikāyastava*** is an Indian Mahāyāna hymn which is known from Chinese and Tibetan translations and transliterations.[18]

None of these three inscriptions enables us to establish the doctrines of Ceylonese Mahāyāna of the early phase in a more specific and detailed way. We must confess that Ceylonese sources do not in any way confirm traditions from non-Ceylonese sources that some of the masters of Mahāyāna, e.g. Āryadeva, were born in Ceylon, had studied in Ceylon or visited Ceylon. So far it seems rather impossible to separate truth and legend in this respect. Notwithstanding this rather disappointing statement, there are a number of points referring to methodology which I can propose here as a result of these observations:

The points of evidence for the spread of Mahāyāna Buddhism in Ceylon before the Sāsana reform carried out by Parākramabāhu I must be arranged and evaluated in the way of a truly historical and critical examination, but so far scholars have collected and almost indiscriminately used material from different periods for general descriptions of "Mahāyānism in ancient and mediaeval Ceylon". Fortunately, however, Sri Lanka has a rather reliable tradition of historiography which allows us to establish dates for important developments not only of political,

but also of cultural and religious history. In this context, we can establish three main periods of Mahāyānism in Ceylon:

A first period ends with the suppression of Vetullavāda by King Vohārikatissa (215–237 A.D.). In this first period, all communities in Ceylonese Buddhism seem to have been more open-minded towards innovations than later on. The only remaining literary work of Mahāyāna from this period is the ***Buddhāpadāna.***

The action of King Vohārikatissa against the spread of new doctrines was instigated by the monks of the Mahāvihāra. From this time onwards, the Mahāvihāra school does not seem to have allowed the spread of Mahāyāna doctrines in its communities. The other two sects generally remained more open-minded towards these innovations, but due to the changing opinions of the rulers, periods of greater influence of Mahāyāna were succeeded by periods of rather total suppression. Unfortunately, the evidence as to the particular nature of Mahāyāna doctrines known in Ceylon in this period is very poor, because neither the existence of statues of some of the well-known Bodhisattvas and Buddhas of Mahāyāna from this period, nor the references in the three Sanskrit inscriptions, nor other available information provides us with details as to the particular philosophical schools and thoughts of Mahāyāna in Ceylon during that time.

The situation is quite different for the third period beginning with the time of King Sena I (833–853), because the historical literature provides us with detailed information for this period which is confirmed by other sources. A rather detailed description of this third period of Mahāyāna in Ceylon can be provided, but this is outside the scope of the present contribution and will be given elsewhere.

NOTES

[1] Nandasena Mudiyanse, ***Mahayana Monuments in Ceylon*** (Colombo: M. D. Gunasena, 1967), XVI, 135 pp.

[2] S. Paranavitana, "Mahāyānism in Ceylon", ***Ceylon Journal of Science***, sect. G, vol. 2 (1928), pp. 35–71.

[3] The quotation is from Diran K. Dohanian, "Mahāyāna Cult in Ancient Ceylon", ***India's Contribution to World Thought and Culture, Vivekananda Commemoration Volume*** (Madras, 1970), p. 425. Dohanian also repeats other outdated opinions in his contribution.

[4] See Heinz Bechert, "Buddha-Feld und Verdienstübertragung: Mahāyāna-Ideen im Theravāda-Buddhismus Ceylons", ***Bulletins de la Classe des Lettres et des Sciences Morales et Politiques***, Académie Royale de Belgique 5th series, vol. 62. (1976), pp. 27–51.

[5] A survey of such evidence is found in H. Bechert, "*Zur Geschichte der buddhistischen Sekten in Indien und Ceylon*", La Nouvelle Clio, vol. 7–9 (1955–57), pp. 351–357.

[6] D. J. Kalupahana, "Schools of Buddhism in Early Ceylon", ***The Ceylon Journal of the Humanities***, vol. 1 (1970), pp. 159–190.

[7] See also H. Bechert, "Buddha-Feld und Verdienstübertragung", loc. cit. (note 6). There I have also discussed Kalupahana's interpretation of the Jetavanārāma Sanskrit inscription.

[8] See Louis de la Vallée Poussin, "Opinions sur les relations des deux Véhicules au point de vue du Vinaya", ***Bulletins de la Classe des Lettres et des Sciences Morales et Politiques***, Académie Royale de Belgique, 5th series, vol. 16 (1930), pp. 20–39.

[9] For the ***Buddhāpadāna*** and its interpretation see my contribution quoted above, note 4.

[10] Paranavitana, loc. cit., p. 46; Mudiyanse, loc. cit., pp. 83 f.

[11] Mudiyanse, loc. cit., pp. 82 f.

[12] S. Paranavitana, in: H. C. Ray (ed.), *University of Ceylon*, ***History of Ceylon***, vol. 1, part 1 (Colombo: Ceylon University Press 1959), p. 380.

[13] S. Paranavitana, "A Note on the Indikaṭusāya Copper Plaques", ***Epigraphia Zeylanica***, vol. 4, pp. 238–242.

[14] Mudiyanse, loc. cit., pp. 90–105.

[15] Tokumyo Matsumoto, ***Die Prajñāpāramitā-Literatur*** (Stuttgart 1932), pp. 33–35; S. Paranavitana, "Indikaṭusāya Copper Plaques", ***Epigraphia Zeylanica***, vol. 3, pp. 199–212. See Edward Conze, ***The Prajñāpāramitā Literature*** ('s-Gravenhage 1960), p. 41.

[16] S. Paranavitana, "Kuccaveli Rock Inscription", ***Epigraphia Zeylanica***, vol. 3, pp. 158–161.

[17] S. Paranavitana, "Tiriyāy Rock Inscription", ***Epigraphia Zeylanica***, vol. 4, pp. 151–160, and B. Chr. Chhabra, in the same vol., pp. 312–319.

[18] S. Paranavitana, "The Trikayāstava in an Inscription at Mihintale", ***Epigraphia Zealanica***, vol. 4, pp. 242–246.

IX
Related Systems

Jñānaśrīmitra's *Sarvajñasiddhiḥ*

Ernst Steinkellner

prāktanācāryanirṇītaramyārthavad-
vṛttamālām imāṃ vākprapañcaṃ vinā /
sādaraṃ buddhadharmasphuṭībhāvakṛn-
nūtanācāryapāde pradānaṃ dade //

I

The Sanskrit originals of Jñānaśrīmitra's various works have been among the findings of Rāhula Sāṅkṛtyāyana in Tibetan monasteries. The twelve texts, ranging from small essays to extensive monographs within the full range of late Indian Buddhist theory, have been edited by Anantalal Thakur[1]. Apart from these recovered texts Jñānaśrīmitra has also written a ***Sarvajñasiddhiḥ***, which is occasionally quoted in his other works[2]. A number of fragments which are explicitly stated to come from the ***Sarvajñasiddhiḥ*** can thus be collected[3]. But this collection can be considerably enlarged in the following way.

A. Thakur has already noted[4] that Ratnakīrti, Jñānaśrīmitra's pupil, when composing his own ***Sarvajñasiddhiḥ***,[5] has not only used his teacher's ***Yoginirṇayaprakaraṇam***, but also his ***Sarvajñasiddhiḥ***. Ratnakīrti expresses his debt in his colophon (R 25,22–25) by revealing his work as a concise treatment (*saṃkṣepaḥ*) of what his teacher has dealt with extensively (*tadvistara-*). Ratnakīrti's ***Sarvajñasiddhiḥ*** thus shows the general characteristic of his works which present the main points of his teacher's essays on the same subject in the style of a strictly formal, logical argumentation.[6]

Jñānaśrīmitra's ***Yoginirṇayaprakaraṇam*** is an essay dealing with the possibility of yogic perception and, as such, a necessary step in any attempt to prove the existence of an omniscient being (*sarvajñaḥ*). The establishment of yogic perception is a logical prerequisite for the establishment of an omniscient.

In Ratnakīrti's ***Sarvajñasiddhiḥ***, this discussion of the possibility of a yogic perception is presented in a section which treats the position of various opponents that it can be proven by inference that such omnisci-

ence is impossible on the ground that its cause—the necessary cognition—is a fiction. This section begins with R 6,25 and covers the main part of the work up to R 20,33. As is to be expected, Ratnakīrti has used his teacher's ***Yoginirṇayaprakaraṇam*** for this section.[7] And it is worth noting that no reference to Jñānaśrīmitra's ***Sarvajñasiddhiḥ*** is to be found in this section of the text, nor is there any text which can be associated with it.

The rest of Ratnakīrti's work mainly deals with various attempts to prove the impossibility of an omniscient being (R 21,1–23,22 and R 23, 23–26,13), or to show the impossibility of proving such a being (R 26, 14–27,32).[8] The actual positive proof of the omniscient is introduced in the beginning of the work (R 1,16–18), followed by a first logical defense of a very concise character (R 1,20–3,19) and a refutation (R 4,10–6,1) of the main arguments against the proof (R 3,20–4,9), both given in a similarly concentrated presentation. It is only with R 6,1 that Ratnakīrti begins to present the arguments of the opponents in systematically structured broad arrangements.

Except for one verse attributed to his teacher, which is given within the final section (R 24,20–23), our attempt to gather information on the lost ***Sarvajñasiddhiḥ*** of Jñānaśrīmitra is naturally focused on the beginning section (R 1,16–6,1) because of its contents and its peculiarly concise form. Another reason is the fact that we find here a number of verses without indication of their author, which in this case can only mean that their author must have been beyond question.

Most of the verses in question are written in metric forms which are rather unusual in ordinary scholarly verse-compositions of the relevant period. They are composed in the metres *Mandakrāntā* (R 2,7–10), *Śikhariṇī* (R 2,16–19), *Śārdūlavikrīḍitam* (R 4,15f.; 5,15–18) and *Vasantatilakam* (R 5,30–33). and there are three *Anuṣṭubh* in this section (R 2,20f.; 5.20f.; 22f.).

The only scholar who is not only known as an excellent master of style and poetic forms but can also be associated with the content of the verses is Jñānaśrīmitra.[9] The metre of the one verse which Ratnakīrti quotes as his teacher's (R 24,20–23) and the half-verse which Jñānaśrīmitra himself quotes from his ***Sarvajñasiddhiḥ*** (J 326, 14f.) is also *Śārdūlavikrīḍitam*. I would not hesitate, therefore, to attribute all these verses to Jñānaśrīmitra's ***Sarvajñasiddhiḥ***.

That this ***Sarvajñasiddhiḥ*** was not a verse-text is shown by the two quotations J 326,14–20 and J 491,23–25. Like most of Jñānaśrīmitra's

works the ***Sarvajñasiddhiḥ*** must have been mainly an essay in prose, adorned with elaborate verses. And that rather natural assumption suggests, on the other hand, that at least some of the prose sentences and formulations within section R 1,16–6,1 of Ratnakīrti's text have also been taken from Jñānaśrīmitra's work. There is, however, no possibility for decisively tracing anything in particular to this source for lack of corroborative instances.

The only remaining question is whether the logical structure of the section can give us an idea of the structure of Jñānaśrīmitra's work. I doubt that it can. The comparison of the structural similarities and diversities of the other cases, where Ratnakīrti re-works a work of his teacher, shows: although Jñānaśrīmitra works with logical forms in the micro-structure of his texts, the macro-structure is always determined by the problems treated and their implications. Ratnakīrti, on the other hand, is using the logical forms in the macro-structure of his texts. The analyses of his texts are therefore structured by logical titles. To be on the safe side I would, therefore, not assume that the positive proof of the omniscient and its corollaries, the *siddhāntaḥ* in Jñānaśrīmitra's work, had the same structure as the corresponding section in Ratnakīrti's text (R 1,14–3,19).[10]

Consequently I shall not overstretch the possibilities of the available materials in an attempt to arrange the fragments according to the analysis of Ratnakīrti's text by subordinating them to a function within the logical structures given by Ratnakīrti. Yet the analogy of other works of Jñānaśrīmitra, e.g. his ***Yoginirṇayaprakaraṇam,*** allows the conclusion that the general division of Ratnakīrti's first section (R 1,16–6,1) into two parts: proof and defense (R 1,16–3,19) and arguments against the proof and their refutation (R 3,20–6,1), reflects the structure of Jñānaśrīmitra's ***Sarvajñasiddhiḥ***. Beyond that, we might be right in assuming that the division of the last big section in Ratnakīrti's work (R 21,1–27,32) into a discussion of the possibility of proving the inexistence of an omniscient (R 21,1–23,22 and R 23,23–26,13) and a discussion of the impossibility of positive proofs (R 26,14–27,32) also reflects a corresponding structure in Jñānaśrīmitra's work.

The following might serve as a working hypothesis for the arrangement of the main sections in his ***Sarvajñasiddhiḥ***.[11]

A. Siddhānta: 1. proof[12]
2. defense
3. refutation of arguments against the proof

B. Polemics: 1. refutation of proofs of the Buddha's non-omniscience
2. refutation of Kumārila's arguments for the impossibility of establishing the existence of an omniscient

All this, considering the small number of fragments, is certainly not decisive enough to allow a convincing arrangement of these fragments in a hypostatized order within the original text. I shall, therefore, arrange them simply according to the sequence of their quotation. I shall also refrain from collecting additional information from other authors who have dealt with this proof in the notes. This is beyond the scope of the following collection. The full meaning and value of Jñānaśrīmitra's lines cannot be grasped until a detailed history of this proof is available.[13] And it would be highly uneconomic to take this small bundle of fragments as a starting point for such a history. I hope that the question of the possible import of Jñānaśrīmitra's work within the development of the Buddhist proof of an omniscient being can be answered on the basis of this small collection when the Buddhist history of this proof will have been written. At this time I must ask the celebrant to accept my apologies for not going further in my interpretation.

II

Fragments:

FRAGMENT 1 (R 2,7–10):

sākṣād duḥkhaprakṛti narakapretatiryaksvarūpaṃ[13a]
martye śarma kvacana tad api grastam evāsukhena /
devānāṃ ca kṣayam upagate puṇyapātheyapiṇḍe
caṇḍajvālāvyatikaramuco hanta bhogās ta eva //

"Evidently the nature of the inhabitants of hells, and that of spirits and of animals is essentially suffering; occasionally there can be happiness in a human being, but that too is already consumed by unhappiness; and [the same is true] of the gods, when their provender of merit has come to an end. Truly those only are pleasures which deliver from the calamity of passion's flame."

FRAGMENT 2 (R 2,16–19):

ahaṃkāras tāvat tad anu mamakāras tadubhaya-

prasūto rāgādis tadahita[14]*mater dveṣadahanaḥ /*
tataḥ śeṣa[ḥ] kleśas tata udayinaḥ karmavisarād
visārī saṃsāraḥ śaraṇarahito dāruṇataraḥ //

"The conception 'I' is first; along with it is the conception 'mine'; passion, etc. is generated by these two; from the mind thereby afflicted arises the fire of hate; from it results defilement; from the abundance of karma which comes from that, saṃsāra spreads out, giving no refuge and most frightful."

FRAGMENT 3 (R 2,20–21):
tasmāt tṛṣṇāviparyāsāv ātmadṛṣṭipuraḥsarau /
saṃsāriskandhajanakau nirṇītau kāryahetutaḥ //

"Therefore, thirst and error, which are presupposed by the idea of a self, are determined to be the causes of the groups of the saṃsāric being by an effect as logical reason (*kāryahetutaḥ*)."[15]

FRAGMENT 4 (R 4,15–16):
ityabhyāsabalāt parisphuṭadaśākoṭiḥ sphuratsambhavī
heyādeyatadaṅgalakṣaṇaguṇaḥ sarvajñatā saiva naḥ //

"Through the force of such training it is possible that a kind of mental function,[16] which is characterized by matters to be obtained, to be avoided, and their kinds, becomes distinctly manifest as referring to the greatest number (*koṭi-*) of totally clear (individual) life-situations. Only this we consider as omniscience."

FRAGMENT 5 (R 5,15–18):
svapne 'pi sphuṭatā tathaiva na tathāpy ekatvam evā[17]*nayor*
na prākārasamatvam eva samatāṃ jāteḥ samāsajjate[18] */*
anyan nidra[19]*nirodhabādhyam itarad bādhyaṃ prayatnaiḥ punar*
vaiśadyaṃ viparītabhāvanabalān naighṛṇyabhede yathā //

"In a dream, too, the distinctness is the same; nevertheless, there is certainly no unity between the two. Sameness of modes[20] alone does not impose itself upon sameness of a kind. The one clearness can be cancelled by a disruption of the dream, while the other can be can-

celled through efforts, as in the case of the various mercilessnesses [their clearness can be cancelled] by force of a meditation of their counterpart (i.e. mercy)."

FRAGMENT 6 (R 5,20–23):

ghaṭādiprakṛtāśesavedane 'pi bhayaṃ bhavāt /
hīyeta yadi ko doṣaḥ so 'pi sarvajñatāṃ vrajet/ /
saṃsāraduḥkhamokṣāya spṛhayanto vayaṃ punaḥ /
bhajema tadupāyajñaṃ sthātuṃ tadgītavartmani //

"Nothing is wrong, if fear of existence could also be lost with a complete knowledge of everything produced, e.g. a pot. He, too, [who knows all these things] would become omniscient. We, now, who long for liberation from the suffering of saṃsāra, should be inclined to follow him, who knows the means for it, on the path he has proclaimed."

FRAGMENT 7(R 5,30–33):

uktakrameṇa munirājanaye pramāyāḥ
śaktir vyanakti[21] *gatim apramitāṃ kṛpāṃ ca /*
anyatra tu dvayam udastam udasyamāne[22]
tenaika eva śaraṇaṃ sa nirātmavādī //

"In the mentioned sequence, the power of the cognition [inherent] in the doctrine of the king of Munis manifests measureless understanding and mercy. In another [teacher], however, the two (understanding and mercy) are excluded. When they are being excluded [in other teachers], therefore, the One alone is refuge [and] he is the one who teaches that there is no self."

FRAGMENT 8 (R 24,20–23):

sattāropakṛto 'pi bhāvanavaśāt kāṭhinyam āpat tathā
śaithilye 'pi yathāsya duḥkhahataye sāndras tathaiva śramaḥ/
utpāde tu phalasya hetuniyamo no tu prabandhasthitau
tasmad duḥkhadṛśaḥ kṣaye 'pi vilasanmaitryāya tasmai namaḥ //

"To the extent that the one who [only] imposes reality [on the respective object] has difficulty and distress on account of meditation, even though [both] are [totally] weakened [in his case], he is making

a strong effort to destroy suffering. Only when produced, is the effect in need of a cause, not for further continuance. Therefore he is aware of suffering, although it has ceased [with him]. Him I revere, whose love is shining."

FRAGMENT 9 (J 326,14–19):[23]

labdho bodhadayādibhis tv atiśayas tadgocaropasthitau
naivaṃ yatnam apekṣate svarasataḥ pratyātmam unmilati ||
tasmāt kṣaṇikatvadharmābhyāse 'pi prakarṣagāmini yāvad anubhavitavyam anena tāvat truṭyadrūpam asmadādidarśanavilakṣaṇam eva. yathāsmākam atyantasadṛśe 'pi bhinnadeśapaṭutarabhedānukāri darśanaṃ vikalpaś ca jhagity eva tathā syāt, anuṣṭhānaṃ vā tadanurūpam, evaṃ yoginaḥ kṣaṇabhedini bhāvadvaye darśanavikalpau. sthairyādibhramodbhavarāgādikalaṅkānaṅkitaṃ cāsya cetaḥ.

"The superiority gained through cognition, mercy etc., however, does not likewise presuppose an effort, when the [respective] object is present; it appears with everyone spontaneously.

All that can be perceived, therefore, by this (yogin) when his meditation on the quality of momentariness becomes intensive, is falling asunder, a form quite different from the view of people like us. Even with somebody who is totally like us, perception, which follows the more minute differences of different places, and conception would instantly be likewise, or practise accordingly.[24] The same is the case with the yogin's perception and conception with regard to the two kinds of things[25] which are different in every moment. And his mind is not spoiled by the stains of passion, etc. which arise from the error of continuity etc."

FRAGMENT 10 (J 491,23–25):[26]

āgamas tāvac cittasya prakṛtipariśuddhatvam. āgantukatvaṃ tu doṣāṇām asakṛd abhidhatte, anubhūyate ca viparyāsaśaṅkayā paripīḍyamānaṃ manaḥ, samyakparijñāne ca nirvṛtam.

"The sacred tradition,[27] then, is the mind's (*citta-*) natural purity.[28] The contingency (*āgantukatvam*) of the faults, however, covers it often. And we observe that [our] functional mind (*manas-*) is troubled by the presumption of errors and that it is at ease with the right insight."

References:

REFERENCE 1 (J 171,14f.)
. . . *pūrvam anupalabdhyā bādhite 'numānādeḥ sādhakasyāpravṛtteḥ sarvajñasiddhau prasādhitatvāt.*

". . . because we have demonstrated in the ***Sarvajñasiddhiḥ***, that no inferential or other[29] proof applies to something which has earlier been negated by a non-perception [of something perceptible] ([*dṛśya-*]*anupalabdhi-*)."

REFERENCE 2 (J 330,4f.):
upayuktasarvajñādhikāreṇa hi vastudharmabhāvanopakṣepaḥ kṛtaḥ, na sarvasarvajñāpekṣayā.

"For it is with reference to someone who is omniscient with regard to what is appropriate (*upayuktasarvajña-*) that I referred to a meditation on the quality of things, not with respect to the thesis of someone who is omniscient with regard to everything (*sarvasarvajña-*)[30]."

REFERENCE 3 (J 343,16):
tathā caivaṃvidham udbheditam asmābhiḥ sarvajñasiddhau.

"Accordingly we have made apparent such matters[31] in the ***Sarvajñasiddhiḥ***."

NOTES

[1] ***Jñānaśrīmitranibandhāvali.*** Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series, vol. 5 (Patna 1959) (hereafter cited as J).

[2] *Ibid.*, Introduction, 11. There is also a stray reference to a treatise, ***Anekānta-cintā,*** which is otherwise unknown.

[3] fragments 9, 10 and references 1, 3 below.

[4] *op. cit.*, Introduction, 11.

[5] ***Ratnakīrti-Nibandhāvalī.*** Ed. A. Thakur, Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series, Vol. 3 (Patna 1957) 1–28 (hereafter cited as R).

[6] This characteristic, that it is the logically structured resumé of one of his teacher's works, is found with Ratnakīrti's following works (see Thakur, *op. cit.*, Introduction, 19f.):

Ratnakīrti's	related to Jñānaśrīmitra's
Sarvajñasiddhiḥ	*Sarvajñasiddhiḥ*
	Yoginirṇayaprakaraṇam
Īśvarasādhanadūṣaṇam	*Īśvaravādaḥ*
Apohasiddhiḥ	*Apohaprakaraṇam*
Kṣaṇabhaṅgasiddhiḥ I (anvayātmikā)	*Kṣaṇabhaṅgādhyāyaḥ I (pakṣadharmatādhikāraḥ)*
	Kṣaṇabhaṅgādhyāyaḥ II (anvayādhikāraḥ)
Kṣaṇabhaṅgasiddhiḥ II (vyatirekātmikā)	*Kṣaṇabhaṅgādhyāyaḥ III (vyatirekādhikāraḥ)*
Sthirasiddhidūṣaṇam	*Kṣaṇabhaṅgādhyāyah IV (ahetukavināśādhikāraḥ)*
Vyāptinirṇayaḥ	*Vyāpticarcā*
Citradvaitaprakāśavādaḥ	*Sākārasiddhiśāstram*

The only exception is Ratnakīrti's ***Pramāṇāntarbhāvaprakaraṇam*** which is an independent essay in his usual style in spite of the verses from Jñānaśrīmitra's ***Advaitabinduprakaraṇam*** quoted in the beginning.

[7] Within this section I have found the following passages of the ***Yoginirṇayaprakaraṇam*** incorporated by Ratnakīrti into his work. Some are, however, quotations in both works. R 9, 11f. (= J 342, 13f.); R 9, 24f. (= J 332, 14–16); R, 10, 26–28 (= J 335, 4–6); R 11, 13–21 (= J 336, 11–19); R 12, 18–21 (= J 337, 3–5); R 13, 1f. (= J 337, 7f.); R 13, 16–19 (= J 338, 2–5); R 13, 27–14, 3 (= J 339, 23–340, 3); R 14, 5–7 (= J 341, 3–5); R 14, 23–26 (= J 341, 24–342, 1); R 14, 28–31 (= J 323, 9–12); R 14, 31–32 (= J 323, 16–17); R 14, 33–15, 7 (= J 327, 8–14); R 15, 27f. (= J 342, 13f.); R 15, 29–30 (= J 333, 5–6); R 17, 27–29 (= J 323, 20–22); R 19, 16f. (= J 341, 16f.); R 19, 18–21 (= J 330, 3–6); R 19, 32–20, 2 (= J 331, 15–19); R 20, 20–23 (= J 327, 23–25); R 20, 24–27 (= J 328, 6–8); R 20, 28–31 (= J 329, 1–6).

[8] This last section is entirely devoted to a discussion of some of Kumārila's arguments as propounded in his ***Ślokavārttikam*** and the lost ***Bṛhaṭṭīkā*** (cf. E. Frauwallner, 'Kumārila's Bṛhaṭṭīkā,' *WZKS* 6, 1962, 78–90.)

[9] That he is the author of the ***Vṛttamālāstutiḥ***, a collection of metric examples, has been shown in the recent edition by M. Hahn (***Jñānaśrīmitras Vṛttamālāstuti. Eine Beispielsammlung zur altindischen Metrik.*** Nach dem tibetischen Tanjur zusammen mit der mongolischen Version herausgegeben, übersetzt und erläutert. Wiesbaden 1971, 5–7).

A survey of the four chapters of his ***Kṣaṇabhaṅgādhyāyaḥ*** shows in addition the following metric varieties in Jñānaśrīmitra's original verses. The impression gained from the metrical preferences shown below corresponds neatly to the one given by Hahn (p. 66), showing the distribution of metres in the ***Vṛttamālāstutiḥ***.
Indravajrā: J 1, 6f.;
Upendravajrā: J 70, 13f.; 140, 18ff.; 155, 10ff.;
Upajātiḥ: J 140, 4ff.; 9ff.;
Vaṃśastham: J 128, 22ff.; 129, 4ff.; 159, 1ff.;
Vasantatilakam: J 82, 16ff.; 89, 22ff.; 141, 6ff.; 142, 1ff.; 143, 22ff.; 144, 6ff.; 148, 19ff.; 24ff.; 150, 24ff.;
Śikhariṇī: J 82, 10ff.; 21ff.; 83, 14ff.; 84, 5ff.; 9ff.; 119, 16ff.; 20ff.;
Mandākrāntā: J 139, 23ff.; 158, 12ff.; 21ff.;
Hariṇī: J 151, 16ff.;
Śārdūlavikrīḍitam: J 1, 8ff.; 89, 16ff.; 107, 3ff.; 13ff.; 108, 4ff.; 21ff.; 109, 4ff.; 22 + 110, 1; 111, 24; 112, 20f; 23ff.; 113, 7ff.; 114, 1ff.; 10ff.; 120, 12ff.; 122, 1ff.; 127, 8ff.; 150, 9ff.; 151, 22ff.; 155, 17ff.; 159, 8ff.;
Anuṣṭubh: 111, 20f.; 119, 7f.; 136, 4f.; 139, 17f.; 144, 23f.; 145, 1f.; 3f.; 5f.; 7f.; 11f.; 149, 3f.; 155, 14f.;

[10] 1. proof (R 1, 16–19)
2. defense (R 1, 20–3, 19)
   a. neither locus (*āśrayaḥ*) nor reason (*hetuḥ*) are unproven (*asiddha-*) for thirteen reasons (R 1, 20–3, 11)
   b. the reason (*hetuḥ*) is not incompatible (*viruddha-*) (R 3, 12)
   c. the reason (*hetuḥ*) is not inconclusive (*anaikāntika-*) (R 3, 12–19)

[11] The question whether the concept of "omniscience" (*sarvajñatā*) needs to be taken as including the concept of "omniscience of everything" (*sarvasarvajñatā*) has probably also been dealt with by Jñānaśrīmitra (see fragmetns 4, 6 and reference 2). That Ratnakīrti communicates the proof with reference to the latter only in a very short appendix (R 28, 10–21) and beyond that refers to an extensive treatment by Jitāri (R 28, 10) shows perhaps only that Jñānaśrīmitra has not dealt with this particular proof.

[12] As Jñānaśrīmitra's formulation of this proof has not come down to us, I give the formulation of Ratnakīrti instead (R 1, 16–18): "Every kind of mental function (*cetoguṇaḥ*) which is accompanied by devoted and uninterrupted training over a long time is capable of distinctness (*sphuṭībhāva-*); like the image of a girl to a loving man; and the (mental) images (*ākārāḥ*) of (*-viṣayāḥ*) the four noble truths are kinds of mental functions accompanied by a training of the mentioned sort." (*yo yaḥ sādaranirantaradīrghakālābhyāsasahitacetoguṇaḥ sa sarvaḥ sphuṭībhāvayogyaḥ; yathā yuvatyākāraḥ kāminaḥ puruṣasya; yathoktābhyāsasahitacetoguṇāś cāmī caturāryasatyaviṣayā ākārā iti.*)

[13] On the Buddhist side none has been tried so far. See Ramjan Singh, ***The Jaina Concept of Omniscience.*** Ahmedabad 1974. As the lines of argumentation, especially in treating the counter-arguments of the Mīmāṃsakas, are very similar in the late epistemological tradition of both the Jainas and the Buddhists, the book brings valuable information for our context too, particularly in its last chapter (173ff.).
13a *naraka-* short for *nāraka- metri causa.*

[14] *ahita-* is probably shortened *metri causa* for *āhita-*; *ahita-* ("unfit, improper, indisposed") would give the less probable meaning "then, from the improper mind . . .".

[15] Although Ratnakīrti quotes this verse immediately after fragment 2, I doubt that this was the case in the original. The *kāryahetuḥ* mentioned evidently refers to a longer discussion between the two fragments which perhaps showed how the cause of saṃsāra can be inferred through its effect, the five groups of beings (cf. . . . *ātmadṛṣṭilakṣaṇasya hetoḥ sāṃsārikapañcaskandhalakṣaṇakāryānyathānupapattito niścayāt.* R 2, 14f.).

[16] *guṇaḥ* is short for *cetoguṇaḥ* (cf. R 1, 16).

[17] *evā-*Ms: *avā-* Thakur.

[18] *samāsajjate*: *samāsaṃgati* Ms, *samāmaṃgati* Thakur (which I don't understand).

[19] *nidrā-: niddha-* Thakur; *nidra-* is shortened *metri causa* for *nidrā-*. This emendation seems so evident (cf. R 5, 13) that I dare to surmise an additional shortening.

[20] *prākāra-*, derivative from *prakāra- metri causa?*

[21] *vyanakti*: *vyānakti* Thakur.

[22] *udasyamāne*: *ado 'stamāne* Thakur; another easier emendation, *ato 'syamāne*, cannot be constructed.

[23] *yathoktaṃ sarvajñasiddhau . . . iti.*

[24] I do not really understand the meaning of this sentence; the translation is, therefore, only tentative.

[25] i.e. perhaps the individual and generic objects (?). They would be different in every moment in the sense that the individual is momentary and the generic is unreal (?). But then, I doubt whether Jñānaśrīmitra would call these two objects *bhāva*.

[26] *tatra . . . . . . iti vibhaktaṃ sarvajñasiddhau.*

[27] i.e. the teaching of the Buddha.

[28] *prakṛtipariśuddhatvam* is synonymous with *tathatāvaimalyam* of *Dharmadharmatāvibhaṅgaḥ* 46, 10 (ed. J. Nozawa in: ***Studies in Indology and Buddhology,*** Kyōtō 1955, 9–49).

[29] i.e. verbal (*āgamaḥ, śābdam*).

[30] The ***Sarvajñasiddhiḥ*** is not mentioned here but this remark implies with high probability that Jñānaśrīmitra has also dealt with the different concepts of a *upayuktasarvajña-*and a *sarvasarvajña-*. As he has not done so in the ***Yoginirṇayaprakaraṇam*** or any other extant work as far as I can see, he must have treated these terms and the discussion related in the ***Sarvajñasiddhiḥ***.

[31] This reference, the very last sentence of the ***Yoginirṇayaprakaraṇam,*** seems to refer only to the last objection (J 343, 14) and the answer, where Jñānaśrīmitra states that the proof of an omniscient being has not been brought forward considering a limitation of this being to a certain place, time or man (*deśakālapuruṣaniyamaḥ*) This topic, then, was probably discussed towards the end of the ***Sarvajñasiddhiḥ*** too.

Prajñā and *dṛṣṭi* in the Vaibhāṣika Abhidharma

Padmanabh S. Jaini

The stress laid in Prajñāpāramitā texts upon the eradication of ignorance (*avidyā*) or attainment of perfect insight (*prajñā*) is of course well-known, often being cited as a distinguishing mark of that body of literature. Little has been said, however, about the concept of *prajñā* as it occurs among the so-called Hīnayāna doctrines, perhaps due to the generally held view that its role therein was a relatively unimportant one. Such a view is not, however, borne out by the textual evidence. Theravādin works, for example, refer to the Abhidharma teachings as *adhi-paññāsikkhā*, "instruction in the highest insight;" similarly, Vasubandhu's opening remarks in his ***Abhidharmakośa*** define the very term *abhidharma* as *amalā* ("completely pure") *prajñā*. It must be admitted, furthermore, that in spite of the great attention paid to the subject by the authors of the Prajñāpāramitā materials, the precise meaning of *prajñā* itself remains obscure; one sometimes feels that nothing definite can be said beyond the statement that *prajñā* is something which was attained by the Buddha and is attainable by the bodhisattvas. Strangely enough, certain Hīnayāna materials are perhaps more useful in this regard than are their Mahāyāna counterparts. We will not claim here that these earlier sources provide complete clarification of the *prajñā* issue. It does seem to be true, however, that some investigation among Hīnayāna texts, supplemented by a reasonable degree of inference, may well add greatly to our understanding of what the Buddhist *prajñā* is and is not. Light may be cast, moreover, upon heretofore unsuspected similarities between doctrines of the Hīnayānist Vaibhāṣika school and those of the Mahāyāna tradition.

Any discussion of *prajñā* and *avidyā* must begin by making clear precisely what is the object upon which these radically opposed modes of awareness are focused. Probably all Buddhist schools would designate this object as "the four noble truths," this expression here being a technical term for "things as they really are." Given that knowing "things as they really are" or failing to do so spells the difference between salvation and eons of suffering, we can see that the spiritual stakes here are of

the highest order. Thus it is no surprise that the terms under discussion should have been subject to the closest scrutiny and generated a great deal of controversy among Buddhist thinkers. Consider for example, the following summary of certain points made in Chapter Three of the ***Abhidharmakośabhāṣya***:[1]

> What is *avidyā*? Is it simply that which is not *vidyā*? Obviously not, for if so then even the eye and other sense-organs, for instance, would have to be called *avidyā*. Is it then the absence of *vidyā*? No, because in that case it would be nothing but an absence, i.e. not a positive existent (*dharma*). And such a theory cannot be accepted, for *avidyā* has time and again been referred to in the Sūtras as being a *dharma*, an adversary of *vidyā* which stands on its own. The (negative) prefix *a-* in *avidyā* is to be understood in the same way as that in *amitra*, which means "an enemy," not just "the absence of a friend." This must be so, for the term *avidyā* appears in various lists of *akuśala* ("unwholesome") *dharmas*. It cannot be considered merely a negative term showing the absence of something else; it must be understood as a positive *dharma*. (Someone else maintains, however, that) while the term *avidyā* does appear in the Sūtras, it is used there in a metaphorical sense, indicating not an absence of *vidyā* but rather a kind of defiled or wrong awareness (*kuvidyā*). Such expressions are common; a bad son (*kuputra*), for example, is often referred to as *aputra*, or an unfaithful wife (*kubhāryā*) as *abhāryā*. Thus, *avidyā* is nothing but *kuprajñā* ("wrong insight," here equivalent to *kuvidyā*). (The Vaibhāṣika position is now given:) This cannot be, for *kuprajñā* is not *avidyā*; in fact it (i.e. *kuprajñā*) is nothing but a *dṛṣṭi* ("wrong view").

This exchange is not only interesting as an example of the content of the *Kośabhāṣya* and its style of argumentation; the final Vaibhāṣika remark, although delivered in a rather offhand manner, is in fact of great importance to our present investigation. First, in order to understand the Vaibhāṣika's point, we must recall the following tenets of the Abhidharma system: *Dṛṣṭi*[2], which refers most particularly to belief in the false notion of a permanent self, is destroyed by attainment of the *darśanamārga*, a moment of great insight which irrevocably establishes the aspirant upon the Buddhist path; *avidyā*, on the other hand, persists beyond the *darśanamārga*, eventually being overcome only at the level

of arhatship through the extended meditational practices of the *bhāvanāmārga*.[3] It is clear that in this system *dṛṣṭi* and *avidyā* cannot be identical; thus, by equating *kuprajñā* with the former, the Vaibhāṣika denies his opponent's view.

Bearing this equation in mind for a moment, let us think a bit more about the term *dṛṣṭi* itself. One of the hallmarks of the Vaibhāṣika system is its enumeration of seventy-five *dharmas*,[4] a collection which supposedly comprises the totality of "reals" (i.e. existent-categories) in the universe. It is a characteristic of this list that many of the *dharmas* included thereon would be classified as "process" or "description" rather than "existent" by thinkers of other schools; in other words, the Vaibhāṣikas do not suffer from any tendency to "leave things out" simply because their identity as *dharmas* might be questionable. Thus it comes as no small surprise to the student of Vaibhāṣika thought to discover that *dṛṣṭi*, which plays such an important role in Buddhist soteriology, *does not appear* among the seventy-five *dharmas*. This is especially strange in light of the Vaibhāṣika doctrine that *dṛṣṭi*, following its destruction by the *darśanamārga*, is replaced by an *asaṃskṛta dharma* known as *pratisaṃkhyānirodha*[5] ("cessation resulting from the application of knowledge"). Now there are said to be several such *nirodhas*, special unconditioned "blanks" which correspond one-to-one with the six *anuśaya*-factors that they forever replace, viz. *vicikitsā*, *rāga*, *pratigha*, *māna*, *avidyā*, and *dṛṣṭi* itself. For some reason all of these six appear on the Vaibhāṣika *dharma* list except *dṛṣṭi*. Hence the Vaibhāṣikas might seem to have inadvertently committed an omission which calls the consistency of their whole schema into question. (This omission, strangely enough, elicits no comment from either Vasubandhu or Yaśomitra; such Abhidharma scholars as Stcherbatsky, moreover, have apparently failed to notice it.) Even the Theravādins, who are free of the *pratisaṃkhyānirodha* doctrine and thus have no pressing need to make *dṛṣṭi* a *dharma*, have seen fit to do so. It will not suffice, however, to simply suggest a Vaibhāṣika oversight here. Rather, we should assume a definite purpose in their manner of presentation, and thus seek to discover precisely what *dṛṣṭi* is understood to be and how this is connected to other aspects of Vaibhāṣika doctrine.

Returning to the passage cited above, a partial solution appears immediately: *dṛṣṭi* is for the Vaibhāṣikas a *type of prajñā* (viz. *kuprajñā*), and since *prajñā* already has a place among the *dharmas*, no new cate-

gory need be created for *dṛṣṭi*.[6] But this of course means that the term *prajñā* itself cannot refer to a single kind of entity; it must have (at least) two varieties.

The situation is complicated still further when we examine the Vaibhāṣika classification of certain *dharmas* as *mahābhūmika*, "found in all moments of consciousness." The *dharmas* which fall into this category are given as follows: *vedanā* ("feelings"), *cetanā* ("will"), *saṃjñā* ("concepts"), *chanda* ("desire"), *sparśa* ("contact" "sensation"), *smṛti* ("memory"), *manaskāra* ("attention"), *adhimokṣa* ("inclination"), *samādhi* ("concentration"), and *prajñā*.[7] The inclusion of *prajñā* here seems very odd, for it means that even those mind-moments characterized by the presence of *avidyā* must contain the supposedly antithetical *prajñā* element. Even more significant, it suggests that *prajñā* is not something which must be *attained*; it is always present regardless of one's state of purity or defilement. The Theravādins avoid such difficulties by placing *prajñā* among twenty-five wholesome *caitasikas* found only in a few particular *cittas* ("mind-moments") and never in conjunction with *avidyā* (=*moha*)[8]. Similarly, Vasubandhu himself apparently did not agree with the Vaibhāṣika classification; one of his independent works, called ***Pañcaskandhaprakaraṇa***,[9] groups *prajñā* with the *pratiniyataviṣayas*, *dharmas* associated only with certain *cittas* and then only when these are focused upon one of a given set of objects.

The Vaibhāṣikas themselves must have been aware of the problems accruing to their categorization of *prajñā* as a *mahābhūmikadharma*. These problems can be circumvented, however, if *prajñā* is taken in a generic rather than specific sense, i.e. as a label designating two or more related but distinguishable entities. We have already seen this interpretation implied by the identification of *kuprajñā* with *dṛṣṭi*, above. The Vaibhāṣikas' further inclusion of *prajñā* among their "universal" *dharmas* leaves little room for doubt that such was indeed their understanding of the term.

How, then, shall we understand the relationship between *kuprajñā* and *prajñā*? In a similar context (viz. the discussion of *mithyāsamādhi* vs. *samādhi*), Yaśomitra uses the analogy of a rotten seed and a good seed; both are "seeds," and yet there is a definite difference between them.[10] At another point in the text, where *dṛṣṭi* is defined by Vasubandhu as *prajñāviśeṣa*, ("a special kind of *prajñā*), Yaśomitra adds the following:

santīrikā yā prajñā, sā dṛṣṭiḥ ("*dṛṣṭi* is that kind of *prajñā* which involves judgement").[11]

Our translation of the word *santīrika* ("involving judgement") requires some expansion here. This seems to have been a Buddhist technical term which, along with the related *santīraṇa*,[12] denoted that stage of the cognitive process which followed perception and which comprised the making of discriminative decisions, i.e. "this is (an) x as opposed to (a) y." Now, it will be immediately apparent that the decision or judgement arrived at may be either incorrect or correct. In the former case we would have an example of *mithyādṛṣṭi*, "inaccurate view;" such views may be of various types, but as we have suggested earlier the term most often implies *satkāyadṛṣṭi*, belief in a permanent soul. (This is the most pernicious, hence most important, of *mithyādṛṣṭis*.) If, on the other hand, one's judgement is correct, i.e. made in accord with the Buddha's teachings ("that thing is nothing but the five *skandhas*; it is characterized by suffering; it is impermanent;" etc.), we have a *samyakdṛṣṭi*, "accurate view."

Lest some confusion arise here, we should point out the rather different use of these terms by Theravādin writers. They understand *dṛṣṭi*, first of all, only in the restricted sense of what has been called *mithyādṛṣṭi* above. *Samyakdṛṣṭi*, on the other hand, seems to be understood as the absence of *inaccurate* views, but not of *all* views. It is considered, moreover, the highest form of insight possible, the functional equivalent of *prajñā*.[13] This is very interesting, for it means that in this system there is no difference between the insight of the stream-winner (*srotāpanna*) and that of the *arhat*; both have experienced the *darśanamārga* and thus eliminated all but accurate views. The distinction between these two levels of the path, therefore, is here one of defilements overcome rather than of understanding attained.

Returning to the Vaibhāṣikas, it is obvious that they have gone beyond the simple Theravādin breakdown of cognition into "inaccurate" and "accurate" modes; as we have seen, Yaśomitra classifies *all* views based on decision making, regardless of their accuracy, as *dṛṣṭi* or *kuprajñā*. His notion of *santīrikaprajñā*, moreover, leaves open the possibility of another type of *prajñā* which is *asantīrikā*, totally free from any judgement whatsoever. This possibility is made explicit by Vasubandhu in the beginning of the seventh Kośasthāna; there he says that all *dṛṣṭis* are forms of knowledge (*jñāna*), but not all forms of knowledge are *dṛ-*

ṣṭis, and that those which are not can be described as "devoid of judgement" (*asantīraṇa*) and "devoid of investigation" (*aparimārgaṇa*). The *asantīranaraparimārgaṇa* category, of course, refers to (pure) *prajñā* as opposed to *kuprajñā*[11].

With these distinctions in mind, it is possible to understand the otherwise perplexing role of *avidyā* in the Vaibhāṣika system. First, we can see that any instance of *avidyā* and *prajñā* coexisting in the same mind-moment must involve only *kuprajñā*, i.e. *dṛṣṭi*, for this factor is *not antithetical* to *avidyā*. Second, the idea that *avidyā* persists even after *dṛṣṭis* are destroyed by the *darśanamārga* makes sense when it is recalled that not all *dṛṣṭis*, but only those of the *mithyā* variety, are so destroyed. Thus, during the practice of the *bhāvanāmārga* the aspirant's consciousness is characterized both by *avidyā* and by the presence of *samyakdṛṣṭi*; the latter, though immeasurably *better* than *mithyādṛṣṭi*, is still a form of *kuprajñā*.

This brief discussion, growing out of the Vaibhāṣika's "omission" of *dṛṣṭi* from their *dharma* list, has now led us back to our original field of inquiry: the Vaibhāṣika concept of pure *prajñā* itself. We have noted above Vasubandhu's reference to certain types of knowledge (*jñāna*) which are not *dṛṣṭis*. Such knowledges are two in number: *kṣayajñāna* ("knowledge of cessation") and *anutpādajñāna* ("knoweldge of non-arising").[15] These are attained when, through the meditational disciplines of the *bhāvanāmārga*, the mind becomes totally free of discriminatory judgements, or, as later Mahāyāna texts would have it, of "concept formation" (*vikalpa*). *Saṃyakdṛṣṭi* and *avidyā*, in other words, are overcome simultaneously. (Indeed, it is not unreasonable to suggest that the investigative and judgemental functions of the former comprise nothing less than the sufficient conditions for existence of the latter.) Once this has taken place, there arises knowledge of the fact that all the *anuśayas* which remained after the *darśanamārga*, (viz. *rāga*, *pratigha*, and *māna*, in addition to *avidyā*) have now ceased to exist, and also that they will never arise again. Arhatship is thus achieved; the mind retains only a sort of "pure awareness" (*pratyavekṣaṇamātram*).[16]

Theravādins, as noted above, seem never to have considered this higher, non-discriminative level of *prajñā*; they simply equated the term with their version of *samyakdṛṣṭi*. But this means, as we have also seen, that the highest form of insight arises *prior* to the *bhāvanāmārga*. Even Theravādins themselves seem to have felt somewhat uncomfortable with this interpretation, for it raises serious questions about the very

raison d'etre of the *samyakdṛṣṭi* (which is, after all, supposedly a functional *dharma*). The point is debated in the ***Aṭṭhasālinī*** in such terms as these:[17]

> If all sixty-two *dṛṣṭis* are left behind by the first path (i.e. the *darśanamārga*), there are none to be overcome by the three higher paths (i.e. the *bhāvanāmārga*). So how would you explain the purpose of *samyakdṛṣṭi* there? (The Theravādin says:) We would still call it *samyakdṛṣṭi*, in the same way that a medicine is still called by that name even when there is no poison against which it may be used. (The opponent suggests:) In that case it is nothing but a name, a totally non-functional thing. And if that is so, the limbs of the path (*mārgāṅga*) are not complete (i.e. if a *dharma* is mentioned in *sūtra* as an essential element of the path, as *samyakdṛṣṭi* is, it must be functional).

Pressed in this manner, the Theravādins offered a rather unconvincing explanation, namely that *māna* ("egocentrism"), one of the *anuśayas* not destroyed by the *darśanamārga* takes the place of *dṛṣṭi* after the latter's removal; *māna*, in other words, takes over the role of *dṛṣṭi* as a "defiling element to be overcome by *samyakdṛṣṭi*, thereby giving *samyakdṛṣṭi* "something to do" on the path from stream-winner to *arhat*.[18] This suggestion is probably based upon the Pali Abhidharma doctrine that *māna* and *dṛṣṭi* never occur in the same *citta*,[19] perhaps because their respective functions (being both centered on ego) are similar enough so that the presence of one makes that of the other superfluous. Whether or not *māna* is indeed a proper "replacement" for *dṛṣṭi* as the object of *samyakdṛṣṭi*'s "medicinal" effects, its use as such does restore some measure of consistency to the Theravādin system.


The Vaibhāṣikas, for their part, envisioned a much broader function for *samyakdṛṣṭi*. That function seems to have been removal of *all* the remaining *anuśayas*. By investigating the nature of his experiences over and over again from the correct standpoint ("this is only the five *skandhas*," etc., as mentioned above,) the aspirant reaffirms the insight of the *darśanamārga* and weakens the unwholesome habits and tendencies produced when he was subject to *mithyādṛṣṭi*. For the Vaibhāṣikas, therefore, *samyakdṛṣṭi* is nothing less than the key element of the *bhāvanāmārga* itself; its application, together with that of the other "limbs" of the eight-fold path, entails the eventual eradication of all emotional attachments to the five *skandhas*. Once these attachments have been re-

moved, even *samyakdṛṣṭi* itself can be allowed to pass out of existence; then, at last, pure *prajñā* is able to emerge.

A further point must be considered here. It was previously asserted that at the time when arhatship is attained, there is first an awareness of the destruction of the *anuśayas* (*kṣayajñāna*), then of the fact that they will never again arise (*anutpādajñāna*). Indeed this description conforms to the conventionally accepted, i.e. Theravādin, view of that event. Such a description cannot, however, be considered adequate for the Vaibhāṣikas, since it clearly involves the very sort of discriminative judgement (*santīraṇa*) which they have insisted must be absent from *prajñā*. Vaibhāṣika doctrine necessitates, therefore, that *kṣayajñāna* and *anutpādajñāna* be understood not as "knowledges" in the ordinary (discriminative) sense, but rather as those mind-moments wherein there occurs, respectively, *aprāpti* ("non-possession") of the *anuśayas* and *prāpti* ("obtainment") of *pratisaṃkhyānirodha*[20] (the "blank" *dharmas* referred to earlier.) Thus the traditional criteria of arhatship are met, but without the "taint" of *santīraṇa*; this is *anāsravā prajñā*, *prajñā* devoid of all defiling *dharmas*.

It may well be asked here just how an *arhat*, ostensibly free from any tendency to discriminate or conceptualize, can function in daily life. The answer proceeds from understanding that the state of pure awareness, of *prajñā*, *does not continue;* it is a conditioned thing (*saṃskṛta*) and must therefore disappear after its moment of existence. Following that moment, the *arhat* once again makes identifications, judgements, etc. (of course in accord with the four noble truths), and to all appearances lives like any stream-winner (*srotāpanna*, i.e. one freed from *mithyādṛṣṭi*) until his death. The *effect* of his moment of pure *prajñā*, however, does *not* disappear; *pratisaṃkhyānirodha* is an unconditioned *dharma* which effectively precludes forever the arising of any defiling influences. In other words, the *arhat* seems to be operating in the context of *samyakdṛṣṭi*, but it is of a special sort, viz. unencumbered by *avidyā* or the other *anuśayas* and generating no attachment to anything, not even the five *skandhas*. Thus we have here still another form of awareness, another subcategory of "*prajñā;*" indeed, the significations given this term by the Vaibhāṣikas are so numerous that we should perhaps construct a small diagram to illustrate them (see p. 409)

If we have been correct in holding that the Vaibhāṣikas view pure *prajñā* as a condition of non-discriminative awareness accompanying the *kṣaya* and *anutpāda jñānas* (in their *aprāpti* and *prāpti* senses, as a-


Prajñā
(a) dṛṣṭi (kuprajñā)
(Views characterized by investigation and judgement)
(b) non-dṛṣṭi
(a-1) mithyādṛṣṭi
(inaccurate views)
(a-2) samyakdṛṣṭi
(accurate views)
(a-2-a) laukikīsamyakdṛṣṭi
(pre-darśanamārga; dṛṣṭianuśaya is still present.)
(a-2-b) śaikśīsāsravā-samyakdṛṣṭi
(after the darśanamārga, but prior to arhatship.)
(a-2-c) aśaikṣīanāsravā-samyakdṛṣṭi
(mode of awareness of the arhat living in the world.)
(b-1) pañcavijñānakāyikā prajñā
(pure worldly perception, i.e. the first moment of any act of cognition, prior to investigation and judgement.)
(b-2) aśaikṣīanāsravāprajñā
(pure non-worldly prajñā i.e. kṣayajñāna and anutpādajñāna).

bove), it would appear that their conceptualization of this supreme insight is not altogether different from that set forth in the Prajñāpāramitā literature. Most signficantly, the *prajñā* of both traditions is said to be free from all conceptualizations, devoid of all *dṛṣṭis* (*śūnyatā sarvadṛṣṭīnām*). Even so, a major distinction remains between the systems, for while the Vaibhāṣikas did relegate even *samyakdṛṣṭi* to the level of *kuprajñā*, they never developed the implications of this move as the Mahāyānists did. Vaibhāṣika doctrine sees only *mithyādṛṣṭi* as *avastuka*,[21] "focused upon unreal or non-existent objects (e.g. a permanent soul);" *samyakdṛṣṭi*, while not considered pure *prajñā*, was nevertheless classed as *savastuka*, "focused upon actually existing objects (i.e. the five *skandhas*)". To apply Mahāyāna terminology, we may say that the Vaibhāṣikas believed in *pudgalaśūnyatā* ("non-existence of anything called 'the self,'") but not in *dharmaśūnyatā* ("non-existence of *dharmas*"). The Prajñāpāramitā tradition, on the other hand, embraced both doctrines equally.

In the Buddha's famous sermon concerning the raft, it is stated that in addition to the obvious need for abandonment of non-*dharmas* (*adhammā*, i.e. the objects of *mithyādṛṣṭi*), eventually even *dharmas* (*dhammā*, i.e. the objects of *samyakdṛṣṭi*) must be left behind as well.[22] The full ramifications of this *sutta*, viz. that *dharmas* too are *avastu*, seem to have been lost on the Vaibhāṣikas. Although they understood that *samyakdṛṣṭi* was an inferior sort of *prajñā*, they were unable to translate that insight into a doctrinal rejection of the reality of the five *skandhas*.

NOTES

1. *athāvidyeti ko 'rthaḥ? yā na vidyā. cakṣurādiṣv api prasangaḥ? vidyāyā abhāvas tarhi. evaṃ sati na kiñcit syāt; na caitad yuktam. tasmāt*

vidyāvipakṣo dharmo 'nyo 'vidyā 'mitrānṛtādivat//28//

yathā mitraviparyayeṇa tadvipakṣataḥ kaścid amitro bhavati, na tu yaḥ kaścid anyo mitrāt, nāpi mitrābhāvaḥ . . . evam avidyāpi vidyāyāḥ pratidvandvabhūtadharmāntaram iti draṣṭavyam. . . .

samyojanādivacanāt,

saṃyojanaṃ bandhanam anuśaya ogho yogaś cāvidyocyate Sūtreṣu. na cābhāvamātraṃ tathā bhavitum arhati. . . .

yathā tarhi kubhāryā abhāryety ucyate, kuputraś cāputraḥ, evam avidyā 'py astu?

kuprajñā cen na darśanāt/ 29 ab/

kutsitā hi prajñā kliṣṭā. sā ca dṛṣṭisvabhāvā iti nāvidyā yujyate.

yā tarhi na dṛṣṭiḥ sā bhaviṣyati? sāpi bhavituṃ nārhati. kiṃ kāraṇam

dṛṣṭes tat samprayuktatvāt/ 29 c/

avidyā cet prajñā 'bhaviṣyan na dṛṣṭis tayā yujyate . . . dvayoḥ prajñādravyayor asampyayogāt. AKB. III, 28–29.

Commenting on the last part Yaśomitra says:

"dṛṣṭes tat samprayuktatvāt" iti. avidyāsamprayuktatvād ity arthaḥ. kathañ ca dṛṣṭir avidyayā samprayuktā yasmād avidyālakṣaṇo mohaḥ kleśamahābhūmau paṭhyate, kleśamahābhūmikāś ca sarve 'pi mahābhūmikaiḥ saha samprayujyanta iti dṛṣṭyā satkāyadṛṣṭyādikayā prajñāsvabhāvayā avidyā samprayujyata iti gamyate. tasmān nāvidyā prajñā, dvayoḥ prajñādravyayor asamprayogāt. SAKV. III, 29.

2. *dṛṣṭayaḥ pañca satkāyamithyāntargrāhadṛṣṭayaḥ/*

dṛṣṭiśīlavrataparāmarśāv iti punar daśa//

. . . ity ete . . . darśanaprahātavyāḥ, satyānāṃ darśanamātreṇa prahāṇāt. AKB. V, 3–4. [It should be noted that the *nirodha* of *vicikitsā* occurs together with that of *dṛṣṭi*.]

3. *catvāro bhāvanāheyāh: tad yathā—rāgaḥ, pratighaḥ, mānaḥ, avidyā ca. dṛṣṭasatyasya paścāt mārgābhyāsena prahāṇāt. AKB.* V, 5a.

4. See *CCB*, Appendix II (Tables of the Elements according to the Sarvāstivādins).

5. *yaḥ sāsravair dharmair visaṃyogaḥ sa pratisaṃkhyānirodhaḥ. duḥkhādīnām āryasatyānām . . . prajñāviśeṣas tena prāpyo nirodhaḥ . . . kiṃ punar eka eva sarveṣāṃ sāsravāṇāṃ dharmāṇāṃ pratisaṃkhyānirodhaḥ? nety āha. kim tarhi? pṛthak pṛthak/ yāvanti hi saṃyogadravyāṇi tāvanti visaṃyogadravyāṇi. anyathā hi duḥkhadarśanaheyakleśanirodhasākṣātkaraṇāt sarvakleśanirodhasākṣātkriyā prasajyeta. sati caivaṃ śeṣapratipakṣabhāvanāvaiyarthyaṃ syāt. AKB.* I, 5cd.

6. *nanu ca dṛṣṭyadhikatvād ekaviṃśatir bhavanti? na bhavanti. yasmān mahābhūmika eva kaścit prajñāviśeṣo dṛṣṭir ity ucyate. AKB.* II, 29ab. Cf. *nanu ca dṛṣṭir adhikā? nādhikā, prajñāviśeṣa eva hi kaścit dṛṣṭir ity ucyate. ADV.* [123]

7. *vedanā cetanā saṃjñā cchandaḥ sparśo matiḥ smṛtiḥ/*

manaskāro 'dhimokṣaś ca samādhiḥ sarvacetasi//

ime kila daśa dharmāḥ sarvatra cittakṣaṇe samagrābhavanti. AKB. II, 24. It should be noted that the *kārikā* actually employs the term *mati* rather than *prajñā* here.

However, Vasubandhu glosses *mati* as *prajñā* (*matiḥ prajñā dharmapravicayaḥ*) in his *Bhāṣya,* and Yaśomitra is at pains to prevent any other interpretation when he says: *pratītatvāt prajñeti vaktavye ślokabandhānuguṇyena matir iti kārikāyām uktam. SAKV.* II, 24.

8. . . . *paññindriyena saddhiṃ pañcavīsati 'me cetasikā sobhanā veditabbā. AbhS.* II, 7. *paññā, dvādasasu kāmāvacarasahetukacittesu, pannarasasu rūpāvacaracittesu, aṭṭhasu arūpāvacaracittesu, aṭṭhasu lokuttaracittesu cā ti sattacattāsīlacittesu sampayujjati. AbhS.* II. 16.

9. That Vasubandhu is indeed the author of this work is confirmed by Yaśomitra: *ime kileti. kilaśabdaḥ paramatadyotane. svamataṃ tu chandādayaḥ sarvacetasi na bhavanti. tathā hy anenaivācāryeṇa Pañcaskandhake likhitam . . . SAKV.* II, 24. For the complete *dharma* list of the *Pañcaskandhaka,* see *IAKB.* Part I, pp. XVI-XIX.

10. . . . *mahābhūmikatvāc ca samādheḥ sarvacittānām ekāgratāprasangaḥ? na; durbalatvāt samādheḥ . . . kliṣṭasya kathaṃ dhyānatvam? mithyopanidhyānāt. atiprasangaḥ? na; tatpratirūpa eva tatsaṃjñāviniveśāt pūtibījavat. AKB.* VIII, 1d.

"pūtibījavat". yathā kiñcid abījaṃ pāṣāṇādi atyantatajjātivilakṣaṇaṃ na pūtibījam ity ucyate, kiṃ tarhi? bījajātīyam evopahataṃ yad bhavati tasminn eva saṃjñāsanniveśaḥ 'pūtibījam' iti. SAKV. VIII, 1d.

11. *yasmān mahābhūmika eva kaścit prajñāviśeṣo dṛṣṭir ity ucyate. AKB.* II, 29 ab.

"mahābhūmika eva kaścit prajñāviśeṣo dṛṣṭir" iti. santīrikā ya prajñā, sā dṛṣṭiḥ. SAKV. II, 29 ab.

12. *santīrikā hi dṛṣṭiḥ, upadhyānapravṛttatvāt. AKB.* I, 41cd.

santīraṇaṃ punar viṣayopanidhyānapūrvakaṃ niścayākarṣaṇam. SAKV. I, 41 cd. See *BHSD.* p. 556.

13. The ***Dhammasangaṇi***, for example, uses *sammādiṭṭhi* as a synonym for *paññindriya: katame dhammā kusalā (yasmiṃ samaye kāmāvacaraṃ kusalaṃ cittaṃ uppannaṃ hoti somanassasahagataṃ ñāṇasampayuttaṃ . . . tasmiṃ samaye . . . paññindriyaṃ hoti . . . sammādiṭṭhi hoti . . . katamaṃ tasmiṃ samaye paññindriyaṃ hoti? yā tasmiṃ samaye paññā . . . amoho dhammavicayo sammādiṭṭhi-idaṃ tasmiṃ samaye paññindriyaṃ hoti. katamā tasmiṃ samaye sammādiṭṭhi hoti? yā tasmiṃ samaye paññā . . . paññindriyaṃ . . . ayaṃ . . . sammādiṭṭhi hoti. Dhs.* pp. 9–12.

14. *kṣayānutpādadhīr na dṛk/*
kṣayajñānam anutpādajñōnaṃ ca na dṛṣṭih, asantiraṇāparimārgaṇāśayatvāt.
tadanyobhayathāryā dhīḥ,
kṣāntikṣayānutpādajñānebhyo 'nyānāsravā prajñā, dṛṣṭiḥ jñānaṃ ca.
anyā jñānaṃ,
laukikī prajāñ sarvajva jñānam.
dṛśaś va ṣat//1//
pañva dṛṣṭayaḥ, laukikī ca samyagdṛṣṭiḥ. eṣā ṣaḍvidhā laukikī prajñā dṛṣṭiḥ, anyā na dṛṣṭiḥ. jñānaṃ tv eṣā vānyā ca. AKB. VII, 1.

15. . . . *kṣayajñānam anutpādajñānaṃ ca na dṛṣṭih ity arthaḥ. yāvad ayam akṛtakṛtyaḥ, tāvad duḥkhādīni satyāny upanidhyāyatj, parimārgayati vāśayato yathoktair anityādibhir ākāraiḥ. . . .tasmān na te darṣtisvabhāve. . ."anye" ti. laukikī. sā sarvajvajñānam ity avadhāraṇam. na sā prajñāsti yan na jñānam ity arthaḥ. kā punar asau*

prajñā? pañcavijñānakāyikā kuśalākuśalāvyākṛtā mānasī yā dṛṣṭisvabhāvakleśasamprayuktā, anivṛtāvyākṛtā ca. . . ."jñānaṃ tv eṣā cānyā ce" ti. eṣā ca ṣaḍvidhā dṛṣṭisvabhāvā prajñā, tato 'nyā ca pūrvoktā jñānam ity ucyate. . . .yasmād etāḥ ṣaḍ jñānāni cocyante dṛṣṭayaś ceti. SAKV. VII, 1. See also *AKB.*. I, 41.

16. . . .*kṛtakṛtyasya punar yathā dṛṣṭeṣv eva duḥkhādiṣv āryasatyeṣu pratyavekṣaṇamātraṃ tābhyāṃ bhavatīti "duhkaṃ mayā parjjñātaṃ na punaḥ parjjñeyam" ity ādi. tasmān na te dṛṣṭisvabhāve. SAKV.* VII, 1.

17. . . .*tattha paṭhamamagge samāmdiṭṭhi micchādiṭṭhiṃ pajahatī ti sammādiṭṭhi. . . . evaṃ sante paṭhamamaggen' eva dvāsaṭṭhiyā diṭṭhigatānaṃ pahīnattā uparimaggattayena pahātabbā diṭṭhi nāma natthi. tattha sammādiṭṭhī ti nāmaṃ kathaṃ hotī ti? yathā visaṃ atthi vā, hotu mā vā, agado agado tv eva vuccati, evaṃ micchādiṭṭhi atthi vā, hotu mā vā, ayaṃ sammādiṭṭhi yeva nāma. yadi evaṃ nāmammattam ev' etaṃ hoti, uparimaggattaye pana sammādiṭṭhiyā kiccābhāvo āpajjati, maggangāni na paripūrenti, tasmā sammādiṭṭhi sakiccakā kātabbā maggangāni pūretabbānī ti. DhsA.* 3.529.

18. *sakiccakā c' ettha sammādiṭṭhi yathālābhaniyamena dīpetabbā. uparimaggattayavajjho hi eko māno atthi, so diṭṭhiṭṭhāne tiṭṭhati. sā taṃ mānaṃ pajahatī ti sammādiṭṭhi. sotāpattimaggasmiṃ hi sammādiṭṭhi micchādiṭṭhim pajahati. sotāpannassa pana sakadāgāmimaggavajjho māno atthi, taṃ mānaṃ pajahatī ti sammādiṭṭhi. . . . anāgāmissa arahattamaggavajjho māno atthi. so diṭṭhiṭṭhāne tiṭṭhati. . . DhsA.* 3.530.

19. *diṭṭhi catūsu diṭṭhigatasampayuttesu* [*labbhati*]. *māno catūsu diṭṭhigatavippayuttesu* [*labbhati*]. *AbhS.* 2.13.

20. Cf. *"ajitajayajitādhyavasānāt". yathā tadajitāni grāmanigamādīni jayati, jitāni cādhyāvasati, evam ānantaryamārgeṇājitān satkāyadṛṣṭyādīn kleśān jayati; tat prāpticchedāt. jitāṃś cādhyāvasati vimuktimārgeṇa; kleśavismyogaprāptisahotpādāt. SAKV.* VI, 54d. On *prāpti* and *aprāpti*, see my article, 'Origin and development of the theory of *viprayuktasaṃskāras*', *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies*, University of London, Vol. XXII, Part 3, 1959, pp. 531–547.

21. . . .*ity ete . . anuśayā darśanaprahātavyāḥ; satyānāṃ darśanamātreṇa prahāṇāt. AKB.* V, 4.

yo hi kleśo yasya satyasyāpavādāya pravṛttaḥ, sa tasmin dṛṣṭe prahīyate; sarpabhrāntir iva rajjudarśanāt. "satyānām darśanamātreṇa prahāṇād" iti. nābhyāsena prahāṇād ity abhiprāyaḥ. SAKV. V, 4. *bhāvanāheyā hi kleśā dṛḍhāḥ, savastukatvāt. ato lokotterāṇāpi teṣāṃ na sakṛt prahāṇaṃ. SAKV.* VI, 1.

22. *kullūpamaṃ vo, bhikkhave, dhammam desissāmi nittharaṇatthāya, no gahaṇatthāya. . . . kullūpamaṃ vo, bhikkhave, dhammaṃ desitaṃ ājānantehi dhammā pi vo pahātabbā pageva adhammā. M.* I, 135.

"dhammā pi vo pahātabbā" ti ettha dhammā ti samathavipassanā. bhagavā hi samathe pi chandarāgaṃ pajahāpeti, vipassanāya pi. . . . idha pana ubhayattha pajahāpento. . .āha. tatrāyaṃ adhippāyo: bhikkhave, aham evarūpesu pi santapaṇītesu dhammesu chandarāgappahānam vadāmi, kiṃ pana imsamim asaddhamme gāmadhamme . . . . MA. Part II, p. 109. Cf. *tasmād iyaṃ tathāgatena vāg bhāṣitā "kolopamaṃ dharmaparyāyam ājānabhir dharmā eva prahātavyāḥ prāg evādharmāḥ" iti. Vajra,* 6. Vasubandhu applies this *sūtra* to the *mārga: . . . mārgasya kolopamatayā 'vaśyatyajanīyatvāt . . . AKB.* VIII, 24d.

THE WORKS OF EDWARD CONZE

BOOKS

A. CONTRADICTION AND REALITY. London: Wightman, 1939; Reprinted: University Microfilms, Ann Arbor, Michigan.

B. BUDDHISM. Its essence and development. 224 pp., Oxford: Cassirer, October 1951. Reprinted: April 1953, September 1957, October 1963. Paperback edition: November 1960.; French translation, October 1952, Payot.; German translation, December 1953, Kohlhammer. Reprinted: May 1956, September 1962 (+ Nachwort and Wort-und Sachverzeichnis), 1966, 1971; Italian translation, March 1955, Mondadori.; Harper Torchbooks, July 1959.; Dutch trsl. April 1971; Japanese translation, 1975.

C. BUDDHIST TEXTS through the Ages. Ed. in collaboration with I. B. Horner, D. L. Snellgrove, A. Waley. 323 pp. Oxford: Cassirer. April 1954. German translation: Im Zeichen Buddhas, Fischer Bücherei n. 144 S. Fischer, January 1957.; Harper Torchbooks, Jan. 1964.

D. ABHISAMAYĀLAṄKĀRA. Translation and Sanskrit-Tibetan Indices. 223 pp. Serie Orientale Roma VI. July 1954. (Reprinting.).

E. SELECTED SAYINGS FROM THE PERFECTION OF WISDOM. 133 pp. London: The Buddhist Society. May 1955. June 1968. 1975.

F. THE BUDDHA'S LAW AMONG THE BIRDS. Translation (from Tibetan) and commentary. 65 pp. Oxford: Cassirer, January 1956, 1974. (Otto von Taube, Tibetanisches Vogelbuch, Verlag der Arche, Zürich, 1957, 1972.)

G. BUDDHIST MEDITATION. 183 pp. London: Allen & Unwin. February 1956. Reprinted: 1959, 1969.; Harper Torchbooks 1969.

H. VAJRACCHEDIKĀ PRAJÑĀPĀRAMITĀ. Edited and translated, with Introduction and Glossary. 114 pp. Serie Orientale Roma XIII, July 1957, 1974 (With corrections and additions.)

I. BUDDHIST WISDOM BOOKS. The Diamond Sūtra. The Heart Sūtra. 110 pp. London: Allen & Unwin, July 1958; Paperback 1975 (With corrections.)

K. AṢṬASĀHASRIKĀ PRAJÑĀPĀRAMITA. Translation (The Perfection of Wisdom in Eight Thousand Slokas), 225 pp. Calcutta: The Asiatic Society, Bibliotheca Indica no. 284. December 1958, November 1970. THE PERFECTION OF WISDOM IN EIGHT THOUSAND LINES AND ITS VERSE SUMMARY. xxii + 325 pp. Bolinas, Calif.: Four Seasons Foundation, 1973, 1975 (With corrections.)

L. BUDDHIST SCRIPTURES. The Penguin Classics, L 88. 250 pp. April 1959. Reprinted: 1960, 1966, 1968, 1969, 1971, 1975; Italian translation, 1973, Astrolakiò.

M. THE PRAJÑĀPĀRAMITĀ LITERATURE. 123 pp. Indo-Iranian Monographs no. VI. 's-Gravenhage: Mouton, November 1960. (Reprinting).

N. A SHORT HISTORY OF BUDDHISM. xii + 117 pp. Bombay: Chetana 1960, February 1961.

O. THE LARGE SUTRA ON PERFECT WISDOM, with the divisions of the Abhisamayālaṅkāra. Part I. L, 203 pp. London: Luzac, July 1961. [Parts II and III. vii + pp. 205–663. Madison, May 1964; Seattle, June 1966, pp. 584–7, 642–50 re-done]
All the three parts together: xviii + 679 pp., Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975.

P. THE GILGIT MANUSCRIPT OF THE AṢṬĀDAŚASĀHASRIKĀ PRAJÑĀPĀRAMITĀ. Chapters 55 to 70, corresponding to the 5th Abhisamaya. Edition and translation. xxvi + 390 pp. Serie Orientale Roma XXVI. March 1962. Chapters 70 to 82, corresponding to the 6th to 8th Abhisamayas. xii–254 pp., 1974.

Q. BUDDHIST THOUGHT IN INDIA. Three phases of Buddhist Philosophy. 302 pp. London: Allen & Unwin, June 1962; Ann Arbor Paperback, August 1967.

R. MATERIALS FOR A DICTIONARY OF THE PRAJÑĀPĀRAMITĀ LITERATURE. vii + 447 pp. Tokyo: Suzuki Research Foundation, April 1967, 1973.

S. THIRTY YEARS OF BUDDHIST STUDIES. xii + 274 pp. Oxford: Cassirer, May 1968; University of South Carolina Press, 1968.

T. THE SHORT PRAJÑĀPĀRAMITĀ TEXTS. viii + 217 pp. London: Luzac., 1974; New Jersey: Rowman & Littlefield.

ARTICLES

1. *"Prajñāpāramitā-hṛdaya."* Translation. *MW*, xx 5 (1946), 105 (Reprinted in C no. 146 and in E.)
2. "The *Hṛdaya Sūtra*; its Scriptural Background." *MW*, xx 6, 124–127 (1946), xxi 1, 9–11, 17.
3. Social and spiritual values. "Values," 1946, 16–18.
4. Buddhist values and the West. "Values," 1946, pp. 12–15.
5. "On Omniscience and the Goal." *MW* (1947), pp. 62–3.
6. Text, Sources and Bibliography of the Prajñāpāramitāhṛdayasūtra. *JRAS* (1948), pp. 33–51 (Reprinted in S).
7. "Remarks on a Pala Manuscript in the Bodleian Library." *OA*, I 1 (1948), pp. 9–12.
8. "An Exhibition of Tibetan Art in Leiden." *OA* II 1 (1949), 25–7.

9. "The Iconography of the Prajñāpāramitā." *OA* II 2 (1949), pp. 47–52 (Reprinted in S).
10. "Preliminary Note on a Prajñāpāramitā Manuscript." *JRAS* (1950), 32–36.
11. Rahulabhadra, "Hymn to Perfect Wisdom." *MW*, xxvi 1 (1951), pp. 24–5 (Reprinted in C as no. 142; and in L).
12. "The Iconography of the Prajñāpāramitā." *OA* III 3 (1951), 104–09 (Reprinted in S).
13. "Selected Sayings from the Perfection of Wisdom 1–4." *Stepping Stones*, II 10 (1952), pp. 271–76 (Reprinted in E).
14. "The Literature of Perfect Wisdom." *MW*, xxvii 1 (1952), pp. 20–23 (Reprinted in E).
15. "The Composition of the *Aṣṭasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā*." *BSOAS*, xiv 2, pp. 251–262 (Reprinted in S).
16. "The Teachings of *Prajñāpāramitā*." *MW*, xxvii 3 (1952), pp. 89–90, 105 (Reprinted in E).
17. "The Doctrine of Emptiness." *MW*, xxvii 4 (1953), pp. 124–27 (Reprinted in E).
18.19.21. "The Way to Wisdom." I, II, III. *MW* xxviii 1 (1953), 11–14; xxviii 2, 1953, 58–61; xxviii 3, 1953, 95–98 (Partly reprinted in Q).
20. "Compassion and Sympathetic Joy." *Self-knowledge*, IV 4 (1953), 106–11 (Partly reprinted in Q).
21. "The Ontology of the *Prajñāpāramitā*." *Philosophy East and West*, III 2 (1953), 117–129 (Partly reprinted in Q).
23. "Love and Compassion in Buddhism." I. Love. *MW* xxviii 4 (1954), 134–137) (Partly reprinted in Q).
24. "Hate, Love and Perfect Wisdom." *The Mahabodhi*, v 62 (1954), pp. 3–8 (Reprinted in S).
25. II. "Friendliness and Compassion." *MW* xxix 1 (1954), pp. 8–11, 36 (Partly reprinted in Q).
26. "The Sixth Buddhist Council." *Manchester Guardian*, 11.5.1954.
27. "The Triple World." *The Aryan Path*, xxv 5 (May 1954), 200–204 (Partly reprinted in Q).
28. "Conditions and the Unconditioned." *The Mahabodhi*, v 62, (1954), 159–164 (Largely reprinted in Q).
29. III. "On Selfless Love." *MW* xxix 2 (1954), 62–66 (Partly reprinted in Q).
30. "A Prajñāpāramitā Rupa." *MW* xxix 2 (1954), 49–50 (Reprinted in E).
31. "The Holy Religion Among the Birds." *MW* xxix 3 (1954), 118–121 (Reprinted in F).
32. "Maitreya's *Abhisamayālaṅkāra*." *East and West* (Rome), v 3 (1954), 192–97 (Largely reprinted in M).

33. "Buddhaghosa's *Meditation on Death.*" I. Translation. *MW* xxix 4 (1955), 159–163 (Reprinted in G, S).
34. "Buddhaghosa's *Meditation on Death.*" II. Commentary. *MW* xxx 1 (1955), pp. 15–18 (Reprinted in S).
35. "The Frontispiece to the *Diamond Sūtra.*" *MW* xxx 1 (1955), pp. 1–2 (Reprinted in I).
36. "Meditations on Emptiness." *The Mahabodhi,* v 63 (1955), 203–211. (See no. 69).
37. "Buddhaghosa's *Meditation on Death.*" III. Commentary. *MW* xxx 2 (1955), pp. 54–7 (Reprinted in S).
38. "The Heart Sūtra Explained." I. *MW* xxx 3 (1955), 104–07, 119 (Reprinted in I).
39. "The Heart Sūtra Explained." II. *MW* xxx 4 (1956), 147–53 (Reprinted in I).
40. "The Heart Sūtra Explained." III. *MW* xxxi, (1956), 20–24 (Reprinted in I).
41. "The Heart Sūtra Explained." IV. *MW* xxxi 2 (1956), 76–81 (Reprinted in I).
42. "Professor Murti's *Central Philosophy of Buddhism.*" *MW* xxx 3 (1955), pp. 114–117, 136.
43. "Tantric *Prajñāpāramitā* Texts." *Sino-Indian Studies,* v 2, (1956), pp. 100–122. Visva Bharati, Santiniketan (Partly reprinted in M).
44. "Buddha's Anniversary. Decline or Revival?" *The Manchester Guardian,* 21.5.1956.
45. "Mystic Art of Tibet." *OA,* II 2 (1956), pp. 68–69.
45a. A Buddhist Student's Manual, 1956, pp. 243, 251–60.
46. "Philosophers and Techniques." *The Hibbert Journal,* lv 1, (October, 1956), pp. 14–19 (Largely reprinted in Q).
47. "The Diamond Sūtra Explained." I. *MW* xxxi 3 (1956), 109–14 (Reprinted in I).
48. "The Diamond Sūtra Explained." II. *MW* xxxi (1957), 166–70 (Reprinted in I).
49. "The Diamond Sūtra Explained." III. *MW* xxxii (1957), 8–12 (Reprinted in I).
50. "The Diamond Sūtra Explained." IV. *MW* xxxii (1957), 48–53 (Reprinted in I).
51. "On perverted views." *East and West* vii 4, (1957), 313–18 (Reprinted in *MW* xxxii (1957), 91–96).
52. "Marginal Notes to the *Abhisamayālaṅkāra.*" *Liebenthal Festschrift, Sino-Indian Studies,* v 3–4 (1957), 21–35 (Partly reprinted in M).
53. "Shakyamuni's Meeting with Dipankara." *MW* xxxii (1957), 54–56 (Reprinted in L).

54. "The Oldest *Prajñāpāramitā*." *MW* xxxii (1958), 136–41 (Reprinted in 76).

55.56.57.58. "The Road to Omniscience." (*Aṣṭasāhasrikā* ch. 1–2). *MW* xxxiii (1958), 8–12.57–9.99–101. xxxiii (1959). 130–34, 129 (Reprinted in K).

59. BUDDHISMO. *Le Civiltà dell'Oriente*. III (1958), 745–848 (For the English version see N).

60. "Recent Progress in Buddhist Studies." *MW* xxxiv (1959), 6–14 (Reprinted in S).

61. "Buddhism: The Mahāyāna." In *The Concise Encyclopedia of Living Faiths*, ed. R. C. Zaehner (1959), 296–320 (Reprinted in S).

62. "The Buddhist 'Personalists'." *The Mahabodhi* 67 (1959), 118–26 (Reprinted in Q).

63. "The Buddha's Bodies in the *Prajñāpāramitā*." *Akten des 24ten Internationalen Orientalistischen Kongresses Muenchen*. 1959, 530–31.

64. "Recent Progress in *Mahāyāna* Studies." *MW* xxxiv 4, (1960), pp. 144–50 (Reprinted in S).

65. Corrections and Sanskrit-Tibetan-English Index to Obermiller's *Ratnaguṇasaṃcayagāthā*, *MW* 'S-Gravenhage: 1960, 127–57.

66. "The Calcutta Manuscript of the *Ratnaguṇasaṃcayagāthā*." *Indo-Iranian Journal* IV 1 (1960), pp. 37–58.

67. "The Development of Prajñāpāramitā Thought." In *Buddhism and Culture. Dedicated to D. T. Suzuki in Commemoration of his Ninetieth Birthday*. ed. by S. Yamagucchi. Kyoto: 1960, pp. 24–45 (Reprinted in S).

68. "Recent Work on Tantric and Zen Buddhism." *MW* xxxv 3, 1960, pp. 93–98, 110 (Reprinted in S).

69. "Meditations on Emptiness." *MW* xxxv (1961), pp. 141–46 (Reprinted in Q).

70. "The Three Doors to Deliverance." *MW* xxxvi (1961), 10–16 (Reprinted in Q).

71. "The Wishless Bliss (of Nirvana)." *MW* xxxvi (1961), 105–112 (Reprinted in Q).

72. "Dharma and Dharmas." *MW* xxxvi (1962), 142–46 (Reprinted in Q).

73. "Dharmas and the Self." *MW* xxxvii 1962, 186–191 (Reprinted in Q).

74. "The Mahayana Treatment of the *Viparyasa*." *Orientemus*, IK 1, (1962). 34–46 (pp. 35–46 reprinted, with minor alterations, in Q).

75. "The Stature of a Tathagata." *MW* xxxvii (1962). 95–6 (Reprinted in S).

76. "The Accumulation of Precious Qualities." *Indo-Asian Studies*, Part 1, ed. Raghu Vira (1962), pp. 126–178.

77. "Once More About the Thundercloud." *MW* xxxvii (1963), pp. 157–

60. (Reprinted in S).
78. "The Perfection of Wisdom in Seven Hundred Lines." *Kalpa* I 2 (1963), 4–10, *Kalpa* I 3 (1963), 11–20 (Reprinted in S).
79. "The Triple Vehicle." *MW* xxxviii (1963), 15–17 (Reprinted in S).
80. "Once More About the Triple Vehicle." *MW* xxxviii (1963), 49–51 (75, 77, 79 and 80 translate ch. 5 of *Saddharmapuṇḍarīka*) (Reprinted in S).
81. "Buddhist Saviours." In *The Saviour God*, ed. by S.G.F. Brandon. Manchester University Press, 1963, pp. 67–82 (Reprinted in S).
82. "Buddhist Philosophy and its European Parallels." *Philosophy East and West*, xiii 1 (1963), 9–23 (Reprinted in S).
83. "Spurious Parallels to Buddhist Philosophy." *Philosophy East and West,* xiii 2 (1963), 105–115 (Reprinted in S).
84. "(The present state and future prospects of) Buddhism." In *Asia, A Handbook to the Continent*, ed. G. Wint, 1965, pp. 528–532. Reprinted in Asia Handbook, 1969 (Penguin Reference Books), pp. 383–88.
85. "Jataka." *Encyclopedia Britannica*, xii 969.
86. "The Way of Wisdom/The Five Faculties." *The Wheel* Publication No. 65/66. Kandy, 1964. (Reprint, with additions, of no. 18, 19, 21)
87. "The Buddha's *lakṣaṇas* in the *Prajñāpāramitā*." *Journal of the Oriental Institute* (Baroda), xiv (1965), 225–29.
88. "The *Adhyardhasatikā Prajñāpāramitā*, translated." *Studies of Esoteric Buddhism and Tantrism*, edited by Koyasan University, 1965, 101–115.
89. "Buddhism and Gnosis." In *Le origini dello gnosticismo. The Origins of Gnosticism.* (Studies in the History of Religions, Supplements to '*Numen*', xii, 1967, pp. 651–667.
90. " 'Maitreya's Questions' in the *Prajñāpāramitā*." *Mélanges d'Indianisme a la mémoire de Louis Renou*, 1968, pp. 229–242.
91. "Dharma as a Spiritual, Social and Cosmic Force." In *The Concept of Order*, ed.
92. Introduction to *On Indian Mahayana Buddhism*, by D.T.Suzuki, pp. 1–29, Harper & Row, 1968.
93. "The Lotus of the Good Law." Chapter 1 (vv.1–55). *MW* xlix 2 (1974), 61–66.
94. "Praśastrasena's *Ārya-Prajñāpāramitā-Hṛidya-Tīka*." *Buddhist Studies in Honour of I.B.Horner* (1974), 51–61.
95. "The Intermediary World." *The Eastern Buddhist*, N.S.vii 2, (1974) pp. 22–31.
96. "List of Buddhist Terms." *The Tibet Journal*, I 1 (1975), 36–62.
97. "Buddhist Prajñā and Greek Sophia." *Religion*, v (1975), 160–167.
98. "Some more comments on the Diamond Sutra". *Vajra* 3 (1976) pp. 3–12

REVIEWS

a. W. Ruben, ***Indisches Mittelalter; Die Philosophen der Upanishaden.*** *OA* i 3 (1948), pp. 148–49.

b. S. Ringgren, ***Word and Wisdom.*** *OA* i 4 (1948), pp. 196–97 (Reprinted in S).

c. S. Akhilananda, ***Hindu Psychology.*** *OA* ii 1 (1949), pp. 40–1.

d. E. Lamotte, ***Le traité de la grande vertu de sagesse de Nagarjuna.*** *OA* ii 4 (1950), pp. 167–8.

e. M-Th. de Mallmann, ***Introduction à l'étude d'Avalokiteśvara.*** *OA* iii 1 (1950), pp. 41–3.

f. H. Zimmer, ***Philosophies of India.*** *MW* xxvii 3 (1952), pp. 108–9.

g. H. de Lubac, ***Le recontre du Buddhisme et de l'Occident.*** *MW* xxvii 4 (1952), p. 152.

h. H. Harrer, ***Seven Years in Tibet.*** *MW* xxviii 3 (1953), p. 122.

i. ***Upanishads.*** Radhakrishnan, etc., ed. tr. *MW* xxviii 4 (1954), p. 166.

k. Ceadel, ***Literatures of the East.*** *MW* xxviii 4 (1954), p. 167.

l. P. L. Landsberg. ***The Experience of Death.*** *The Aryan Path* (1954), pp. 83–4.

m. W. Liebenthal, ***The Sermon of Shen-hui.*** *MW* xxix 1 (1954), p. 45.

n. W. Y. Evans-Wentz, ***The Tibetan Book of the Great Liberation.*** *MW* xxix 1 (1954), p. 46.

o. S. Hummel "Three Books on Tibetan Art." *OLZ* (1954), 3/4. pp. 167–9.

p. K. Reichelt, ***The Transformed Abbot.*** *MW* xxix 3 (1954), p. 142.

q. L. P. Elwell-Sutton, ***Persian Proverbs.*** *MW* xxix 4 (1955), p. 179.

r. R. Robinson, ***Chinese Buddhist Verse.*** *MW* xxix 4 (1955), pp. 180–1.

s. L. Bryson, ***Symbols and Values.*** *MW* xxix 4 (1955), p. 182.

t. S. Hummel, ***Geschichte der tibetischen Kunst.*** *OLZ* (1955), 3/4, pp. 175–7.

u. Runes, ***Treasury of Philosophy—Spirit and Nature.*** *MW* xxx 1 (1955), p. 38.

v. A. Waley, ***The Nine Songs.*** *The Aryan Path* (1955), p. 320.

w. D. T. Suzuki, ***Studies in Zen.*** *The Aryan Path.* (1955), pp. 321–2.

x. A. K. Gordon, ***Tibetan Religious Art.*** M. Lobsiger-Dellenbach, Nepal. O. Monod-Bruhl, ***Peintures Tibetaines.*** Tsung-lien Shen, ***Tibet and the Tibetans.*** OA, N. S. i 2 (1955) pp. 91–2.

y. "Some recent books." *MW* xxx 2 (1955), pp. 84–6.

z. J. LeRoy Davidson, ***The Lotus Sutra in Chinese Art,*** *MW* xxx 3 (1955) pp. 125–6.

za. Chou Hsiang-Kuang, ***Indo-Chinese Relations.*** *MW* xxx 3 (1955), p. 126.

zb. W. Heissig, ***Mongolische Blockdrucke,*** *AM.* N.S. 5 (1956), p. 115.
zc. T.R.V. Murti, ***The Central Philosophy of Buddhism***, *Luzac's Oriental List.* lxvi 4 (1955), pp. 61–2.
zd. "(3) Books on Indian Art." *MW* xxx 4 (1956), pp. 176–8.
ze. H. P. Shastri, ***Scientist and Mahatma.*** *MW* xxi (1956), pp. 58–9.
zf. E. Sarkisyanz, ***Russland und der Messianismus des Orients.*** *MW* xxxi 1 (1956), p. 61.
zg. "Philosophy East and West." P.G. Kuntz, *MW* xxxi (1956), p. 62.
zh. Anil de Silva-Vigier, ***The Life of the Buddha.*** *OA* ii 1 (1956), pp. 36–7.
zi. R. A. Stein, ***L'épopée tibétaine de Gesar.*** *OA* ii 2 (1956), pp. 74–5.
zk. T.R.V. Murti, ***The Central Philosophy of Buddhism.*** *JRAS* (1956), pp. 115–6.
zl. A. Bareau, ***Les sectes bouddhiques,*** etc. *JRAS* (1956), pp. 116–7.
am. ***Jungian Psychology and the Dharma.*** *MW* xxxi 2 (1956), pp. 95–6.
zn. R. de Nebesky-Wojkowitz, ***Oracles and Demons of Tibet.*** *MW* xxxi 2 (1956), pp. 102–3.
zo. R. de Nebesky-Wojkowitz, ***Oracles,*** etc. *HJ* lv (1956). pp. 95–6.
zp. "Buddhism and Jodo Shinshu." *MW* xxxi 3 (1956), pp. 135–6.
zq. T. Lobsang Rampa, ***The Third Eye*** *MW* xxxi (1957), pp. 182–4.
zr. G. Tucci, ***Minor Buddhist Texts I.*** *MW* xxxi (1957), p. 184.
zs. The Travels of Fa-hsien. *MW* xxxi (1957), p. 184.
zt. Morgan, ***The Path of Buddha***; Hilliard, ***The Buddha, the Prophet and the Christ,*** *HJ* lv (1957), pp. 312–4.
zu. ***A Buddhist Bible***, ed. Goddard, *MG* 26.4.57.
zv. R. Collin, ***The Theory of Eternal Life.*** *MW* xxxii (1957), pp. 36–7.
zw. S. Radhakrishnan, ***The Recovery of Faith.*** *MW* xxxii (1957), p. 38.
zz. R.deNebesky-Wojkowitz, ***Oracles and Demons of Tibet.*** *OA* N.S. III 2 (1957), pp. 75–6.
zaa. Morgan, ***The Path of the Buddha.*** *OA* N.S. iii 2 (1957), p. 76.
zab. P. Levy, ***Buddhism: a "Mystery Religion"?*** *HJ* lv (1957), pp. 420–2.
zac. A. Govinda, ***Grundlagen tibetischer Mystik.*** *MW* xxxii (1957), p. 81.
zad. "Problems of Buddhist History" (Sangharakshita, ***A Survey of Buddhism***). *The Aryan Path*, (July 1957), pp. 318–21.
zae. G. Tucci, ***Minor Buddhist Texts I.*** *AM* N.S. vi 1 (1957), pp. 122–23.
zaf. F. R. Bischoff, ***Ārya Mahābala-nāma-Mahāyānasūtra*** *AM* vi 1 (1957), pp. 128–29.
zag. D. Seckel, ***Buddhistische Kunst Ostasiens.*** *OA* iii 3 (1957), pp. 113–14.
zah. Bareau, ***Les premiers conciles bouddhiques.*** *JRAS* (1957), pp. 273–74.
zai. D. L. Snellgrove, ***Buddhist Himalaya,*** *MG* 17.1.1958.
zak. J. M. Clark, Meister Eckhart. *MW* xxxii (1958), pp. 160, 162.
zal. D. L. Snellgrove, ***Buddhist Himalaya.*** *MW* xxxii (1958), pp. 162–63.
zam. "Buddhism and the West" (four books). *MG* 21.2.1958.

zan. D. T. Suzuki, ***Mysticism, Christian and Buddhist.*** *The Aryan Path,* (1958), p. 180.

zaq. G. Tucci, ***To Lhasa and Beyond***; Snellgrove, ***Buddhist Himalaya.*** *OA* iv 1 (1958), p. 35.

zar. A. David-Neel, ***The Secret Oral Teachings.*** *Luzac's Or. List* lxix 3, p. 45.

zas. Sis and Vanis, ***Tibetan Art.*** *OA* iv 3 (1958), p. 122.

zat. W. Y. Evans-Wentz, ***Milarepa.*** *MW* xxxiii (1958), pp. 119–20.

zau. ***Suvikrāntavikrāmīparipṛcchā***, ed. T. Matsumoto. *Indo-Iranian Journal* ii (1958), pp. 316–18.

zav. R. Linssen, ***Living Zen.*** *Luzac's Or. List* lxix (1958), p. 69.

zaw. H. V. Guenther, ***Philosophy and Psychology in the Abhidharma.*** *MW* xxxiii (1959), pp. 163–64.

zay. Meister Eckhart, J. M. Clark and J. V. Skinner. *MW* xxxiii (1959), p. 167.

zaz. B. Bhattacharya, ***The Indian Buddhist Iconography.*** *OA* v 1 (1959), p. 31.

zba. Bahm, ***Philosophy of the Buddha***; M. Eliade, ***Yoga.*** *HJ* lvii (1959), pp. 295–96.

zbb. Meisezahl, ***Die tibetischen Handschriften.*** *OLZ* liv (1959), Nr. 3/4, pp. 202–04.

zbc. ***The Cultural Heritage of India.*** *HJ* lvii (1959), pp. 410–11.

zbd. G. Tucci, ***Minor Buddhist Texts II***; J. Blofeld, ***The Wheel of Life;*** D. T. Suzuki, ***Zen and Japanese Culture.*** *Luzac's Or. List* lxx, (1959), pp. 53–56.

zbe. E. O. James, ***The Cult of the Mother Goddess***; A. K. Gordon, ***The Iconography of Tibetan Lamaism.*** *HJ* lviii (1959), pp. 94–96.

zbf. ***Suvikrāntavikrāmīparipṛcchā,*** ed. R. Hikata. *IIJ* iii (1959), pp. 232–34.

zbg. Sgam-po-pa, ***The Jewel Ornament of Liberation.*** H. V. Guenther, tr. *MW* xxxiv (1959), pp. 133–34.

zbh. A. Csoma-Koros; Lamotte, ***Histoire***; Symonds, Blavatsky. *MW* xxxiv (1959), pp. 135–36, 138, 139.

zbi. A. K. Gordon, ***Iconography of Tibetan Lamaism.*** *OA* v 3 (1959), pp. 123–24.

zbk. B. Gray and J. B. Vincent, ***Buddhist Cave Paintings at Tun Huang.*** *OA* v 3 (1959), pp. 126–27.

zbl. W. Rahula, ***What the Buddha Taught.*** *Luzac's Oriental List,* lxx 4, (1959), p. 82.

zbm. G. Tucci, ***Minor Buddhist Texts II***; A. Ferrari, ***Mkhyen Brtse's Guide.*** *Asia Major* vii 1–2 (1959), pp. 230–1.

zbn. “The Orthodoxy of Chinese Buddhism.” Review: E. Züercher, ***The Buddhist Conquest of China.*** *MW* xxxiv 4 (1960), pp. 173–6.

zbo. E. Zürcher, ***The Buddhist Conquest of China.*** *Luzac's Oriental List*, lxxi (1960), pp. 4–5.

zbp. A. F. Wright, ***Buddhism in Chinese History***. *HJ* lviii (1960), pp. 317–18.

zbq. Ch. Luk, ***Ch'an and Zen Teaching. Series One.*** *MW* xxxv 1 (1960), pp. 32–33.

zbr. J. Blofeld, ***The Wheel of Life.*** *JRAS* (1960), p. 100.

zbs. ***Ratnakīrtinibandhavālī.*** *JRAS* (1960), pp. 100–01.

zbt. Ch. Luk, ***Ch'an and Zen Teaching, First Series***. *Luzac's Oriental List* lxxi 2 (1960), p. 26.

zbu. Ch. Luk, ***Ch'an and Zen Teaching, First Series.*** *HJ* lviii (1960), pp. 411–12.

zbv. F.D.K. Bosch, ***The Golden Germ***. *OA* 3 (1960), pp. 114–15.

zbw. E. Dale Saunders, ***Mudrā.*** *OA* vi 3 (1960), pp. 115–6.

zbx. D. L. Snellgrove, ***The Hevajra Tantra.*** *BSOAS* xxiii 3 (1960), pp. 604–06.

zby. “Buddhism and the West” (5 reviews). *MG* 4.11.60, p. 7.

zbz. “Dr. Koestler and the Wisdom of the East.” *HJ* lix, (1961), pp. 178–181.

zca. M. Pallis, ***The Way and the Mountain***; A Govinda, ***Foundations of Tibetan Mysticism.*** *HJ* lix (1961), pp. 202–4.

zcb. D. Seckel, ***Einführung in die Kunst Ostasiens***; F. Sierksma, ***The Gods As We Shape Them.*** *OA* vii (1961), pp. 41–2.

zcc. N. Smart, ***A Dialogue of Religions.*** *HJ* lix (1961), pp. 301–02.

zcd. Govinda, ***The Psychological Attitude of Early Buddhist Philosophy***; S. Dutt, ***Early Buddhist Monachism.*** *HJ* lix (1961), pp. 376–77.

zce. Govinda, ***The Psychological Attitude of Early Buddhist Philosophy.*** *Luzac's Oriental List* lxxii (1961), p. 23.

zcf. R. Thapar, ***Asoka and the Decline of the Mauryas***. *MW* xxxvi (1961), p. 134.

zcg. Ch. Luk, ***Ch'an and Zen Teaching. Second Series.*** *MW* xxxvi (1961), pp. 136–7.

zch. ***The Pramānavārttikam of Dharmakīrti*** R. Gnoli ed. *JRAS* (1961), p. 144.

zci. G. Tucci, ***The Theory and Practice of the Mandala,*** *OA* vii 5 (1961), pp. 197–98.

zck. D. Snellgrove, ***Himalayan Pilgrimage.*** *OA* vii 4 (1961), pp. 198–99.

zcl. ***Anthology of Zen***. ed. W. Briggs, *Luzac's Oriental List* lxxii LXXII (1961), p. 62.

zcm. G. Tucci, ***The Theory and Practice of the Mandala.*** *Luzac's Oriental List* lxxii (1961), pp. 62–63.

zcn. ***Abhidharmadīpa.*** P. S. Jaini, ed. *MW* xxxvii (1962), p. 226.

zco. Wen Fong, ***The Lohans and a Bridge to Heaven.*** *OA* viii 2 (1962), p. 94.

zcp. S. Tachibana, ***The Ethics of Buddhism***; Nyanaponika, ***The Heart of Buddhist Meditation***; A. W. Watts, ***The Way of Zen***; Ch. Luk, ***Ch'an and Zen Teaching. Third Series***; ***The Bhagavad Gīta,*** J. Mascaro, trsl. *Luzac's Oriental List*, lxxiii (1962), pp. 26–8.

zcq. J. Blofeld, ***The Zen Teaching of Hui Hai;*** D. Maurice, ***The Lion's Roar.*** *Luzac's Or. List* lxxiii (1962), pp. 46–7.

zcr. ***Abhidharmadīpa,*** P. S. Jaini, ed. *JRAS* (1962), p. 161.

zcs. ***Jñānaśrīmitranibandhāvali***, A. Thakur, ed. *JRAS* (1962), p. 162.

zct. G. Tucci, ***The Theory and Practice of the Mandala.*** *JRAS* (1962), pp. 162–3.

zcu. A Wayman, ***Analysis of the Srāvakabhūmi Ms.*** *JRAS* (1962), p. 163.

zcv. A. Dahlquist, ***Megasthenes and Indian Religion***; T. O. Ling, ***Buddhism and the Mythology of Evil***; G. Tucci, ***The Discovery of the Malla.*** *Luzac's Or. List*, lxxiv (1963), pp. 3–4.

zcw. ***The Hundred Thousand Songs of Milarepa.*** C. C. Chang, trsl. *MW* xxxviii (1963), pp. 39–41.

zcx. J. Ph. Vogel, ***The Goose in Indian Literature and Art.*** *OA* N.S. ix (1963), p. 107.

zcy. E. Lamotte, ***L'enseignement de Vimalakīrti.*** B. Phillips, ed. ***The Essentials of Zen Buddhism***; S. Dutt, ***Buddhist Monks and Monasteries in India.*** *Luzac's Or. List* lxxiv (1963), pp. 22–3.

zcz. A. Macdonald, ***Le Mandala du Mañjuśrīmūlakalpa***, *BSOAS* xxvi, (1963), pp. 440–1.

zda. ***Rgyan-drug mchog-gnyis.*** *JRAS* (1963), p. 294.

zdb. ***Buddhism.Studia Missionalia XII.*** *MW* xxxviii (1963), pp. 128–9.

zdc. A. Wayman, ***Analysis of the Srāvakabhūmi Manuscript; The Yogācārabhūmi, Part I,*** ed. V. Bhattacharya. *IIJ* vii (1964), pp. 226–31.

zdd. D. Schlingloff, ***Die Religion des Buddhismus, I.*** *IIJ* vii (1964), pp. 231–2.

zde. H. V. Guenther, ***The Life and Teaching of Naropa.*** *JRAS* (1964), pp. 123–4.

zdf. ***Vimuktimārga Dhutaguna-nirdeśa.*** P. V. Bapat, ed. tr. *MW* xxxix 4 (1965), p. 190.

zdg. T. Vimalananda, ***Buddhism in Ceylon.*** *Luzac's Or. List* lxxvi, p. 3.

zdh. K. S. Ch'en ***Buddhism in China.*** *MW* xl 2 (1965), pp. 94–5.

zdi. A. Foucher, ***The Life of the Buddha***, trsl. S. B. Boas. *JAOS* 84 (1964), pp. 460–1.

zdk. S. Kramrisch, ***The Art of Nepal.*** *OA* xi (1965), p. 177.

zdl. F. Fourcade, ***Peinture Murale de Touen Houang.*** *OA* xi (1965), p. 177.

zdm. R. B. Ekvall, ***Religious Observances in Tibet.*** *JRAS* (1965), p. 133.

zdn. Bhiksu Thich Minh Chau, ***The Chinese Madhyama Āgama and the Pāli Majjhima Nikāya.*** *MW* xl 3 (1965), pp. 140–1.

zdo. D. Schlingloff, ***Die Religion des Buddhismus, II.*** *IIJ* ix 2 (1966), p. 159. cf. no. zdd.

zdp. D. Schlingloff, ***Dogmatische Begriffsreihen***; Tripathi, ***25 Sūtras.*** *JAOS* 85 (1965), pp. 463–4.

zdq. ***Vimukti-mārga Dhutagunanirdeśa*** P. V. Bapat, ed.tr. *Luzac's Or. List.*

zdr. F. Weller, ***Zum Kāśyapaparivarta.*** *IIJ* x 4 (1968), pp. 302–5.

zds. Dh. N. Shastri, ***Critique of Indian Realism.*** *JAOS* 87, (1967), p. 337.

zdt. "Books on Buddhism." *Pacific Affairs* xl, 1967, pp. 170–2.

zdu. R. H. Robinson, ***Early Madhyamika in India and China.*** *BSOAS.*

zdv. Y. Karunadasa, ***Buddhist Analysis of Matter.*** *BSOAS.*

zdw. Th. Merton, ***The Zen Revival.*** *MW* xlvi (1971), p. 92.

zdx. ***The Arthaviniścaya-Sūtra,*** H. Samtani, ed. *JRAS* (1974) p. 76.

zdy. Y. Takeuchi, "Probleme der Versenkung im Ur-Buddhismus," 1972. *JRAS* (1974), p. 78.

zea. T. Ling, ***The Buddha,*** *Journal of Chinese Philosophy,* 2 (1974), pp. 87–94.

zeb. ***The Threefold Lotus Sutra.*** *Codex Shambhala,* iv 3 (1975), pp. 6–7.

MISCELLANEOUS

ma. "The New Buddhist Encyclopedia." *MG* (July 1955?)

mb. Foreword to ***Mystic Art of Tibet.*** Berkeley Galleries Exhibition, April 1956.

md. Foreword to ***Jataka Tales***, by E. Beswick, May 1956.

me. "Buddhist Literature Outside India." Broadcast for All-India Radio. (5/18/56 and 6/2/56)

mf. "Saluting the Supernatural." BBC.22.9. 1956.

mg. "The Circle of Becoming." *MW* xxxi (1957), pp. 145–6.

mh. Foreword to ***A Study of Abhidharma Philosophy,*** by G. H. Sasaki, Tokyo: 1958, pp. v-vi·

mi. "The *Yogācārin* Treatment of *Prajñāpāramitā* Texts" in. ***Proceedings of the 23rd Congress of Orientalists***, ed. D. Sinor, pp. 230–1. Cambridge, 1954.

mk. "Buddhist Teachings by Buddhist Stories." Australian Broadcasting Commission. October 1959.

ml. Prefatory Note to ***The Flower-Spray of the Quodam-modo Doctrine*** by F. W. Thomas, 1960, p. 3.

mm. "Examination Questions: Indian Philosophy." MS., 1960.

mn. "Buddhism in the Soviet Union: *MW* xxxv 3 (1960), pp. 113–4.

mo. "Examination Questions: Indian Buddhism." MS., 1961.

mp. "Abhisamayālaṅkāra (1)", ***Encyclopedia of Buddhism***, (1961), pp. 114–6.

mq. Letter to ***Observer***, 10.9.61

mr. "Nachwort zur dritten Auflage" (***Der Buddhismus***), p. 216. Sept. 1962.

ms. Examination Questions. Indian Buddhism.

mt. Introductory Note to ***Tibetan Literary Texts and Documents Concerning Chinese Turkestan, Part IV: Indices***, selected and edited by F. W. Thomas, London: Luzac & Co. for the Royal Asiatic Society, 1963.

mu. "The Buddha's Recipe for Mental Peace." ***Faith and Freedom*** 17 (1963), no. 49, pp. 41–44.

mv. Preface to: ***A Thousand Lives Away*** by W. L. King, 1964, pp. 5–6.

mw. "D. T. Suzuki,—a personal tribute." ***The Eastern Buddhist***. NS II 1 (1967), pp. 84–85.

mx. "Tibetan Art." Oxford, 1968.

my. "La doctrine de la vacuité d'apres la Prajñāpāramitā." ***Hermes*** 6, Le Vide, 1969, pp. 204–209, = E pp. 19–24.

mz. "The Legend of the Buddha Shakyamuni." Noted by the International Buddhist Association. Shinozaki Shorin, Tokyo (1967?), iii + 71 pp. = I pp. 35–66.

SOME NON-BUDDHIST PUBLICATIONS

o1 ***Der Begriff der Metaphysik bei Franciscus Suarez, S. J.*** Leipzig: 1928. v, 72 pp. F. Meiner. ***Forschungen zur Geschichte der Philosophie und der Paedagogik***, Bd.3,H.3.

o2 DER SATZ VOM WIDERSPRUCH. Hamburg: 1932.

o3 "Social Implications of Logical Thinking." ***Proceedings of the Aristotelean Society***. xxxv 1934–35, pp. 23–44.

o4. "The Objective Validity of the Principle of Contradiction." *Philosophy*, (1935), pp. 205–18.

o5. THE SCIENTIFIC METHOD OF THINKING, 1935.

o6. AN INTRODUCTION TO DIALECTICAL MATERIALISM, 1936.

o7. SPAIN TO-DAY, 1936.

o8. "Social origins of Nominalism." *Marxist Quarterly* (1937), pp. 115–124, 431–436.

INDEX

Abhayagirivāsa 361
Abhayākaragupta 283
—Theory of gotra 286
Abhidharma
—Mahāyāna 6
—teachings 403
—Pali A° 409
Abhidharmakośa 144, 403
—°***bhāsya*** 404
Abhijñā 259
Abhimukhā
—°*bhūmi* 157
Abhinirhāra
—full application 256
Ābhiprāyika
—intentional 292, 295
Abhisamaya
—encounter 245
—eight a° 295, 299
Abhisamayālaṃkārakārikāprajñā-pāramitopadeśaśāstraṭikā 284
Abhisamayālaṃkārāloka 98
Abhisamayālaṃkārāvṛtti 317
Abhisaṃdhi
—oblique expressions 292
Abhisaṃskṛta 289
Abhiṣeka
—consecrated (besprinkled) 158
Abhūtaparikalpa 154, 157, 350
Acalā
—°*vidyārāja* 124
—°*bhūmi* 157, 292
Acitta
—°*tva*, no-mindedness 352
Adarśajñāna 159, 179
Ādesanā, mind-reading 221
Ādhāra
—ground 299
—°*ādheyabhāva*, support and supported 294
Adheya
—supported (see *ādhāra*) 300
Ādheyadharma 301
—differentiation of the supported factors 294
Adhigama
—different comprehensions 293
—six° dharmas, factors of comprehension 299, 306
—self-realization 315
Adhimukti, convinced adhesion 290
Adhiṣṭhāna
—blessing 25
—masteries 253, 255
—might
—sustaining power 16, 266
Adhyardhaśatikāprajñāpāramitā, 285
Adhyāśaya
—*Pāramitā* 158
Ādīnava
—disadvantages 291
Advaya, non-dual 298
Āgamas 348
Āgantukamala
—adventitious impurities 293
Āgas 299
Agha
—bad/evil 299
Agni 371
Agotra
—non-gotra 291
Ahi Budhnya 378
Aisatsu 357
Ajānaka
—ignorant 11
Ākāśa 155
—*maṇḍala* 159
Akṣobhya 20, 33
Ālambana
—object 294
Ālaya 321
Ālayavijñāna 155, 342
Alīkākāravāda see *vijñānavada*
All-knowledge 180, 249, 263

Amalā
—completely pure 403
Amitābha Buddha 336
Amitāyurdhyānasūtra 330, 334, 338
Amitāyus Buddha 331
Amoghavajra 108
Amṛta
—*tvāsyesāno*, Lord of immortality 376
Ānanda 95, 398
Aṅguttaranikaya 140
Animitta 120
—°*lakṣaṇa* 154, 155
Aniyata
—uncertain 315
—undetermined 240
Anubhāva
—grace
—might 15
—einfluss 44
Anumāna
—valid inference 307
Anumodana
—rejoicing 7
Anuradhapura 365
Anuśaṃsā (see *ādīnava*)
—advantages 7, 19, 26, 34, 291
Anusāsanī
—marvel of instruction 221
Anuśaya 408, 409, 410
—six a° 405
Anusmṛti
—contemplative technique 337
Anutpādajñāna 408, 410
Anutpathkadharmakṣānti 326
Anuttara mantra 160
Apavāda
—depreciation (see *samāropa*)
Apāya 154
Apraṇihita 155
Apratiṣṭhita 155, 157
Arapacana
—alphabet 33
Arcaṭa (see *Dharmākara*)
Arciṣmaṭā
—°bhūmi 157
Arhats 15, 407, 410
—as plants 10
—gotra 290
—level of 318
Arjuna 334, 335
Artha
—property 350
Ārya
—°citta, Noble thought 8
—°dharmas 293, 299
—°gotra, Noble ones 318
—°marga 157, 175
—saint 299
—°śrāvaka 291
Āryadeva 139, 144, 366
Asaktatāyām
—non-attachment 294
Asallakṣaṇa (see animitta)
Asaṃsarga
—dissociated 315
Asaṃskṛta
—unconditioned 301
Asaṅga 85, 136, 141, 142, 144
—lakṣaṇa 195
Aṣṭasāhasrikāprajñāpāramitā 3, 6, 7, 14–17, 20, 21, 24–26, 28–34, 35, 97, 98, 204, 277, 284
Ātma
—°gotra 299
—self 292
Atoms 181
Āttamanāh 95, 97
Aṭṭhasālinī 409
Aurṇavābha
—spider demon 379
Avadāna 6
—°*nikas* 16
—°*śataka* 94
Avalokitasūtra 13, 14
Avalokiteśvara 33, 120, 123, 128, 129, 140, 149, 163
—°Bodhisattva 121
Āvaraṇa 256
—*kleśa*° and *jñeya*° 298
Avastu
—° *dharmas*
Avataṃsaka
—°*sūtra* 339

—Tradition 223, 243
Āveṇika
—*dharmas* 27
Avidyā
—ignorance 299, 403–05
Avivartiya
—irreversible 14
Awakening 301
Āyatanas
—Six a° 171

Bagchi, s. 23
Bhāyabuddhakṣetra 315
Bailey, H.W. 83, 85, 89, 163, 166
Balapāramitā 158
Bāla
—childish 295
—uniniated 324
Bandhuprabhā 355
Bareau, A. 306
Baroda ms. 204
Bechert, H. 368
Bendall, 187
Benveniste, E. 378
Bhagavadgītā 333–40, 401
Bhaiṣajyarāja 4, 22
Bhājana
—recipient 290
Bhājata, one who does *bhakti*
Bhakti 333–37
Bhalluka (see *Vallika*)
Bhaṭṭāraka 291
Bhavāgra
—'summit of existence' 141, 145
Bhāvanā
—*marga* 292
—realization 295, 298
Bhāvanākrama
—of Kamalaśīla 264
Bhāvanāmārga 157, 165, 176, 292, 403, 408
Bhāvaviveka 187, 342, 343–46, 355
Bhikṣu
—good/lax 13
Bhrānti
—error 318
Bhūmi 156
—Arhat, Pratyeka, Buddha° 14
—Bodhisattva career 275
—5th/6th 314
—10th 227
Bhūṭakoti 16, 119, 290
Bīja
—"germ"/"capacity" 291
Birds 226
Blacker, C. 125–26
Bodhi 157, 292, 294, 296, 301
—°*maṇḍa* 121, 160
—*citta* 52, 154
—22 °*cittotpādas* 299
Bodhiruci 96, 99
Bodhisattva
—ability 255
—and Tathāgatahood 264
—as trees 10
—*caryā* 167, 228, 263
—defined 18
—first birth stage 248
—*gotra* 293
—in Aṣṭa 263
—irreversable 151, 263, 267, 273, 280
—Jizo 124
—lay 19
—non-Bodhisattva states 269
—path 139, 144, 364
—Prince of Dharma 254
—*samādhis* of 254
—saviour 274
—śrāvaka, compared with 8
—standing in the sky 13
—*tāyin* 226
—13-fold 292
—*yāna* 12, 321
Bodhisattvabhūmi 259, 267
Bodies also see *kāya*
—illusory b° 230
—*Dharma* b° 179, 234
—form b° 245
—apparitional b° 247
Book of Zambasta 318, 319
Brahmā
—Palace of 241
Brahman 399

Brahmasūtra 335
Brough, J. 93–94
Brown, W. N. 378
Bstan 'gyur 284
Buddha
—*anusmṛti* of the B° 336
—attributes 27
—Billions of B° 330
—°*dharmas* 34
—18 qualities of 326
—eye 180, 266
—°*garbha* 296
—*gotra* 153, 294
—Kassapa B° 326
—lamp bearing 160, 181
—lands (*kṣetra*) 33, 106, 160, 223, 228, 255, 270, 280, 315, 329–30
—*mudra* 160
—°*nirmāṇa* 255
—*pūja* 18, 265
—°'s illness 320
—°*skandha* 170
—°tā 228
—°*yāna* 12, 321
—°*putra* 28
Buddhaghosa 94, 363
Buddhāpadāna 364
Buddhism
—Nepalese 23
Butterfly 294

Caitasika
—twenty five 406
Caitya 23, 302
Caland 374, 379
Cambridge manuscripts 187
Canada Council 337
Candrakīrti 139, 187
Candraprabhāsvararāja 330
Candrapradīpasūtra (Samādhirāja C°) 285
Caramabhavika
—final-existence 292
Catuhśataka 139
Central Asia 312
—fragments

Ceylon 361
Ch'an *also see* Zen 258
—masters 357
Chanda
—wish 299
Chao, Ch'i 118
Charm 275
Chavannes, E. 117
Ch'en, K. 24
Chih Ch'ien 36, 336
China 336
Chinese Translations
Chou, Yi-liang 121
Chu Hsi 116
Citta 389
—*avaraṇa* 147
—°*mātravāda* (see *vijñānavāda*)
—*saṃtāna*, conscious series 296
—luminosity of 296
Cittopāda 289
—22 *Bodhi*° 299
Cloud of Dharma 250
Cobra 375
Cone Tanjur
—*śes phyin* 86
Confucian Tradition 115
Conversion 296
Conze, Edward, 6, 7, 16, 19–21, 25, 32, 33, 35–37, 73, 75, 84, 95, 96, 103, 104, 114, 119, 130, 131, 151, 153, 166, 187, 192, 193, 195, 196, 199, 203, 214, 215
Coomaraswamy, A.K. 380
Cowell 93
Cows 371
Creator 373

Daitya 372
Dānapāramitā 158
Darkness 380
Darśanamārga 157, 176, 292, 404, 407–08
Dośabhūmi
Daśabhūmika
—°***sūtra*** 331, 340
—°*bodhisattva* 160

Daśadharmakasūtra 290
Daśāṅgulam
—face of God 380
de Jong, J.W. 325
Death 374
Demiéville, P. 332, 337
Derge 136
Devadatta 4
Dge lugs pas 311
Dgoṅs gźi
—intended foundation 295
Dgyes śiṅ 97
Dhammadhātu 364–65
Dhammarāja 375
Dhammasaṅgaṇi 414
Dhammasenāpati, (Sāriputta) 375
Dhāraṇī 4, 22, 130–32
—*Uṣṇīṣavijaya°* 114
Dharma 17
—°*dhātu* 225, 227, 290, 364–65
—°*dhātu* as "object" 286
—element 283
—Gateway 109
—*meghā* 157, 292
—*nairātmya* 287
—°*nirmāṇa* 255
—°*paryāya* 34
—preachers 279
—*śarīra* 234
Dharmākara
—Bodhisattva D° 284, 331, 340
—°(datta) (religious name for Arcaṭa) 304
Dharmakāya 16, 30, 139, 154, 157, 160, 164, 165, 167, 317, 321
—Dharma Body 234
Dharmakīrti
—Jayabāhu D° 364
Dharmameghābhūmi 292
Dharmamitra 283, 285, 304, 307
Dharmapāla 284
Dharmaparyāya 4, 5, 7, 22
Dharmapriya 36
Dharmarucika sect (see Abhayagirivāsa)
Dharmas
—as objects 294
—gateway to liberation 144
—incalculable 119
—inner & outer 272
—75 405
Dharmatā 300, 301
—Dharmahood 119
—°*rūpa*, dharmic nature of form 359
—Nature of all Dharmas 225
Dharmodgata 329
Dharmottara 284
Dhātu
—as a relic 288
—18 156, 172
—elemental natures 290
Dhyāna, 157, 336
—°*pāramitā* 158
—four 138
—meditation 146
—6 types 325
Dighanikāya 278
Dignāga 285, 307
Dīpaṃkaraśrijñāna 358
Divyāvadāna 6, 24
—*evam mayā śrutam* 93
Doxographers 285
Dran pa (see *smṛti*)
Dream, 387
—of Sadāprarudita 329
Dṛṣṭi
—62 409
—theory 297
Druma
—Trees 9
Duḥkha 128, 156, 160
Dundubhisvarāja 330
Dūraṃgamā bhūmi 157
Durita
—bad/evil 372
Dvaya 154, 158, 159
—duality

Eckhart, Meister 399
Edgerton, F. 77, 78, 203
Egyptians 377

Ekajātipratibaddha
—one more birth 292
—12th bhūmi 292
Ekarasa
—one value (all dharmas) 301
Ekayāna 283, 285, 313 ff.
Emmerick, R.E. 325
Emptiness
—18 168
Ensink 12
Epic 372
Etymology 291, 301
Evil
—problem of 265, 372, 378
Eyes
—five 160, 180
Fa-hsien 204
Feer, H.L. 103, 114
Feet 372–73, 376
Findlay, J.N. 401
Fire 290
Flower 338
Franke, O. 117
Frauwallner, E. 283, 343
Fudō Myō-ō 124
Fukōmyoji 123

Gaṇḍavyūhasūtra 223, 332
Gandhāra 221
Gandhavāti
—land of 329
Garbha
—womb of the arising of the Perfection 249 ff.
—womb of arising of Inclination, 250 ff.
Gate 130, 148
Geisan, H. von 379
Geldner 373
Giant 379
Gilgit
—SP 20, 24, 29
Girikaṇḍikacaitya 366
Glasenapp, von 401
Gnas (see *Nilaya*)
Gnoseology 283
Gnosis 238
—five 244–45
Gocara 228
God 399
Gombrich, R. 401
Gopā 227
Gospels 397
Gotra 164
—of the Buddha 167, 294, 315
—cut off 285
—*dharmadhātu* as its nature 291
—°*bhedataḥ* 321
—as motivating cause 306
—as psycho-spiritual categories 283
—realizes qualities of (*guṇottārana*) 291
—two 290
—variety of 283 ff.
—as *yāna* 314
Govinda, L.A. 22
Gṛdhrakuṭa
—Mt G° 337, 338
'Grel pa don gsal 284
Guṇabhadra 276
Guṇaprabha 304
Gunaratna 309
Guṇas
—virtuous qualities 28, 265
Gźi (see *ādhāra*)

Hahn, M. 391
Han dynasty 117
Hariba, G. 104, 114
Haribhadra 94, 98, 99
Heirinji 123
Hell 272
—dwellers 240
Heracles 373
Hermeneutic 291
Hero 329, 375–76
Hetu
—(motivating) cause 299
Hevajra 393
Hikata 36–38, 185–86, 273

Hinayāna
—Dogmatik 45
—orthodoxy 361
Hindu
—*bhakti* 337
—mythology 339
Hīnendriya 298
Hirabayashi, J. 357
Hirakawa, A. 32
Hiraṇyakaśipu 372
Hōben (see *upāyakauśalya*)
Hoernle, A.F.R. 83
Hormerti 380–81
Hṛdayasūtra 103, 106, 124, 135
—in the ***Catalpa Bow*** by Carmen Blacker 125
—"heart" 149
Hsüan-tsang 25, 107–08, 120, 128, 163, 187, 189, 346
Hua-yen 244
Hui-chung
—preface to the***Hṛdayasūtra*** 107
Hui-yüan
Huxley, A. 399

I Ching 86
Icchantikas 165, 315
Iconography 284
Iddhi (see *ṛddhi*)
Iida, S. 341, 344, 346, 357
Inaba, S. 358
Indikaṭusäya
—copper plaques 365
Indra 371
Indriya
—six 155
Initiation 397
Inscription
—Kuccaveli, Tiriyāy and Trikāyastava Rock° 366
—vijayārama copper plaques 365
Irreversible (see Bodhisattva)
Iśvara
—creator 298
Izumi H. 103, 114

Jacobi, H. 199
Jain
—ascetics 398
—°a concept of omniscience **392**
—literature, 342
Jaini, P.S. 357
Janmabhūmi 246
Jātaka 18, 24
Jetavanavāsa
—or sāgalika seat 361
Jettmar, K. 378
Jina 239
—sons of 14, 239
Jizo 124
Jñāna (knowledge) 407
—*ādarśana* 159
—*darśana* 141, 159
—gnosis 228, 297
Jñānagarbha 139
Jñānaprasthāna 115
Jñānaśrimitra 383
Jñeyāvaraṇa 298
Jones 14

Kajiyama, Y. 343
Kajiyoshi 37, 38
Kālacakrāvatara 284
Kalupahana, D.J. 363
Kalyāṇamitra 244, 260
Kāmaguṇa 156
Kamakura period 123
Kamalaśīla 286, 331
Kannon 123
—***sūtra*** 128
Kārikāsaptati 85–86
Karṇa 373
Karuṇā 157, 158
Karuṇāpuṇḍarīka 323
Kashmir 337
Kassapa Buddha 326
Kāśyapaparivarta 93, 365
Kathāvatthu 363
Kauśika 288
Kāya
—Buddha bodies 165, 224
—See *Dharma*°, *Nirmāṇa*,
—*Sāṃbhoga*,° *Tri*°

Khams (see *dhātu*)
Khotanese
—texts 153, 161
—***Vajracchedikā*** 83 ff.
Khuddakanikāya 364
Kikuchi, H. 357
Kino, K 126, 128, 130
Kitō (see *dhāranī*)
Kleśa
—°*āvarana* 298
—°*vasanā* 154, 314, 324
Konow, S. 83, 89
Kṛṣṇa 333–34, 401
Kṛtsnāyatana exercise 241
Kṛtyānuṣṭhāna jñāna 159, 179
Kṣānti
—constancy 291
—*pāramitā* 158
Kṣitigarbha 124
Kuang pai lun shih lun 349
Kuiper 373
Kūkai 124, 125, 130, 132, 135
Kulaputra 23
Kumārajīva 4, 12, 22, 23, 36, 103, 120, 128, 161, 166, 293, 337
Kumārila 386
Kuprajñā 404–07
Kuśala
—*dharmas* 155
—°*mūla* 16, 26, 265, 315
—°mūlotsarga—forsaken root of meritorious action 315
Kūṭāgāra *see* Maitreya—tower of
Kutch 236
Kuvidya 404

Lakṣaṇa
—Dharmamitra's interpretation 285
—three 285
Lamotte, E. 6, 25, 276, 322, 324
Lamp
—°bearing Buddha 160, 181
Lancaster, L. 16, 30, 35, 36, 55, 73, 75, 275, 329, 332
Laṅkāvatarasūtra 165, 313–14
Laukikā
—°*agradharmas* 157, 176
—outer worldly 321
Lefmann, S. 197
Leumann, E. 83
Lévi, S. 366
Lévy, P. 397
Lhasa 358
Li Yü 118
Liang dynasty 118
Lin Chi 222–24, 235, 244
—°*lu* 244, 258
Lineage 253
Liṅga
—(or *hetu*) 307
—inferential mark 290–91
—'logical reasons' 307
Lo-yang 108, 121
Lokadhātu 241, 256
Lokakṣema 35–36, 273, 276, 329
Lokeśvararāja
—Buddha L° 331
Lotus
—womb 258
Lumbinī 247

Madhyamakāloka 289
Madhyamakāvatāra 187
Mādhyamika 136, 341–42, 349
Madhyāntavibhāgakarika 355
Magic
—creations 254, 331
—production of Buddhas 255, 258
—skills 340
—and Tantra 258
—transformation 251, 255
Mahā-asakta 52
Mahābhārata 373
Mahābhūmika
—°*dharmas* 406
Mahābrahmā 151
Mahāmatrī 249
Mahāparinirvāṇa 303
Mahāpuruṣa 273

Mahāsaṃnaddha 70
Mahāvaṃsa 364
Mahāvastu 279
Mahāvihāra sect 362
Mahāvīra 375
Mahāyāna 136
—in Ceylon 361, 366
—early 332
—fundamental doctrines 228
—*gotra* 301
—Sthaviras 364
—suppression of 361
Mahāyānasaṃgraha 320–22
Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra 142, 146
Maitreya 339
—Arya M° 296
—Chapter 150, 285, 341
—°nātha 286
—Tower of 223, 236, 239, 241, 332
—°*vimokṣa* 224
—*in* ***Yogācārabhūmi*** 332
Majjhimanikāya 141, 278
Māna
—egocentrism 409
Manaḥ saṃskāras 145
Manas 389
Mandabuddhin
—lazy minded 324
Maṇḍala
—*ākāśa* m° 159
Mañjuśrī 6, 366
Mañjuśrīnairātmyāvatarasūtra 85
Mañjuvak (see Mañjuśrī)
Mantra 121, 130, 136, 180, 181
—incantation 148
—*anuttara m°* 160
—*mūla m°*
Māra 29
—army 160
Mārga see *bhāvanā°*, *darśana°*, *prayoga°* and *sambhāra°*
Marmakaumudī 284
Maruts 371
Matsumoto, T. 366
Matvalasen (see Sena I)
Māyā
—magical production 239
—°*devī*, mother of Buddhas 258
Mencius 116
Meter 35, 392
—Mandakrāntā, śikhariṇī, śārdūlavikrīḍitam, vasantatilakam, anuṣṭubh 384
—Śloka 8 ff.
—Triṣṭubh 8 ff.
—Vasantatilakā 203
Mīmāṃsaka 392
Mind 156
Ming
—Emperor 104
—°T'ai-tsu 118
—Times 119
Mirage
—of water 344
Mirror
—°like gnosis 244
—Tower of Maitreya 239
Mithras 373
Mithyā
—°*dṛṣṭi* 407, 408, 412
—false 344
—°*samādhi* 406
—°*samvṛti* level 344
Mitra, R. 204
Mjall, L. 275
Mokṣala
—translation of *Pañca* 268, 329
Monkey 156
Mother
—of Buddhas 160
—of *tathāgatas* 258
Mudiyanse, N. 361
Mudrā 180
Muhammad 402
Mūla
—*kleśāvāsana* 154
Mūlasarvāstivāda 363
Müller, Max 95, 103, 137, 166
Multi-*yāna* 316
Munimatālaṃkāra 284
Muslim 396, 401

Myōshinji 123
Mysteries, Greek/Egyptian 395
Mystery religions 398

Na dbon kun dga 'dpal 304
Nagao, G. 346
Nāgārjuna 325, 355
Nairātmya
—non-substantiality 296
Nairmānikīṛddhi 230
Nakamura, H. 126, 130, 198
Nālandā 109
Nāma
—*prajñapti* 154
—*mātra*, name-only 298
Namuci 372
Nanjio, B. 137, 313
Narasiṃha 372
Nātha see saviour
Nepalese version 24
Neya 348
Nichiren
—*shū* 124
Niḥtsvabhvāa
—*tā* 348
Niiza 123
Nikāya
—°*s* 16
—***Kevaṭṭasutta*** 221
—sects 361–62
Nilaya
—residence 299
Niraupaṃyastava 286
Nirmāṇa-kāya 140, 165, 179, 245–46
Nirodha 405
—cessation 319
Nirūkṣakarma 154
Nirukta
—hermeneutic etymology 291
Nirupadhiśeṣanirvāṇa 322
Nirusdhabhāgīya 289, 306
Nirvāṇa 314, 402
—all dharmas 225
—*bhūta-koṭi* 16
—°*buddhi*, awakening to Nirvāṇa
—*dhātu* 20
—extinction 91
—extinguishing fire 30
—final stage 10–11, 108
—*Parinirvāṇa* 139
—passed into 146
—related to *saṃskāras* 89
—sixfold 314
—*trikāya* 131
—with and without remaining conditions 322
Nirvedhabhāgīyas
—factors of penetration 293
—four 176, 292
Nirvikalpa
—*jñāna*, highest truth 345
Nirvṛti—20
Niṣpannayogāvali 384
Niśraya
—foundation 299
Nītārtha
—explicit and certain meaning 289
—ultimate 347
Nivaraṇa 159
Niyata
—determined 300
Nobel, J. 6, 90, 197
Nogami, S. 358

Obermiller, E. 203, 205
Ocean 242
Oedipus 379
Oṃ
—Brahman 334
Ontology 227
Oṣadhi
—plants 9
Padurek, C. 401
Palaces 240
Pāli
—canon 396
—literature 362
—sacred language 361
Pāṃśupradānāvadāna 94
Pañcagati 156, 159
Pañcaskandkaprakaraṇa 406

Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā
—notion of Buddhas and Bodhisattvas 266
—on copper plaques 365–66
—Tibetan 96
Pañjika
Pāpmā 374
Parable
—burning house 11
Parākramabāhu 366
Paramārtha 96, 297, 344–46
—°*satya* 346
Pāramitā
—penetrate true nature of dharmas 189–90
—Perfection 147, 151
—ten 157
Paranavitana, S. 266
Paratantra
—dependent 285
—*lakṣaṇa* 292
—°*svabhāva* 285, 341–42, 349–52
Parigraha
—grace 266
Parikalpa
Parikalpita
—imagined 349
—imaginarily constructed 285
—*lakṣaṇa*
—*rūpa*, imagined form
—*svabhāva* 285, 342, 349–52
Pariṇāma
—dedicated 268
Pāriṇāmikīṛddhi 230
Parīndanā
—entrustment 7
Pariniṣpanna
—°*lakṣana* 292
—Perfect 285
—*svabhāva* 285, 342, 349–52
Parivarta
—three 347
Paryarasthāna
Paryāya
—verbal equivalents 299
—mundane 344
Paryudāsa
—limitational negation 345
Paryupayoga
—surmounting 300
Pāsānda-anyatīrthika
—96 160
Path (see *mārga*)
stages of 307
Peking edition 302
Prabhākarī bhūmi 292
Prabhamitra 355
Prabhaṃkara bhūmi 156
Prabhūtaratna 338
Pradhan 115
Prajāpati 371
Prajñā 403, 405–08, 410, 412
—insight 140
—practice of 131
—discriminative knowledge 297
—pure p° 403, 408, 410
Prajñāpāramitā
—original 28
—perfection of insight 129
—Philosophy 285, 412
—she/he who arrives 152
—taking up 265
—texts 270, 341, 365,
—vehicle of power 125–26
Prajñāpāramitāpiṇḍārtha 285
Prajñāpāramitāratnaguṇasaṃcaya-gāthā 35, 203, 318
Prajñāpradīpa (***mūlamadhyamakavṛtti***) 187
Prajñapti
—designation 294
Prajñāviśesa 406
Prakṛti
—°*ṣṭhagotra* 286, 300
—°*prabhāsvara*, naturally luminous 292
—*viśuddha*, pure by nature 293
Pramāṇa
—means of knowledge 345
Prāmodyarāja 28
Pramuditā
—°*bhūmi* 156

—°*nayanajagadvirocanā* 231
Prāṇātipāta 156
Praṇidhāna 157
—resolve 315
—°*pāramitā* 158
Prāpti
—obtainment 410
Prasajyapratiṣedha—total negation 345
Prāsaṅgika 343
—Mādhyamikas 303
Praśāntarutasāgaravatī 232
Praśāstrasena 149
Prasphuṭapadā
—of Dharmamitra 284
Pratibhāsa
—reflections of appearance 231
Pratiniyataviṣaya
—°*dharmas* 406
Pratipakṣa
—counteragents 299
Pratipatti
—four p° 307
—practice 289
Pratisaṃkhyānirodha 405, 410
Pratiṣṭhā
—support 299
Pratītyasamutpāda 342
Pratívedhamārga 176
Pratividdha
—penetrate 253
Pratyavekṣaṇa
—°*jñāna* 159
—pure awareness 408
—°*mātram* 408
Pratyekabuddhas 157
—°*gotra* 294
—individualists 315
—middle size plants (*madhyamā oṣadhi*) 9
—rhinocerous 144
Pratyekayāna 136
Pratyutpannabuddhasaṃmukhāvasthitasamādhisūtra 336
Pravṛtti—°nimitta, cause of application 299
Prayoga mārga 157, 176, 189, 292
Pride
—9 types 115
Protestants 396, 399
Pudgala
—individual 292
—*nairātmya* 56, 315
—*śūnyatā* 412
Pūja
Puṇya 157
Pure Land 330
Pūrṇa 365
—called śrāvaka 9
Puruṣa 376
Pūrva
—°*mgama*, precursor 299
—°*yoga* 4
Pyramid Texts 381

Quïzïl 337

Raft 412
Rain of Dharma 245
Rājagṛha
Rāma 401
Rāmānuja 335
Rāmapāla 284
Raṅ bźin (see *prakṛti*)
Ra sa 'phrul snaṅ 358
Ratna
Ratnagotravibhāga 287
Ratnagunasamcayagāthā *see* ***Prajñāpāramitā°***
Ratnākaraśānti 152, 283
Ratnakīrti 383, 372–93
Ratnakūṭa 259, 365
Ṛddhi
—magic power 32, 229, 259
—marvelous power 222
—supernatural power 10
—thaumaturgic power 225, 228
—thaumaturgy 221, 231
Rebirth (see *ekajātipratibaddha* and *caramabhavika*)
—among gods 269
—evil rebirth 271, 278
—as a woman 279

Renou, L. 378
Ṛgveda 371
rgyu (see *hetu*)
rten (see *niśraya*)
rton-pa (see *upastambha*)
Robinson, Richard H. 339
Ruegg, D. Seyfort 337
Rūpa 154
—*śarīra* 234

Sa bon (see *bīja*)
Sadāprarudita 329–30, 332, 339–40
—"ever-weeping" 329
Saddharmapuṇḍarīkasūtra 4, 278
—bear in mind 338
—benevolent attitude toward *pratyeka* and *śrāvakayāna* 316
—***Lotus Sūtra*** 128–29
—metaphysical foundation 339
—Sadāparibhūta of S° 330, 333
—same as *Dharmadhātu* 365
Sādhumā bhūmi 157
Sāgalika (see Jetavanavāsa)
Sakaki, R. 103, 114
Sakra 288
Sākyamuni 13
—wife 233
Samādapaya 273, 279
Samādhāna 160, 167
Samādhi 4, 32–33, 331, 339–40
—Bodhisattva's 240, 254
—108 s° 319
—place 124
—and *ṛddhi* 233
—3 s° 268, 273
Samādhirāja sūtra 225, 296 ff.
Samantabhadra
—Bodhisattva 291
—*caryā* 230
Samantamukhasamādhi 252
Samāpatti
—4 'equipoises' 141
Samāropa
—imputation 298
—superimposition (see apavāda)
Samatā 238
Samatajñāna 159, 179
Sambhāra
—equipment 236
—*mārga* 157, 175, 289
Sāṃbhogakāya 140, 165, 179, 245
Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra 150–51, 342
Saṃgha 18
Saṃketa
—mark 353
Sāṃkṛtyāyana, R. 358, 383
Sammoha—confusion 297
Saṃnāha
—equipment for attaining all-knowledge 249
Saṃprayukta hetu 359
Saṃprayukti
—*svābhava* 351
Saṃskāras
—conditionings 301
—motivation 138
Samudānīta
—developed 300
Saṃvṛti 344
—°*satya* 346
Samyak
—*dṛṣṭi* 156, 407–12
—°*sambuddha* 288
Samyuttanikāya 138
Saṅgharakṣa 332
Saṅghavarman 8
Sāṅkṛtyāyana, R. see Sāṃkṛtyāyana
Śāntarakṣita 286, 303
Śanta 158, 167
Santīraṇa 407, 410
Santīrika
—involving judgment 407
—°*prajñā* 407
Sapakṣa—positive case 345
Śāriputra 9, 21, 163, 163–64
Śarīra 253
Sārottamā
—(sāratamā?) 284
Sarvajñā
—°*tā* omniscience 392
—°*ḥ* omniscient being 383
Sarvajñāna

—all knowledge 249, 254, 256
Sarvajñasiddhiḥ 383
Sarvākārajñatā
—*abhisamaya* 295
Sarvanagararakṣāsaṃbhavatejaḥśrī 227
Sarvāstivādins 315
—or Vaibhāṣika 363
Śāsana
—teaching 9
Śāstravṛtti 284
Satō, T. 131
Sattvanirmāṇa 255
Sattvas 287
Sautrantika 363
Savior 276, 338
Schmidt 19, 373
Schmithausen, L. 311
Scorpion 380
Script
—Sinhalese 366
—Grantha 366
Seed 406
Self 384
Sena I
—King S° 365, 367
Seth—god of Evil 381
Shamanistic practices 125, 134
Shiio, B. 204
Shingon 124, 132, 135
Shinto 127
Shiraishi, S. 104, 114
Shōtoku
—***Hṛdayasūtra*** 125
Śikṣāsamuccaya 319
Śīla-pāramitā 158
Silakāla
—King S° 364
Silla 346
Singh, R. 392
Skandha
—five 154–55, 166–67, 169
Śloka
—verse 5
Smoke 290
Smṛti 336
Smṛtyupasthana
—four 167
Snake 202–03
sṅon du 'gro ba (see *pūrvaṃgama*)
Soma 371
Sopadhiśesanirvāṇa 322
Soteriology 283
Speijer, J.S. 137
Sphutārthā 284
Spider demon 379
Spiro, M. 401
Śrāvaka
—Auditors 293
—5 5
—°*gotra* 293
—compared to Bodhisattva 8, 28
—°*yāna* 136, 157, 318
—True disciple 9
—Traditional Buddhists 11
—ignorant 11
—as plants 10
—followers of old tradition 18
—course of 23
—conceited 29
—a Sarvāstivādin 314
Śreṇika
—the wanderer 30
Srī Lanka 361
Śrīmālādevīsiṃhanādasūtra 302, 317, 322
Ssu wai liu yao fa 337
Stäel-Holstein 93
Stcherbatsky, Th. 405
Sthāvara
—insentient 286
Sthīramati
—*subcommentary on* ***Sūtrālaṃkāra*** 144
Stricker, B.
Stūpa 288–89, 302, 338
Śubha 291
Subhūti 15, 95
Śuddhimatī 301
Sudhana 227 ff. 332
Sudurjayā bhūmi 157
Suffering 272

Sufism 399
Sugata 232
Sukha 156, 159
Sukhāvati 330, 336
—°***vyūhasūtra*** 331, 364
Sun 294
—nocturnal 373, 378
Śūnya (tā) 17
—°dharmas
—°*vāda* 20
—°*vādin* 317
—or Mādhyamika 363
Śūraṃgamasamādhi 320
Sūrya 373
Śuṣṇa
—daemon 378
Suvikrāntavikrāmi 223
—***paripṛcchā*** 187
Suzuki, D.T. 135, 236, 313, 398
Svabhāva
—nature 253
Svāhā 152
Svasaṃvedana
—self awareness 298
Svātantrika 343
—Mādhyamika school 283

Ta chih tu lun 119
Ta hsing-shan ssu
—Loyang 108
Taki, S. 204–05
T'ang dynasty 107, 346
—frontier 109
—6th emperor of 117
Tantra 121, 258, 365, 395
Tapassu (see Trapusaka)
Tāranātha 284, 304
Tarkajvala 349, 353–54
Tasmāt 137
Tathāgata hood 264, 276–77
Tathāgatagarbha 164, 283, 286–87, 296, 319
—Buddha nature 283
—first mention in *Prajñāpāramitā* 285
—spiritual potential 287
—°***sūtra*** 310
Tathatā 287
Tathyasaṃvṛti 344
Tattva
—°*jñāna*—knowledge of reality 286
—reality 181, 297
Tāyin —Bodhisattva 226
Textual corruption 112
Thakur, A. 383
Theism 340
Theravāda 405–09
—monks 361
Tīkṣṇakarma 154
Tombstones
—and ***Heart Sūtra*** 129
Tosaki, Hiromasa 187–88, 195–96
Trapusaka, the merchant 366
Trikāya 139
Trikāyastava 366
Triratna 402
Triṣṭubh
—verse 5, 8
Tri-svabhāva 341, 348
Triyāna 12, 286, 315, 321
tshul-khrims-rgyal-ba 358
Tsukamoto, Z. 118
Tucci, G. 85
Tun-huang 103, 108, 203, 209, 358
Tvaṣṭṛ 373

Ucchlaṅkhá
—arches of the feet 376
Upādhyāya 108, 121
Upaniṣad 397
—foundation 299
—meditation 335
Upāsanā
—contemplative technique 335
Upastambha
—base 299
Upāya 16, 28
—expedient 296
—(Jap) *Hōben* 128
—*Kauśalya* 313
—means 298

—° *pāramitā* 158
—skill in means 267–69, 274
Upāyana 320
Ur-*Prajñāpāramitā* 37
Uroborus 380–81
Ussankha 376
Utpāda
—22 293
—origination 319

Vaibhāṣika 403–10
Vaidehī
—Queen 330–31, 333, 340
Vaidya, P.L. 39, 95, 204–05
Vaipulya sūtras 9
Vairocana
—dharmadhātu 223
—° jñānagarbhakośa Gnosis of 256
—° *vyūhālaṃkāragarbhamahākūṭāgāra* 236
Vaiśāradya
—confident ability 255
Vajra 375
—° asana 160
—° ***cchedikā*** 83, 94–96
—° *dhātu* 251
—° pāṇi 137, 380
—° parvatas 365
—° ***vali*** 284
—° yāna 365
Vajropamasamādhi 292
Vala 371
Vallée-Poussin, de la 116, 322, 324
Vallika the merchant 365
Vaṃśa
—lineage 253
Vāsanā 157
Vasantatilakā meter 203
Vasanti 234
Vasubandhu 86, 91, 137, 140, 144, 405–08
Vega
—impelling force 256
Vetullavāda
—term for Mahāyāna 361
—suppression of 367
Vigrahavyāvartanī 301
Vijayarāma
—copper plaques 365
Vijñāna 153, 167, 169
Vijñānavādin 164–65, 315, 317, 343, 363
—Alikākāravāda branch 284
Vijñaptimātratā(siddhi) 165, 322
Vikalpa
—dichotomizing conceptualization 299
—° *pitarūpa*, discerned form 359
Vikurvaṇa
—manifestation 225, 234
Vikramaśilā 284
Vimalā bhūmi 156
Vimalakirti 127
—° ***nirdeśa*** 6
Vimalamitra 284
Vimokṣa, 261
—108 v° 319
—° dṛṣṭi 155
Vimuktisena
—two, (Ārya and Bhadanta) 283
Vinaya 362
Vineya
—ordinary disciples 176, 292
—beings to be trained 295
Vinitadeva 141, 150
Vipāka
—*avaraṇa* 158
Vipakṣa
—negative proof 345
—heterologous examples 307
Viparyāsa
—error 292
Viprayukta saṃskāras
Vīrya-pāramitā 158
Viṣaya 118, 156
—sphere of Buddha's gnosis 228, 256
—of Tathāgatas 252
Viśeṣa

—*mārga* 157
—13th *bhūmi* 292
—five superiorities 321
—*cintabrahmaparipṛcchā* 120
Viṣṇu 334, 371
Visuddhimagga 337
Vohārikatissa
—King V° 364, 367
Void
—*ākāśa* 119
Vow
—formula 271
—Bodhisattva V° 269
Vṛtra 371
Vṛttamālāstutiḥ 391
Vyākaraṇa 5, 23
Vyatireka
—lack of absence 307

Waldschmidt, E. 305
Water
—mirage of 344
Wayman, A. 317, 324–25, 337
Wayman, H. 324
Wei
—Northern W° 118
Wheels 375
Wikremasinghe, Dom M. de Zilva 364
Wisdom eye 232
Womb 251
Women
—Buddhahood 32
—Bodhisattva as 271
Wŏnch'uk 342–43, 346–47, 354
Worlds
—three 138

Yaksha
—Palace of 242
Yāma 270
Yamada, R. 103–04, 114
Yāna
—five 314
—as *gotra* 314
—new 15
—3 11
Yāska 372
Yaśomitra 405–07
Yoga
—treatise 337
—masters of Kashmir 337
Yogācāra 137, 341, 343, 345–46
—°***bhūmi*** 141–42, 151
—Madhyamaka 286
Yogic perception 383
Yogin 316
Yoginirṇaya prakarṇam 383
Yüan-ts'e (see Wŏnch'uk)
Yukta
—controlled 333
Yukti
—reason 345
Yuyama, A. 78, 204–05

Zaehner, R. 399
Zambasta see ***Book of Zambasta***
Zen 124, 129, 131, 136
—Sōtō 132
—Lin-chi, Huang-po's disciple 222
—masters 398
Zhalu Monastery 358
Zürcher, E. 336